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HOLDING WOMEN'S PSYCHES HOSTAGE: AN
INTERPRETIVE ANALOGY ON THE
THOMAS/HILL HEARINGS
PENELOPE E. BRYAN*
She sat before the TV alone-intently staring at the screen-a half
empty beer bottle clenched in one hand. Littered with the dirt of ne-
glect, the apartment reflected her distraction of the past few days. It was
Sunday evening and the Thomas/Hill hearings were coming to a close.
Gripped by a morbid fascination, Betty had watched the entire proceed-
ing. At times during the testimony-especially when the TV camera
moved from Anita Hill's solitary face to the wall of impassive white male
faces on the committee-Betty felt weak and short of breath. When Sen-
ators Hatch and Specter attacked Ms. Hill, Betty could not contain her
anxiety. She paced her small apartment asking the empty room why no
one defended Professor Hill, how this could happen to a respected pro-
fessional and, if it could happen to Ms. Hill, what it meant for Betty. She
felt the old familiar nausea again.
On the Sunday evening the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded
its investigation into Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations against
Clarence Thomas, Betty felt despondent and trapped. She was a forty-
five year old white woman who had spent most of her adult life living
with and caring for her aged parents. But they had died within the past
two years leaving Betty without companionship, marketable skills or re-
sources. She had turned to her relationship with her male friend for
comfort but Frank had proved psychologically and physically abusive.
After ending her relationship with Frank, Betty felt more isolated and
less confident than ever. In addition to Betty's social alienation, lack of
confidence, minimal employment skills and middle age, she was over-
weight. Recognizing her apparent limitations Betty felt fortunate to
have found employment at a plumbing supply store in the city.
She was not altogether fortunate however. In herjob Betty was sex-
ually harrassed. Upon her arrival in the mornings male employees char-
acteristically greeted her with comments like, "Well, Betty's here-now
the gang bang can begin." Throughout the day they openly and degrad-
ingly discussed her physical anatomy. A favorite was, "Hey, sweetie,
how can a guy get it in past all that fat?" At the day's end the four male
employees typically gathered in the central office where Betty worked.
They jostled her around, asked if she "had any" lately, suggested their
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver, College of Law, B.S. Rollins
College, 1978; J.D., University of Florida, 1981; M.A. (Sociology), University of Florida,
1989. A special thank you is due to my research assistant Laird Blue for his dedicated help
with this essay and to Professor James Winokur for his comments on an earlier draft.
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willingness to relieve her sexual frustrations and sometimes touched
parts of her body. Betty frequently left work sick to her stomach-
vomiting when she arrived at home.
Several times during the past year Betty had not been able to make
herself get out of bed and go to work. She stayed at home-her head
hidden beneath her pillow-escaping from life in sleep. Her employer
complained of her absences. Fearful of provoking worse behavior from
male employees and of losing her job, Betty said nothing of the harass-
ment and promised to be more regular. A customer who overheard
some of the sexually explicit comments directed at Betty expressed his
outrage to her. The customer's validation finally gave Betty the courage
to complain. Her employer responded by telling her that if she wanted
any job working with "the guys" she would have to become more thick-
skinned. As she had feared, when the male employees heard of Betty's
complaint, their harassment intensified and they urged the employer to
fire Betty. A week later he did.
When Betty filed for unemployment benefits her employer ob-
jected. He said he fired her because of excessive absences and she
therefore was not entitled to unemployment benefits. When Betty went
to see a legal aid lawyer he told her the employer was right. The lawyer
did not ask the reason for Betty's absences and she was too embarrassed
to tell a male attorney how she had been treated.
The hearing on Betty's right to unemployment benefits was sched-
uled for the Wednesday after the Sunday conclusion of the Thomas/Hill
hearings. Before watching the hearings Betty had worked hard to over-
come her embarrassment and had planned to tell the hearing officer the
reason she had missed work, hoping he would understand. Instead,
when the Thomas/Hill hearings ended, Betty turned off her television,
deliberately took an overdose of sleeping pills, and died.
Too dramatic, too sensational, the reader may think. Yet it hap-
penedl-and my struggle to comprehend Betty's death and its larger
meaning motivated me to write this essay. Hoping to find some clue, I
began my search for understanding by listening to other women's re-
sponses to the hearings. Some women were angry with the SenateJudi-
ciary Committee, the Senate and the Bush Administration for their
insensitive and one-sided treatment of the parties and the issues. Over
time some of these women remained angry, while the anger of others
seemed to dissipate, replaced by a quiet withdrawal. Another group of
women angrily insisted that Anita Hill had lied and had gotten what she
deserved during the hearings. No man in Thomas's position, they in-
sisted, would behave the way Professor Hill said Thomas behaved. They
further expressed their horror at what Professor Hill had done to
Thomas and his family. Other women emphatically insisted that even if
Thomas had sexually harrassed Anita Hill she should have complained,
1. I have, of course, deliberately altered some facts of Betty's story to preserve her
privacy and dignity. I have not, however, altered the essence of her personal struggle nor
the reality of her reaction to the Thomas/Hill hearings.
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quit her job or not followed Thomas to the EEOC. At the very least,
since she had not come forward earlier, Professor Hill should have re-
mained silent. My monitoring of women's diverse reactions thus initially
did little to increase my understanding of Betty's behavior.
Yet as I puzzled over this diversity and sorted through my own reac-
tions to the hearings I began to think that many of these different reac-
tions, including Betty's, might have the same etiology. In this essay I
argue that the unanticipated trauma women felt in the wake of the hear-
ings explains many of their diverse responses. In developing this theme
I analogize the trauma induced in women by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's treatment of Anita Hill to the trauma experienced by prisoners
of war (POWs) at the hands of their captors. I then explore how many
women's reactions to the hearings are similar to POWs responses to
their captivity. Throughout, I discuss the negative implications for the
women's movement of these reactions.2 I conclude with some prelimi-
nary thoughts on how to minimize the damage.
Before beginning I want to acknowledge that the perspective
presented in this essay supports the negative side of the debate over the
hearings' effect on the women's movement. While I recognize that the
SenateJudiciary Committee's treatment of Anita Hill and insensitivity to
women's concerns spurred some women to greater activism, I present
this negative view because I am concerned that some members of the
women's movement have persuaded themselves that the effects of the
hearings mainly are positive.3 While underestimating the damage done
by the hearings may enable some to preserve their morale and continue
working, it nevertheless diminishes the movement's ability to confront
and dispel the disillusionment and hostility of many women who reacted
differently. With the hope of contributing to the movement's ability to
represent and integrate all women, this essay confronts the darker side
of the hearings reflected in inany women's responses.
I. WOMEN AS PRISONERS OF WAR
POWs experience devastating trauma that precipitates emotional
and behavioral reactions bearing a striking resemblance to some wo-
men's reactions to the hearings. Thus, to develop the analogy between
war prisoners' reactions to captivity and women's responses to the hear-
ings it is necessary to first explore the similarities between the trauma
suffered by POWs and the trauma inflicted upon women by the Senate
Judiciary Committee during the hearings. Certainly most women never
experience the physical and psychological torture and the extreme dep-
rivation of necessities like food, shelter, and medical attention that cap-
2. For purposes of this essay I perceive the women's movement as comprised of indi-
viduals who openly call themselves feminists and actively engage in promoting women's
equality to men in the family and throughout society.
3. Leaders in the women's movement talk of detecting an increase in women's activ-
ism as a result of the hearings, yet rarely or fleetingly mention women's disillusionment.
E.g., Nina Burleigh, Now That It's Over: Winners and Losers in the Confirmation Process, 78
A.B.A.J. 50, 53 (1992).
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tors commonly inflict upon POWs. 4 Yet many women in this society do
experience physical abuse, psychological terror,5 and the deprivation of
food, shelter and medical care that attends their ever-increasing poverty.
For these women this essay's analogy draws tightly.
Acknowledging the above distinction does not negate other un-
canny similarities between the causes of war captivity stress and the
causes of women's trauma during the hearings. 6 This section thus ex-
plores these common causes: unexpected immersion in a hostile envi-
4. For instance, Korean Conflict POWs experienced sudden subjugation, arbitrary
killings, forced marches, frequent relocations, extreme and continuous nutritional depri-
vation, death threats, physical torture, solitary confinement, disease with limited medical
attention and mass indoctrination. Patricia B. Sutker et al., Assessment of Longterm
Psychosocial Sequelae Among POW Survivors of the Korean Conflict, 54 J. PERSONALITY ASSESS-
MENT 170, 171 (1990). See also Bruno Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme
Situations, 38 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (1943)(describing experiences of Nazi
concentration camp prisoners).
5. I. Lisa McCann et al., Trauma and Victimization: A Model of PsychologicalAdaptation, 16
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 531, 533-34 (1988). As McCann et al. note, assuming the cur-
rent rape rate does not change, a 46 percent likelihood exists that an American woman will
experience attempted or completed rape in her lifetime. Approximately one-third of all
women experience sexual abuse in childhood and projected statistics suggest that up to
1.8 million wives suffer physical abuse each year. Consequently, while many women's lives
do not capture the full range or intensity of the abuse endured by POWs, parallel exper-
iences do exist for many women.
6. I confess I have chosen in this essay to develop the more dramatic of two possible
analogies: prisoner of war or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). I have done so to
maximize the power of imaging. Moreover, PTSD explains reactions to traumatic events
that have ended. I chose the POW reaction to captivity to explain women's reactions to
the Thomas/Hill hearings because, while traumatizing in themselves, I think the hearings
made clear the continued captivity, rather than the repatriation, of women. For those who
find my textual analogy stretches too far however I offer this footnote.
Rather than use POWs' reactions to their captivity experience to explain women's
diverse responses to the hearing, I easily could have employed PTSD. TheAmerican Psychi-
atric Association's 1980 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III) describes
PTSD as a group of symptoms that occur in response to an unusual traumatic event that
would normally cause significant distress. McCann et al., supra note 5, at 536. The DSM-
III's list of specific symptoms however has evoked criticism as too restrictive because they
focus more on reexperiencing the trauma rather than denial. Id at 531.
Moreover while interest in understanding the behaviors of repatriated POW originally
encouraged research on and official recognition of PTSD, the disorder is now acknowl-
edged as a common response to a large variety of life stressors: observation of another
person experiencing a seriously threatening event, Philip A. Saigh, The Development of Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder Following Four Different Types of Traumatization, .29 BEHAV. RES. THER-
APY 213, 213 (1991); death of a loved one, John P. Wilson et al., A Comparative Analysis of
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome Among Individuals Exposed to Different Stressor Events, 1J. Soc. &
Soc. WELFARE 793, 793 (1984); personal injury, J. Krupnick & M. Horowitz, Stress Response
Syndromes: Recurrent Themes, 38 ARcHIvs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 428 (1981); rape, Frances K.
Marton, Defenses: Invincible and Vincible, 16 CLINICAL SOC. WORKJ. 143 (1988); Edna B. Foa
et al., Processing of Threat-Related Information in Rape Victims, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 156
(1991); divorce, Wilson et al., supra, at 808; a natural disaster, Peter Steinglass & Ellen
Gerrity, Natural Disasters and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: Short-Term versus Longterm Recovery
in Two Disaster-Affected Communities, 20J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1746 (1990); work-related
injuries, Billie Zeller Lawson, Work-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Reactions: The Hidden Dimen-
sion, 12 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 250 (1987); wife battering, e.g., Mary Romero, A Comparison
Between Strategies Used on Prisoners of War and Battered Wives, 13 SEx ROLES 537 (1985); and
war captivity, John F. Russell, The Captivity Experience and Its Psychological Consequences, 14
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 250, 251 (1984); Robert Joseph Ursano & James Ray Rundel, The
Prisoner of War, 155 MIL. MED. 176 (1990). In essence, an individual may experience PTSD
as a result of any traumatic incident that erodes her faith in the world's safety and in her
own invulnerability. Lawson, supra, at 252. PTSD also seems a more likely response when
[Vol. 69:2
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ronment, unanticipated loss of status and support systems, and
indoctrination.
A. Experiences Common to POWs and Women
1. Unexpected Immersion in a Hostile Environment
One of the first and most intense stressors encountered by POWs is
the destruction of their innate sense of invulnerability that occurs when
they unexpectedly confront a hostile environment. 7 Understanding how
the hearings similarly encouraged women to confront their previously
unacknowledged vulnerability requires deciphering the surprisingly hos-
tile messages broadcast to women by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
the Senate and the Bush Administration.
During the hearings, Betty and other women throughout the United
States watched as Republican committeemen attacked Anita Hill and
Democratic committeemen failed to defend her.8 Moreover during the
proceedings women heard that the Bush Administration and the Repub-
lican party had mobilized their considerable resources to uncover
the traumatized person suffers injury or betrayal by other human beings, especially those
she trusted. Id
The symptoms of PTSD closely parallel the POWs' reactions to their captivity the
essay discusses-loss of self (destruction of one's sense of invulnerability and loss of sta-
tus), e.g., Wilson et al., supra, at 796 (depending on one's psychosocial development, a
stressor event can precipitate identity diffusion); Marton, supra, at 145-46, 151 (loss of
sense of invulnerability can result in a traumatic neurosis); shock, e.g., id., at 146 (panic can
result when the ego is overwhelmed by a threatening danger); denial (avoidance), e.g., Foa
et al., supra (providing a cognitive explanation of denial); Marton, supra, at 144, 152; Stein-
glass & Gerrity, supra, at 1752-53, Wilson et al., supra, at 799; apathy (passive compliance),
e.g., Marton, supra, at 151 (noting the sense of hopelessness that develops in a rape victim
who can no longer count on protecting hersel); Zahava Solomon et al., Negative Life Events,
Coping Responses, and Combat-Related Psychopathology: A Prospective Study, 97 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 302, 306 (1988)(the higher the level of PTSD in POWs the less likely they would
engage in active problem solving behavior); Wilson et al., supra, at 798-99 (helplessness
develops when one experiences a loss of control); displaced anger, Solomon et al., supra, at
312 (suggesting that veterans with PTSD express anger and hostility towards others in
order to avoid accepting personal responsibility for their postwar maladjustment); identi-
fication with those causing the trauma (identification with captors), Susan Lee Painter &
Don Dutton, Patterns of Emotional Bonding in Battered Women: Traumatic Bonding, IN'LJ. WO-
MEN'S STUD. 363, 364-65 (1985) (comparing the bonding of captives with their captors to
the bonding of battered women with their batterers); self-destructive behaviors, Marton,
supra, at 145 (rape victims may blame themselves); id. at 152-53 (rape victims sometimes
turn their rageful impulses against themselves); Zahava Solomon et al., supra, at 306 (the
more severe the PTSD the greater the number of negative life events the victim exper-
iences); and resistance (no symptoms of PTSD), Steinglass & Gerrity, supra, at 1759 (ap-
proximately only 15 to 20 percent of studied victims of natural disaster exhibited PTSD
four months after the disaster). The finding that women experience PTSD more fre-
quently than men, id at 1760-61, also has relevance in this essay.
7. E.g., Robert S. Andersen, Operation Homecoming: Psychological Observations of Repatri-
ated Vietnam Prisoners of War, 38 PsycnxARY 65, 65-66 (1975); Richard H. Rahe & Ellen
Genender, Adaptation to and Recovery from Captivity Stress, 148 MIL. MED. 577, 577-78 (1983).
8. F. Lee Bailey notes the vicious ineptness of Republican Senators Hatch and Spec-
ter and the passive incompetence of the Democratic Senators Biden, Heflin and Leahy. F.
Lee Bailey, Where Was the Crucible? The Cross-Examination that Wasn't, 78 A.B.A.J. 46 (1992).
The cross-examination by Republicans Specter and Hatch ultimately was as poor as the
cross-examination by Democrats Biden, Heflin and Leahy in terms of discovering what
happened between Hill and Thomas. Yet the Republicans' ineptness did not erase the
messages sent by the Republicans' viciousness toward women and the Democrats' unwill-
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whatever compromising information they could about Ms. Hill. 9
MESSAGE: Speaking against a (powerful) male provokes mobili-
zation of male power against you-and you will face the attack
alone.
Although the purported purpose of the hearings was to investigate
the truthfulness of Anita Hill's allegations against Clarence Thomas, wo-
men witnessed the vicious distortion of Anita Hill's testimony by Sena-
tors concerned more with achieving their political objective than with
discovering the truth.10
ingness to defend. The tele-electronic images of attack and defenselessness remain indeli-
bly etched on women's psyches.
I do not mean to imply that Anita Hill was totally defenseless. For many who watched
the hearings her quiet dignity and strength of character were her ultimate defenses against
the SenateJudiciary Committee's disgraceful behavior. As one commentator noted, "[b]ut
Anita Hill also won: She maintained her dignity in the face of unimaginable pressure. The
Republican smears were too ridiculous to affect her daily life or reputation."Joe Klein,Joe
Klein on the Clarence Thomas Follies: Tabloid Government, NEw YORKER, Oct. 28, 1991, at 29, 31.
While Professor Hill admirably defended herself, she had to withstand the Republican
assault alone. In contrast Thomas received the Democrats' respectful deference and the
Republicans' vehement support. Many victimized women lacking Anita Hill's strength and
impeccable character would not fare as well against such odds, as the William Kennedy
Smith rape trial graphically illustrated.
9. Before the hearings began The New York Times noted, "[the White House, for its
part, is hunkered down, preparing to make a heavy assault against Professor Hill." Mau-
reen Dowd, The Thomas Nomination; Facing Issue of Harassment, Washington Slings the Mud, N.Y.
TMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at Al. Despite the employment of such resources the Republican
party and the Bush administration produced no credible evidence negatively implicating
Anita Hill's character or stability. See infra note 26 discussing the Republican's ineffective
attempt to prove Anita Hill's allegations resulted from her sexual fantasy about Thomas.
Thomas proponents also claim his character suffered unfair attack during the entire
confirmation process by what President Bush affectionately called "special interest"
groups. Burleigh, supra note 3, at 52. Whether or not one agrees with this perspective, the
televised image of massive power mobilized against a solitary woman remains the same.
10. The most noteworthy example of this was Senator Specter's accusation that Pro-
fessor Hill had committed perjury. As well stated by F. Lee Bailey:
Specter sanctimoniously declared that Hill was a perjurer, calling upon his not
very illustrious experience as a prosecutor to make that judgment. Had he had
the temerity to hurl that accusation in Hill's face, she might have used what
Thomas termed her 'willingness to fight' to destroy the senator witha phrase
used by Boston lawyerJoe Welch in the demise of Sen. Joe McCarthy: 'Have you
no decency?' Had Specter made that gratuitous declaration anywhere but in the
protective cocoon of a Senate chamber, many a lawyer would have offered to take
up the cudgel for Hill and fry his rump in a jury skillet.
No lawyer reading the record of these proceedings would even consider, on
any objective basis, that a case of perjury could be made against Hill without
some much more compelling evidence.
Bailey, supra note 8, at 48-49.
The Democrats as well had their objectives. Meaningfully exploring the propriety of
Clarence Thomas's confirmation took a backseat to overcoming their embarrassment at
initially having trivialized Anita Hill's allegations and to defending their staffs from Repub-
lican allegations of violation of the Senate rules of confidentiality. See Dowd, supra note 9
(suggesting the public's mystification at the Senate's greater focus on defending its rules
than on defending either Thomas or Hill).
The current controversy regarding the "leak" and the race to find the culprit seems
equally misdirected. Rather than search its soul and ask why it initially found Anita Hill's
allegations insufficiently important to warrant in-depth review, why it failed to understand
how those allegations spoke to Thomas's capacity to serve as a Supreme CourtJustice, why
Senators from both parties behaved so poorly during the hearings, how it violated wo-
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MESSAGE: The very people given the responsibility to deter-
mine the truthfulness of your'story against a man inevitably will
distort your expression-your reality remains unacknowledged
and unknown.
Our society's laws and rhetoric imply that men cannot treat women
with whom they work in a sexually degrading and dehumanizing fashion.
Thus when a woman complains of such behavior her concerns at least
should be taken seriously. Yet the Senate Judiciary Committee trivial-
ized Anita Hill's concerns by initially refusing to investigate thoroughly
her allegations. The President of the United States followed suit by de-
daring his unwavering support for Clarence Thomas before even hear-
ing Anita Hill's story.11
MESSAGE: You are not the first class citizen you thought you
were-your legal rights are subject to male whim.
Contrary to what would be allowed in a formal trial of a sexual har-
assment claim, women watched as Senate Judiciary committeemen used
factually unsupported inuendo and unchallenged biased nonexpert tes-
timony12 to impugn Professor Hill's character. Testimony that Clarence
men's faith, and ultimately whether it erred in confirming Clarence Thomas to the
Supreme Court, the Senate instead diverts attention to procedural issues-hoping to en-
courage the public to ignore its substantive indiscretions. Moreover it seems curious that
no one has suggested the staffer who leaked the information might have engaged in time-
honored civil disobedience, rather than an easily discredited breach of the rules. Certainly
information vital to an individual's capacity to serve as a Justice on the United States
Supreme Court demands careful consideration. Perhaps social conscience rather than
political expediency motivated the leak.
11. Before the Thomas/Hill hearings began, President Bush strongly supported his
nominee: "I support him 100 percent, no fear of contradiction. I am strongly for him."
Adam Clymer, The Thomas Nomination: Conflict Emerges Over A 2nd Witness, N.Y. TMES, Oct.
11, 1991, at Al. Even former EEOC press secretary Angela Wright's statement that cor-
roborated Anita Hill's allegations did not influence President Bush's support for Thomas.
As The Washington Post noted just before the hearings began: "Judy Smith, a deputy
White House press secretary, said last night that Wright's allegations have not caused the
White House any second thoughts about Thomas: 'Absolutely not. Judge Thomas had
and has our full support. At the end of this process, he will be confirmed.'" Ruth Marcus
& Ann Devroy, 2nd Woman Tells Committee of Incidents With Thomas, WASH. PosT, Oct. 11,
1991, at Al.
Some speculated that Thomas's personal White House connections encouraged Presi-
dent Bush to ignore*Anita Hill's allegations even before they became public. Ann Devroy,
White House Pins Hopes on Pledged Senate Votes: Benefit of Doubt is Sought for Thomas, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al. An alternative explanation however suggests the White House
and Republican Senators simply exhibited an incredible insensitivity to women's issues
and miscalculated their resulting political vulnerability. See Dowd, supra note 9 (political
operatives indicated surprise at the White House and Republican Congressmen's tin-
awareness of their political vulnerability because of women's anger).
12. For instance FED. R. EvID. 701 sets out the criteria for admission of opinion testi-
mony by a lay witness. The rule requires opinions or inferences of a lay person to be
rationally based on the witness's perceptions. During the hearings Thomas's women wit-
nesses speculated, largely without challenge, that Professor Hill was: (1) a spurned lover;
(2) a victim of fantasy; (3) a schizophrenic and (4) a liar, while simultaneously admitting
that they never had heard Professor Hill speak of Thomas in anything but an admiring
professional manner, that she had never shown signs of fantasy or any type of mental
instability, and that she never had behaved in any unethical manner. Because their opin-
19921
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Thomas had not sexually harrassed other female coworkers, inadmissi-
ble at trial,13 was introduced. Women also were left wondering what
happened to relevant and admissible evidence against Thomas: the co-
worker who claimed Clarence Thomas had expressed himself in sexually
inappropriate manners to her14 and Thomas's Yale Law School class-
ions lacked a perceptual base, Rule 701 would find them inadmissible. The United States
Supreme Court reflects this consideration in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-
68 (1986), where it recognizes the potential admissibility of fantasy evidence if the plaintiff
has verbally expressed the fantasies.
Another of Thomas's witnesses, Mr. Doggett, testified on the basis of minimal contact
with Ms. Hill that she had sexual fantasies about his interest in her. Instinctively recogniz-
ing the lack of rational connection between Mr. Doggett's perceptions and the require-
ments of Rule 701, Senator Biden could not contain himself, labeling Mr. Doggett's
conclusions preposterous. See infra note 26 for more detailed discussion of the exchange
between Senator Biden and Mr. Doggett.
The admissibility of the foregoing testimony also can be challenged under Rule 702
that requires qualification of the witness as an expert before she can comment on situa-
tions requiring specialized knowledge, such as delusional fantasies or schizophrenia.
13. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) precludes admission of prior bad acts to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity with the prior bad act. Likewise, Rule
404(b) prevents the admission of prior good acts to prove the character of a person and
suggest conformity with the prior good acts in the present situation. To reason otherwise
would allow a defendant accused of murder to attempt to prove he did not commit the
crime at issue by having witnesses testify he had not killed them. Moreover Rule 404(a)
generally bars character evidence offered to prove action in conformity with one's charac-
ter on a particular occasion. Consequently the testimony of Thomas's women coworkers
that Thomas had never sexually harassed them arguably lacked admissibility in the hear-
ings addressing Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment. But see infra note 14 sug-
gesting that Rule 404(b)'s exceptions to the inadmissibility of character evidence based on
acts frequently provide creative counsel successful argument for admissibility.
14. The committee did enter into the record a transcript of an unsworn telephone
interview with Angela Wright. During that interview Ms. Wright indicated Thomas pres-
sured her to date him while she worked at the E.E.O.C. in 1984. Adam Clymer, The Thomas
Nomination; Parade of Witnesses Support Hill's Story, Thomas's Integrity, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 14,
1991, at Al. According to Ms. Wright, Thomas also commented on the size of her breasts
and arrived unannounced one evening at her apartment; Ruth Marcus, 4 Testify Hill Spoke
Years Ago of Harassment; Others Assert Her Picture of Thomas is False, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1991,
at Al. Ms. Wright decided to share her experiences with Thomas after watching Anita
Hill's initial press conference. She explained, "I knew I felt from my experience with Clar-
ence Thomas that he was quite capable of doing what she [Anita Hill] said." Clymer, supra.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) states that evidence of a prior bad act is inadmissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the prior bad act.
Thomas's alleged behavior with Angela Wright is a prior act similar in kind to his alleged
behavior with Anita Hill. Moreover, the alleged behavior with Angela Wright implicates
Thomas's character and suggests his propensity to engage in the actions of which Ms. Hill
accused him. Rule 404(b) thus seems to preclude Ms. Wright's testimony. However An-
gela Wright's testimony is not relevant solely to Thomas's character-it also tends to es-
tablish the existence of a hostile environment, a basis for a sexual harassment claim against
an employer. LindaJ. Krieger and Cindy Fox, Evidentiay Issues in Sexual Harassment Litiga-
tion, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 136-39 (1985). Rule 404(b) should not control its
admissibility. Unsurprisingly many court decisions reflect the admissibility of such evi-
dence. E.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986); Henson v. City of Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 911-12 & n.25 (11 th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 &
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Furthermore if Rule 404(b) were found to control the admissibility of Ms. Wright's
testimony, the rule contains exceptions to the inadmissibility of character evidence. For
instance, if Angela Wright's testimony were offered to prove Thomas's intent to sexually
harass Anita Hill, the Rule should allow the testimony constrained only by Rule 403's
concern with undue prejudice, e.g., Kit Kinports, Symposium in Honor of Edward IV Cleary:
Evidence and Procedure for the Future: Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 440 n. 157.
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mate who acknowledged the nominee's long-standing appreciation of
pornographic movies. 15
MESSAGE: You cannot know how to play the game because men
create and alter the rules to advantage themselves- the play-
ing field is never level-you cannot win--do not try.'
6
As Professor Kinports notes, attorneys generally succeed in fitting character evidence into
one of Rule 404(b)'s exceptions and securing its admission. Id. at 426-27 & n.82 and 85.
Ms. Wright declined to label Thomas's behavior toward her sexual harassment.
Rather she labeled it annoying and obnoxious, describing herself as very strong-willed and
not easily intimidated. Clymer, supra. Irrespective of Ms. Wright's perception, however,
her testimony corroborates that of Anita Hill. Although the press later released Ms.
Wright's unsworn statements, women watching the hearings remained uninformed regard-
ing Ms. Wright's potential corroborating testimony.
Moreover, although Senator Biden suggested the Committee spared Angela Wright
the burden of testifying because of the late hour, Transcript of Senate Judiciay Committee Hear-
ing on the Supreme Court Nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas, Oct. 13, 1991 (Lexis)[hereinafter
Transcript] his explanation rings hollow because the threatening tone of the hearings in-
vites an interpretation of her absence more consistent with that tone. Without knowing
more, women could speculate that Angela Wright did not testify because she received
overt or covert threats. Women also could surmise that Ms. Wright's character or past
behavior could not withstand the unfair scrutiny to which Anita Hill's character and behav-
ior was subjected. See Clymer, supra (committee aides indicated Democrats were uncertain
of Ms. Wright's credibility); Marcus, supra (Thomas fired Ms. Wright allegedly for referring
to homosexuals as "faggots"). Both these conclusions-that Angela failed to appear be-
cause of threats or potential exposure to unfair ridicule-deepen the perception of threat
the hearings created in women.
15. The New York Times quoted Ms. Lovita Coleman, a former Yale Law School class-
mate and strong supporter of Thomas, as stating that during law school Clarence Thomas
had often patronized x-rated movie houses, and had more than once humorously de-
scribed an x-rated film to her and others. Lovita Coleman also said that neither she nor
the other students were offended by Thomas's amusing comments. Michael Wines, The
Thomas Nomination: Stark Conflict Marks Accounts Given by Thomas and Professor, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1991, at B14.
An exchange between Senator Leahy and Mr. Kothe, the former Dean of Oral Roberts
Law School, beautifully illustrates the relevance of this excluded information to the credi-
bility of Clarence Thomas:
SEN. LEAHY: And, Dean, you have testified the Clarence Thomas you knew
could not possibly have made the statements Anita Hill claims he made. And I
understand that you stated that very forcefully, sir. Do you believe that the Clar-
ence Thomas you knew could enjoy talking about pornographic movies? I mean,
that's one of the things that was alleged-Anita Hill alleged that he talked to her
about pornographic movies. Are you saying that the Clarence Thomas you knew
couldn't-wouldn't even enjoy talking about pornographic movies?
MR. KOTHE: I can't believe it. I can't believe that this man would even think in
terms of pornographic movies. All of my relationship with him was at such a high
level, talking about books of religion and philosophy and things that he was read-
ing. I can't imagine that this man would have any diversion in the area that you
described. I just simply can't.
Transcript, supra note 14, Oct. 13, 1991. Senator Leahy then informed Mr. Kothe of Ms.
Coleman's statement. Mr. Kothe admitted his surprise. Id.
16. At the beginning of the hearings Naomi Wolf noted that women's outrage sent the
Senate Judiciary Committee scrambling to appear concerned. She suggested that if the
committee also were to respond to Anita Hill's allegations with appropriate gravity, busi-
ness as usual could not continue. If the Senate were to demean the seriousness of Anita
Hill's charges, she argued, women would have been told that "20 years into the battle for a
level playing field, they can play the game the boys' way or go home." Naomi Wolf, Sex,
Lies and Silence: Feminism and Intimidation of the Job: Have the Hearings Liberated the Movement?,
WAsH. PosT, Oct. 13, 1991, at Cl. Because the Senate did not take the allegations seri-
ously enough even to conduct a balanced, fact-finding hearing, Ms. Wolf's negative pre-
monition seems correct. Women now know the playing field is not level and, because they
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Betty and women across the country watched other women give
painful and moving accounts of their own experiences of sexual harass-
ment. Women heard as women explained their continued sense of vul-
nerability and shame that kept them silent. 17 Afterwards they listened as
Senate Judiciary committeemen continued to express ignorance of and
insensitivity to the reality and psychological dynamics of sexual
harassment.
MESSAGE: The powerful males who sit in judgment of you do
not have and will resist acquiring sympathetic understanding of
your reality-for them your reality is fiction.
As the hearings drew to a close Senate Judiciary committeemen
took turns acknowledging the seriousness of sexual harassment and ex-
pressing their gratitude for the sensitization they had experienced. But
women then heard those same relieved committeemen fondly recall
their college years and their Playboy magazines. 18
unsuccessfully played the game the boys' way, they should go home and business as usual
can continue.
17. According to her testimony Anita Hill remained silent because, "I wanted to stay
in civil rights. I thought I had something to add." Other professionals like law professor
Emma ColemanJordan have advised, "keep silent or risk destroying the hard-won gains of
years of education and rigorous training." Anita Hill's silence then hardly seems unusual.
Naomi Wolf explains:
No woman should be judged for whatever decision leads her to keep silent. I've
been hearing variations of such silence across America. It extends far beyond the
tolerance of specific episodes of sexual harassment, and into many women's pub-
lic disavowal of attitudes that could be construed by their employers as feminist.
While traveling from state to state, to listen to audiences of ambitious, educated
middle-class women explore why they often don't identify with the women's
movement, I have begun to ask them about professional punishment for holding
feminist beliefs.
It is at this point that heads begin to nod in affirmation. IfI am interviewing women in
an office building, it is also at this point that I'm drawn behind closed doors. They tell me
their stories and ask not to be named. Wolf, supra note 16.
Susan Estrich, a law professor at the University of Southern California, stated that
women who brought sexual harassment claims based on a hostile environment usually did
so only if they quit the job or suffered dismissal. Karen DeWitt, The Thomas Nomination; The
Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at A28. Thus if continuing
relations seem important because they provide career recommendations, women seem dis-
inclined to raise sexual harassment issues.
In a 1987 survey of federal workers by the United States Merit Systems Protection
Board, 42%o of the female federal workers indicated they experienced sexual harassment,
whereas only 14%o of men reported sexual harassment. Only five percent of all sexually
harassed respondents however formally complained. Many believe women underreport
sexual harassment because of the stigmatization they experience upon complaint. Id.
18. In an attempt to minimize the importance of Clarence Thomas's appreciation of
pornographic movies during his law days, Senator Simpson stated the following:
[I] want to tell you, if we all started to trot out what we did in law school, that
ought to be a riot for the American public. I don't know what Clarence Thomas
did in law school, but I've got a hunch about it. And I believe Playboy came out
while I was in law school, and I remember reading it for its articles and its edito-
rial content. (Laughter)
Transcript, supra note 14, Oct. 13, 1991. Mr. Stewart, one of Clarence Thomas's witnesses,
did not appreciate Senator Simpson's humor and reminded the committee of the gravity of
its task. Id. After Mr. Stewart's plea the Committee returned to the business of examining
Mr. Doggett. However when given an opportunity to speak, Senator Hank Brown refused
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MESSAGE: These proceedings-in the end-have been only a
joke to these men-despite your expressed pain-nothing has
changed.
And, finally, at the conclusion of the hearings women heard com-
mitteemen call for a time of healing in the Senate.
MESSAGE: After our public display of sensitivity to women's
concerns we men shall close ranks-nothing can compromise
our male solidarity.
Cumulatively these messages transmit the image of a male domi-
nated society overtly hostile and covertly demeaning to women. More-
over they brutally expose women's vulnerability to male power. These
messages shocked me and left me feeling vulnerable in a way I have not
experienced since I was a young child chased by neighborhood bullies
whose hatred I neither expected nor understood. Then, as during the
hearings, I felt captive in a foreign culture-prisoner of a war I had not
fully known existed. In the face of all the advances many women
thought had been made during the past two decades, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee made certain women understand they exist subject to
their male captors' approval. Male tolerance of women, the messages
read, still demands women's good behavior-women's complicity, in es-
sence, in their own oppression. I believe many other women felt the
same traumatic vulnerability Betty and I did in response to the unex-
pected hostility toward women broadcasted throughout the hearings-a
trauma closely paralleling that inflicted upon POWs.
2. Unexpected Loss of Status
In addition to their abrupt confrontation with a hostile environ-
ment, war captives experience a dramatically traumatizing transforma-
tion of their status as person to that of object' 9 ultimately eroding the
longterm captive's independent and integrated personality.20 Analo-
gously, when the Senate Judiciary Committee treated Anita Hill and the
women testifying on her behalf as though their experiences did not oc-
cur or acknowledged the reality of their experiences while simultane-
ously denigrating its importance, it stripped women of identity and
to be outdone by Senator Simpson. Senator Brown concluded his brief questioning of Mr.
Doggett with:
Mr. Chairman, I want to yield back, but ifI could just make a note about the legal
research that Senator Simpson did in law school. We had a student in Colorado's
law school-I don't-it was not Yale, but it was Colorado-who did legal re-
search, I understand, with Playboy, because he took certain pictures out of Play-
boy and appended them to his answer in torts. In two or three places, he received
the highest grade in the class. I will yield back.
Id. The transcript indicates no additional laughter.
19. John F. Russell, The Captivity Experience and Its Psychological Consequences, 14 PSYCHI-
ATRIc ANNALS 250, 251 (1984). See also Robert Joseph Ursano &James Ray Rundell, The
Prisoner of War, 4 MIL. MED. 176 (1990).
20. Russell, supra note 19, at 251.
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dignity-transforming them, in essence, from individuals into objects. 2 1
Upon bombardment with the Committee's objectifying messages some
women who internally experienced themselves as persons waivered and
suffered a diminished sense of status.2 2 Others in this society listening
to such messages also might comprehend and ultimately treat women as
inferior.
Moreover, as Patricia Williams eloquently persuades, acknowledg-
ing legal rights for persons who have existed without them affirms the
individual's internal sense of identity.23 Women know they have a legal
right to bring sexual harassment claims. Yet the way the Senate Judici-
ary Committee conducted the hearings suggested that any such right
was a mere fiction. As noted earlier, inadmissible evidence was intro-
duced 24 and highly probative material was excluded.2 5 Witnesses with
no expert knowledge were allowed to make psychological diagnoses
even when no facts supported those diagnoses. 26 Senator Specter
21. Republican Senator Simpson exemplifies the inability or refusal of the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee to hear the women who testified for Anita Hill. He continued to ex-
press his disbelief that a woman would not complain if subjected to Clarence Thomas's
behaviors despite the testimony of women relating their own experiences of sexual harass-
ment and their subsequent failure to come forward. The sexist jokes made by Senators
Simpson and Brown at the end of the hearings provide yet another example of the Judici-
ary Committee's inability to comprehend the seriousness of the women's issues they alleg-
edly addressed. See Transcript, supra note 14, Oct. 13, 1991.
22. Many women with whom I spoke during and after the hearings talked of feeling an
identity loss as a result of the SenateJudiciary Committee treatment of Anita Hill. Because
the men on the committee so obviously viewed women differently from the way these wo-
men viewed themselves, the women found themselves compelled to adjust their view of
themselves as independent and powerful personalities-and as worthwhile persons. Some
talked of feeling insecure in their professional environments, wondering anew what the
men with whom they worked really thought of them. Others spoke of feeling more at the
mercy of the men for whom they worked, vowing to be more careful in the future of what
they said and did. As one female bartender I talked with stated, "Well, I have to say, I feel
more like a piece of meat than I did before." For women with little sense of their indepen-
dence and power the Thomas/Hill hearings would not have been traumatic-simply
reinforcing.
23. PatriciaJ. Williams, Akhemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
24. See supra note 12.
25. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The public was left wondering what
happened to the other women who allegedly were going to testify about other instances of
Thomas's inappropriate sexual behavior. Moreover, no one bothered to seek or introduce
evidence of Thomas's prior or current practice of renting and discussing pornographic
movies. This type of evidence had relevance to the credibility of both Anita Hill and Clar-
ence Thomas.
26. A notable example of this occurred when Senator Specter attempted to establish
Anita Hill's propensity for sexual fantasy through questioning Mr. Kothe and Mr. Doggett.
In response to Senator Specter, Mr. Kothe read into the record a statement he had made
on October 7, 1991. "I find the reference to the alleged sexual harassment not only unbe-
lievable but preposterous. I am convinced that such is a product of fantasy." In his by
then characteristically inept fashion, Senator Specter pursued Mr. Kothe who responded,
"And the second statement I made in October 10-I left that off-that was a-that wasn't
intended as words of art or scientific expression. It was just the instant reaction I had to
this-awful event." Refusing to give up, Senator Specter posed another question, "Well,
Professor Kothe, was there anything that you could point to in Professor Hill's conduct
that would lead you in a--either an evidentiary or a feeling way to that conclusion of fan-
tasy?" Mr. Kothe responded:
"No. I think perhaps my selection of words there was probably unfortunate. I've
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twisted Anita Hill's testimony in order to make groundless charges of
perjury against her.27 Questioning of the principal actors was ineffec-
tive and unbalanced.28 Senators grandstanded rather than probed for
the facts. In essence the substantive issue-whether Clarence Thomas
sexually harrassed Anita Hill-remained buried beneath a procedural
trashheap, sending women the message that their legal rights and the
portion of their identity reinforced by those rights remain ephemeral-
not real.
To the extent women internalized these messages or realized that
powerful actors in society see them as objects rather than individuals,
the hearings did much to transform the status of women from person to
object. Women's experience of the hearings thus again parallels that of
POWs.
3. Loss of Important Support Systems
From the time of capture, POWs lose the social, physical and envi-
ronmental supports upon which they previously relied. 29 Moreover
POWs from Western countries usually expect law to protect their legal
rights. When confronted in captivity with a system that fails to respect
their personal freedoms they sometimes react with utter disbelief and
disillusionment. 30 Similarly, from the time of the hearings women had
to acknowledge that many of the societal supports upon which they
counted did not exist. Men they had helped elect to an allegedly demo-
cratic Senate proved insensitive to their concerns. The hearings them-
selves failed to provide procedural justice.3 1 And, ultimately, a highly
never seen Anita Hill in a situation where she wasn't a decent person, a dignified
person, a jovial person. I've never seen her in a situation where actually you
would say she was fantasizing in that sense. I almost regret that I had used that in
my first reaction."
Transcript, supra note 14, Oct. 13, 1991.
Giving up on Mr. Kothe, Senator Specter then unleashed his prosecutorial talents on
Mr. Doggett. With Senator Specter's assistance Mr. Doggett established that he thought
Anita Hill had difficulty dealing with men who rejected her, id., because at a going away
party for Ms. Hill she had approached him and stated she was disappointed in him for
leading women on and letting them down. Id. Based on this contact, a chance meeting
while he was out jogging, and a dinner date that fell through Mr. Doggett concluded Ms.
Hill fantasized about his sexual interest in her. Id. In one of his rare moments of leader-
ship, Senator Biden forcefully indicated he found Mr. Doggett's conclusions preposterous.
In his examination of Mr. Doggett, Senator Biden established that no other communica-
tion whatsoever had occurred between Anita Hill and Mr. Doggett, that Mr. Doggett had
no background in psychology, that Mr. Doggett knew of no other instance that would
suggest Ms. Hill's propensity for fantasy, and that Ms. Hill had not raised her voice at the
party when she allegedly claimed disappointment with Mr. Doggett. Id. Senator Biden
ended his examination by stating he felt Mr. Doggett's conclusions about Anita Hill were
"a true leap in faith or ego, one of the two." Id. In apparent agreement with Senator
Biden, the audience laughed. Unfortunately Senator Simpson accused Senator Biden of
playing to the audience and Senator Biden retreated. Id. See supra note 12.
27. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
29. Russell, supra note 19, at 251.
30. Rahe & Genender, supra note 7, at 578.
31. Senator Biden announced at their beginning that the hearings were not formal
judicial proceedings. Transcript, supra note 14, Oct. 11, 1991. Yet many individuals lack
the sophistication to determine how the hearings differed from court proceedings. Re-
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suspect male was made a Justice on the nation's highest court,3 2 sug-
gesting a severe compromise of substantive as well as procedural justice.
Many women, similar to POWs, sat in disbelief and shock as a system
gardless of the forum, citizens of the United States expect any dispute resolution proce-
dure to approximate procedural due process-a fair opportunity for both sides to present
their case. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice as a
Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 296 (1986); P. Christo-
pher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Participation in Task Selection: The Role of
Control in MediatingJusticeJudgments, 52J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1148 (1987); Kwok
Leung & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Culture: Effects of Culture, Gender, and Investigator
Status on Procedural Preferences, 50J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PsYCHOL. 1134 (1986). The Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee hearings violated that expectation, particularly for women.
32. The Thomas/Hill hearing pit the credibility of Professor Hill directly against that
of Clarence Thomas: most agree one of them lied. Thomas's credibility seems highly sus-
pect because he had obvious reasons to lie: (1) potential confirmation to the United States
Supreme Court; (2) preservation of his professional reputation in order to continue serv-
ing as a federal appellate judge in the event the confirmation failed; (3) preservation of his
marriage. Barbara Vobejda, Who's Telling the Truth? Experts Say Answer May Never Be Known,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at A30 (in a courtroom Thomas would have faced questions
about his motivation to lie because of the danger to his career, reputation, and relation-
ships if Hill's allegations proved true); and (4) knowledge that his lying would go unde-
tected because witnesses to his behavior did not exist. In contrast Professor Hill had
nothing to gain and much to lose by coming forward and/or lying: (1) public ridicule; (2)
diminished professional stature and opportunity; (3) loss of privacy; and (4) employment.
Moreover, Thomas seems far more prone to sexual fantasies than Professor Hill. Psy-
chologists who work with divorcing people recognize that sexual behaviors intensify
among separated people, e.g., JUDrrH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING
THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wrTH DIVORCE 32-33 (1980);Joy K. RICE
& DAVID G. RICE, LIVING THROUGH DIVORCE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO DIVORCE
THERAPY 121-126 (1986). Some of Thomas's alleged harrassing behavior took place dur-
ing his separation from his wife.
Thomas also put his credibility into question during the initial confirmation proceed-
ings by stating that he had never discussed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with any-
one, Executive Session: Nomination of Clarence Thomas, of Georgia, to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 137 CONG. REC. S14451 at 14459-an impossibility for any
person actively engaged in the legal profession. Klein notes," . . the only memorable
statement to emerge from the first Thomas hearings was the judge's incredible denial that
he'd ever "debated" the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision. 'I'd guess he wasn't
quite telling the truth there,' Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey would later deadpan, 'which
raised some questions in my mind about his character.'" Klein, supra note 8, at 29.
Finally, Thomas showed himself subject to delusion by labeling the hearings a racial
lynching. In so doing he ignored the "reality" that he himself requested the hearing, that
committee members strongly advocated for him, that the Bush Administration steadfastly
supported him, and that the woman accusing him of sexual harassment was also an Afri-
can-American.
Thomas correctly perceived his confirmation as racially discriminatory-but not in the
way he meant. Rather the Bush Administration and the United States Senate discrimi-
nated against African-Americans by appointing a black man to the United States Supreme
Court whose moral character, independence from the administration, and intellect re-
mains suspect to many Americans. Th racist message implicit in Thomas's appointment
is that a black of questionable morality and intellect is the best we can find for a United
States Supreme Court Justice. Surely in this country fine African-American judges exist
who command the respect of all and whose appointment to the Supreme Court would
enhance rather than diminish the status of Africans-Americans. In his open letter to Clar-
ence Thomas, Judge Higginbotham eloquently expresses the agony felt by some African-
Americans in the wake of the Thomas appointment. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open
Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas From a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005
(1992). See also Tom Shales, At The Senate Hearings, More of the Mortifying Spectacle, WASH.
POST, Oct. 14, 1991, at D1 (Roger Wilkins, a longtime civil rights activist and history pro-
fessor, expressed his anger at Thomas's use of the term "lynching").
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they had counted on to operate representatively and fairly evaporated
before their eyes.3 3 Because the system that failed was their own rather
than a foreign country's, one legitimately can speculate that their disillu-
sionment proved extreme.
3 4
Moreover many women had come to expect some degree of under-
standing from men on women's issues. Fellow travelers-be they men
or women-could be counted on for empathy and support. Yet the very
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee who claimed their dedica-
tion to liberal or women's issues in the end proved ineffective champi-
ons.3 5 The passiveness of these allegedly supportive males in- the face of
Republican attack made male support generally suspect.3 6 Thus the
hearings strongly suggested to women the support systems they had
counted on did not exist and, like POWs, these women experienced the
stress associated with that loss.
3 7
4. Indoctrination
POWs frequently find themselves punished by their captors for
maintaining their own country's social and cultural values. Simultane-
33. See Wolf, supra note 16. (noting that the Thomas/Hill hearings illustrated the
political system's failure to work for women). See also Tom Shanes, At The Senate Hearings,
More of the Morting Spectacle, WASH. PosT, at DI, Oct. 14, 1991 (suggesting that a combi-
nation of ineptness and fear of being labeled racist disabled the Democrats and labeling
the Senate's initial bungling response to Anita Hill's allegation as as a betrayal of women).
Many men were also disillusioned by the way the Senate Judiciary Committee con-
ducted the hearings. Their dissatisfaction seemed related to the the ineptness of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Commitee members and the basic unfairness of the hearings.
34. In the haunting words of a Vietnam prisoner of war who was reacting to
repatriation:
However, if a "friendly" system lets you down, is oppressive, or keeps you in a
state of uncertainty, it is more devastating to you and makes you cynical of any
environment, of anyone else.... You soon sense how far away you have been
from a world you once took for granted.
Russell, supra note 19, at 253.
Not all women of course appreciate the procedural travesty the hearings represented.
They might well think courts of law operate in this unfair and untrustworthy fashion. To
the extent women now perceive courts this way, the hearings should prove a significant
deterrent to their willingness to bring sexual harassment lawsuits. The Wall Street Journal
recently reported a rise in sexual harassment claims within organizations but noted there
was no corresponding increase in lawsuits. WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1992, at Al.
35. Senator Biden, for instance, proved extremely deferential to unethical Republican
behavior, failed to control Republican abuse of process, seemed concerned primarily with
protecting his reputation as Chairperson of the committee, and ultimately conceded that
Clarence Thomas should have the benefit of the doubt in the event of ambiguity. Ruth
Marcus, Thomas, Allies Step Up Counterattack, WASH. PosT, Oct. 13, 1991, at Al. Senator
Edward Kennedy, a recognized liberal, probably feeling constrained by his prior indiscre-
tions with women, did not use his rhetorical skill to champion Anita Hill's cause. Dowd,
supra note 9 (implying. that Senator Kennedy's improprieties with alcohol and women led
to his low profile before the hearings).
36. Many of my female friends and acquaintances have expressed their increased re-
luctance to trust men on any issue after the Thomas/Hill hearings.
37. One significant stress for Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war was the
sequential experience of severe threat-followed by captors' promises of safety-followed by
captors' arbitrary reintroduction of severe threat. Harvey B. Strassman et al., A Prisoner of
War Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress, 112 AM. J. PSYCHIAT aY 998, 998 (1956).
Women should experience a similar trauma when confronted with threats from men inter-
spersed with promises of support.
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ously captors subject POWs to intense indoctrination and reward POWs
when they accept the captor's ideology. 38 For instance, Chinese and
North Korean POWs found that acceptance of the communist ideology
or participation in collaborative activities earned increases in food, phys-
ical comforts and privileges, as well as promises of early repatriation. 39
Similarly the hearings indicate that women who deviate from patri-
archal ideology are vulnerable to male power. Certainly Professor Hill,
as an unmarried high status professional, deviates from the traditional
patriarchal script for women. Moreover she dared to challenge a power-
ful man. For these acts of defiance she suffered attack. The messages of
the hearings thus nicely reinforce the current ideological campaign to
encourage women to return to their proper social position4 °-
subordinate to men.
Contrasting the hearings with the Tyson rape trial makes the
message clearer. Tyson's successful antagonist, Desiree Washington,
seemed to have an impeccable moral character similar to Anita Hill's.
However, rather than defying patriarchal values, she fulfilled the accept-
able script of beauty queen that, in turn, encourages the perception of
women as sexual objects for men's pleasure.4 1 Whereas Anita Hill, the
nonconforming antagonist suffered attack and defeat, the conformer
met with success-Mike Tyson was convicted of rape.42 I do not mean
to belittle Ms. Washington's courage or leave unacknowledged her chal-
lenge to patriarchy by bringing charges against a powerful male. Yet
both Ms. Hill and Ms. Washington accused successful men, leaving them
approximately equal on that score. 43 Safety for women, the message
still reads, depends upon the extent of their compliance with patriarchal
ideology44-just as safety for POWs frequently meant acceptance of
38. E.g., id.; Sutker et al., supra note 3, at 171.
39. Strassman et al., supra note 37.
40. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
(1991). In her book Faludi painstakingly sets out the campaign against American women
found in the media, id. at 75-111; movies, id. at 112-39; television, id. at 140-68; fashion, id.
at 169-226; politics, id at 229-80; popular psychology, id. at 335-62; law, id. at 423-30; and
writings of revisionist feminists, id. at 312-32.
41. Both Anita Hill and Desiree Washington were unmarried. However in contrast
to Anita Hill's maturity, Desiree was only nineteen years old-too young for people to
believe she deliberately decided to defy patriarchal values by remaining unmarried.
42. The juxtaposition in the text ignores the obvious differences between Clarence
Thomas, the federal court judge, and Mike Tyson, the boxer, that also influenced the dif-
ferent outcomes. The dissimilarity between Thomas and Tyson dilutes but does not ne-
gate the message that greater safety for women accompanies acquiescence to patriarchal
ideology.
Moreover, despite her more traditional life expression, Desiree Washington was not
entirely safe. She and Anita Hill both met with hostility from African-Americans who felt
they had broken faith with their race by accusing high-profile African-American men of
wrongdoing. Victim Offered '$1 Million to Recant', DENY. POST, Feb. 21, 1992, at 2A.
43. Arguably Anita Hill's charges against a Supreme Court nominee threaten patri-
archy more than Desiree Washinton's charges against a boxing champion. A Supreme
Court Justice still seems more important to the preservation of male supremacy than a
violent athlete-although recent appointments give me pause.
44. This statement is consistent with research indicating that observers tend to blame
rape victims more when the victims deviate from traditional sex role norms than when they
comply. Alan C. Acock & Nancy K. Ireland, Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: The Impact of
[Vol. 69:2
HOLDING WOMEN'S PSYCHES HOSTAGE
their captors' values.
B. Reactions to Captivity
The above sections argue that the captivity experience of POWs
bears an uncanny similarity, in kind though not degree, to what many
women confronted during the hearings. One might expect then their
reactions to the hearings to parallel the reactions of POWs to their im-
prisonment. For many POWs the traumatic stress of captivity causes
common symptoms. This section explores these symptoms, how they
reflect the responses of Betty and many other women to the hearings,
and what these responses mean to the women's movement's viability.
1. Passive Compliance
As explained above, the unanticipated loss of status and support, as
well as immersion in a hostile environment, destroy the prisoner's prior
sense of invulnerability45 and generate fear.4 6 The prisoner's immedi-
ate reaction is fight or flight.4 7 For most prisoners however fight and
Norm Violation, Gender, and Sex-Role Attitude, 9 Szx ROLES 179, 187 (1983); Barbara Krahe,
Victim and Observer Characteristics as Determinants of Responsibility Attributions to Victims of Rape,
18J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 50, 51 (1988).
45. See infra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
46. Russell explains:
The prisoner, in many ways, reverts to the child who relies on others to control
his life. The captors are seen as totally omnipotent. However, unlike the child-
parent relationship, the controller is not the caring, loving authority, but rather is
someone aggressive, punitive and unpredictable, even at times malicious. At best
the controller is seen as unconcerned about the welfare or survival of the captive.
Fear develops.
Russell, supra note 19, at 252. See also Rahe & Genender, supra note 7, at 578. The ten-
dency for POWs to regress to childlike responses seems universal. See, e.g., Bettelheim,
supra note 4, at 435-37, 444-47.
Regression sometimes is encouraged by the prisoners themselves. Bettelheim com-
ments on this phenomenon in the context of Nazi concentration camps:
[Tihis regression would not have taken place if it had not happened in all prison-
ers. Moreover ... [the prisoners] asserted their power as a group over those
prisoners who objected to deviations from normal adult behavior. They accused
those who would not develop a childlike dependency on the guards as threaten-
ing the security of the group, an accusation which was not without foundation,
since the Gestapo always punished the group for the misbehavior of individual
members.
Id. at 444.
47. Russell, supra note 19, at 251. In addition to the panic reaction noted in the text,
POWs frequently respond to their initial captivity with denial. E.g., Bettelheim, supra note
4, at 427, 431; Ursano & Rundell, supra note 6, at 177. Kitahara explains that the Japanese
exhibited denial at their surrender and occupation after World War II similar to the denial
found in newly arrived prisoners. ManyJapanese did not believe the news of capitulation,
or if they accepted the news, they distorted the contents to make it less painful. Michio
Kitahara, The Nazi Concentration Camp and Occupied Japan: Responses in Two Historical Situations,
16J. PSYCHOHISTORY 191, 194 (1988). Many women watching the hearings also may have
responded to their initial perceptions of captivity by denying that status or by convincing
themselves the situation was not as bad as first thought.
Among most prisoners, however, denial proves shortlived. Ultimately they confront
and adapt to their captivity, or they, as Betty did, commit suicide. E.g., Bettelheim, supra
note 4, at 425-27; Kitahara, supra, at 194-95. One might expect then the short duration of
women's denial and their eventual willingness to adapt to their captivity through passive
compliance and other mechanisms developed in the text.
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flight prove impossible.48 Their fatigue, depression and deep sense of
vulnerability eventually promote their adaptation to captivity:4 9 apathy
and passive compliance results.50 The compliant POW frequently
chooses to minimize harassment by not challenging captors and by par-
ticipating in mundane and safe, rather than meaningful but dangerous,
activities. In essence, resignation to one's fate becomes the norm.5 1
Similarly, the unanticipated hostility of the messages broadcast dur-
ing the hearings made clear women's vulnerability to male power and
women's inability to control what happens to them. Like prisoners of
war, women cannot escape their captivity in a hostile culture. Nor can
they, as the hearings made evident, fight effectively against such odds.
52
One might then expect their reaction to parallel that of the POW: pas-
sive compliance and reluctance or refusal to challenge their captors, es-
pecially on dangerous women's issues.
I believe this response is reflected in those women who initially re-
48. The circumstances surrounding imprisonment and the prior experiences of the
captives also effect the prisoner's initial reaction to captivity. For instance, Bettelheim's
observations made in Nazi concentration camps revealed that the group least able to with-
stand the initial shock of and comprehend their imprisonment were nonpolitical middle-
class prisoners. He explained:
They had no consistent philosophy which would protect their integrity as human
beings, which would give them the force to make a stand against the Nazis. They
had obeyed the law handed down by the ruling classes, without ever questioning
its wisdom. And now this law, or at least the law-enforcing agencies, turned
against them, who always had been its staunchest supporters. Even now they did
not dare to oppose the ruling group, although such opposition might have pro-
vided them with self-respect. They could not question the wisdom of law and of
the police, so they accepted the behavior of the Gestapo as just. What was wrong
was that they were made objects of a persecution which itself must be right, since it
was carried out by the authorities. The only way out of this particular dilemma
was to be convinced that it must be a "mistake." These prisoners continued to
behave in this way despite the fact that the Gestapo, as well as most of their fellow
prisoners, derided them for it.
Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 426. To the extent that an analogy exists between the initial
shock of imprisonment in a Nazi concentration camp and women's shock at confronting
their imprisonment within our hostile society, one might expect women who steadfastly
have followed the cultural script laid down for them to have the most difficulty accepting
the negative implications for women of the Thomas/Hill hearings.
In time, confronted with daily brutalities, the nonpolitical middle-class prisoners that
Bettelheim observed came to accept their actual situation. Bettelheim, supra note 4, at
427. Women however who have steadfastly followed their cultural script usually are not
subjected to the same obvious terrors experienced by the concentration camp prisoners.
They may never acknowledge their imprisonment in a hostile culture.
49. Russell, supra note 19, at 252.
50. E.g, id.; Strassman et al., supra note 37, at 999 (1956); Ursano & Rundell, supra
note 6, at 177; RobertJ. Ursano et al., Coping and Recovery Styles in the Vietnam Era Prisoner of
War, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 707, 708 (1986).
51. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 19, at 252; Strassman et al., supra note 37, at 999;
Ursano & Rundell, supra note 6, at 177.
52. One of the most distressing aspects of the Thomas/Hill hearings was the inability
of women to protect a woman who already possessed power based on her income, educa-
tion, prestigious occupation and impeccable character. If the full support of the feminist
community proved ineffective in protecting a woman with Anita Hill's positive attributes
from an egregious use of male power, clearly the women's movement can do little to pro-
tect less powerful women from similar-or worse-abuse. This is not to say that the wo-
men's movement should possess the sole responsibility for protecting women from male
abuse.
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sponded passionately to the hearings but whose startled disbelief and
anger eventually changed to withdrawn acceptance and unwillingness to
discuss further what had occurred. Unless their response is acknowl-
edged and addressed one can expect their political activism as well as
their willingness to identify with the women's movement, to decrease
rather than increase in the wake of the hearings.
2. Displaced Anger
Because POWs cannot express their rage against their captors
safely they sometimes unconsciously displace their anger onto safer
targets. 58 Similarly, women, angered by their vulnerability to male op-
pression highlighted during the hearings, may have recognized the dan-
ger of directing their outrage against their male captors. Rather, like
POWs, some women unconsciously displaced that anger onto a safer
target-Anita Hill, the individual providing women striking evidence of
their threatening vulnerability.
Moreover women who have complained of sexual harassment and
suffered retaliation or who have left their jobs to escape harassment
might resent Anita Hill's delay in complaining against Thomas. Why
should Ms. Hill, they might wonder, be able to avoid the costs they ex-
perienced simply by delaying her complaint until long after her job
ended? 54 Projection of this anger against Anita Hill however ignores
the true culpit: a system that provided these women no protection
against retaliation or required resignation to avoid sexual harassment.
Displaced, rather than deserved, anger thus might explain the hostility
many women exhibited toward Anita Hill after the hearings.
Women's displaced anger decreases the women's movement's effec-
tiveness. If women recognized the actual source of their anger they
could meaningfully direct their efforts for change. For instance, those
women angry at Anita Hill for failing to bring a harassment charge
sooner and escaping the costs they experienced could be instrumental in
changing women's oppressive workplace reality if they redirected their
energy toward reforming the system that permitted sexual harassment
and then provided women no protection from retaliation or no choice
but to resign their jobs. Displacing their anger onto Anita Hill in con-
trast inhibits women's ability to detect the source of their discomfort and
53. Russell, supra note 19, at 253 (citing S. Wolf & H.S. Ripley, Reactions Among Allied
Prisoners of War Subjected to Three Years of Imprisonment and Torture by the Japanese, 104 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 180 (1947)).
54. This anger likely is exacerbated by the class difference between Professor Hill and
most of these women. With less power and resources at their command (few were Yale
Law School graduates) they had the courage to complain. If they faced risks to defend
their dignity in the workplace, why should Professor Hill, who possessed power few of
them could imagine, be allowed to avoid coming forward without suffering blame. This
thinking unfortunately ignores Anita Hill's vulnerability while working for the head of the
government agency responsible for eliminating the very behavior in which he allegedly
engaged. At that time in history, who would have believed her? Even now her story seems
incredible to many.
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correspondingly cripples their ability to make meaningful changes in
their oppressive reality.
Moreover, to the extent women with displaced anger perceive Anita
Hill as associated with the women's movement, 5 5 one can predict their
increased disaffection with the movement. They might be more difficult
than ever to convince that the movement's goals reflect their best inter-
ests. 5 6 Setting aside flowover anger from Anita Hill, the women's move-
ment itself probably attracted some women's hostility during the
hearings. Leaders of the movement often have urged women to stand
up and be heard. Yet when Anita Hill, a powerful woman compared to
most, did so, the movement failed to protect her from male attack. Wo-
men thus might feel betrayed by the movement and less willing to listen
to exhortations to continue struggling for women's equality. Again a
chilling analogy exists in the war captivity experience. In his study of
Nazi concentration camps Bettelheim found that prisoners frequently
expressed irrational hostility toward family and friends outside the
camps who were trying desperately, yet ineffectively, to rescue them.
5 7
Displacement however does not explain all women's anger with
Anita Hill.58 Commentators suggest that the anger of some African-
American women stems from their belief that Anita Hill broke faith with
55. As one commentator noted, "[s]he [Anita Hill] has an enduring place in the Femi-
nist Hall of Fame. Klein, supra note 8, at 29, 31.
56. As Faludi notes, the women's movement has suffered severe criticism for its al-
leged failure to recognize and work for the family interests allegedly exclusive to women.
FALUDI, supra note 40, at 281-332. See also Scott Jaschik, Philosophy Professor Portrays Her
Feminist Colleagues as Out of Touch and 'Relentlessly Hostile to the Family', THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDuc.,Jan. 15, 1992, at A15 (noting how Clark University's philosophy professor
Christina H. Sommers accuses elite feminist philosophers of shoddy work, insensitivity to
most women's concerns, and hostility to the family, resulting in most women wanting
nothing to do with feminism).
57. Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 439-43. Bettelheim lists several reasons for the pris-
oners' hostility toward their families: (1) inevitable changes in their families that thwarted
prisoners' desire to return to the outside world as the same person who left, idt at 440; (2)
concern that their families were not doing enough to free them, idt at 439; (3) their inevita-
ble hostility that needed release, coupled with their inability to endure the addition hard-
ship of blaming themselves for their captivity, id. at 441; and (4) their hatred of all those
living on the outside who seemed to enjoy life in ignorance of the prisoners' plight, id at
442. Over time the prisoners tended to cease directing their hostility towards those on the
outside or the Gestapo. Instead they learned to direct aggression against themselves. Id.
at 443.
58. In addition to the argument in the text, the discomfort some women felt at wit-
nessing Anita Hill's courage might have precipitated their hostility toward her. Many wo-
men silently have endured experiences similar to Ms. Hill's. Anita Hill's courageous
challenge of a powerful male is an inspiring example. Yet her behavior also implicitly
suggests the deficiency of women who have silently accepted their plight. These women
now must exhibit similar courage or face their own inadequacy. Anita Hill's behavior thus
threatens these women's self-esteem and promotes their hostility toward her.
Professor Ehrenreich partially explains men's hostility to women in the workplace in a
similar way. Women who refuse to accept the status quo and press for workplace reform
challenge the complacency of male workers. Faced with assertive women role models,
women heretofore considered inferior to men, the male workers see themselves as lacking
in corresponding courage and ambition. This perception encourages their hostility to-
ward women workers and their engagement in sexually harrassing behavior. Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harass-
ment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1227-28 (1990).
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her race by accusing a successful black man of sexual impropieties.
Black men have experienced a long and difficult history of racism in the
United States, making their success contingent upon overcoming nearly
insurmountable obstacles. 59 Black men also have proven vulnerable to
injustice when accused of sexual crimes.60 When the successful Judge
Thomas recharacterized the hearings as a racial lynching,6 1 he tapped
these images of discrimination. He effectively implied that Anita Hill, by
alleging sexual misconduct by a successful African-American man, was a
traitor to her race.
62
Thomas ignored much of history in making that implicit charge.
Historically black men did suffer unjust lynchings when accused of sex
crimes-but only sex crimes allegedly committed against white women.
That the hearings addressed charges by a black woman against a black
man became lost in Thomas's purportedly anti-racist rhetoric. The ra-
cial and sexual stereotype of Anita Hill as the promiscuous and lascivi-
ous black woman 63 also went unrecognized. Nevertheless the spectre of
a racial lynching of a black man undoubtedly generated anger against
Anita Hill in some black women. Protecting a prominent black man
seemingly came more naturally than protecting a black woman.64
Certainly black women's hostility toward Anita Hill for breaking the
racial faith poses problems for the women's movement. Although the
racial issues in the hearings arguably should have promoted more pro-
tective instincts within the African-American community toward Anita
Hill than Clarence Thomas, Thomas's anti-racist rhetoric struck a chord
in many Blacks, whereas Anita Hill's femininst rhetoric did not. To the
extent that Anita Hill personifies the women's movement, Ms. Hill's per-
ceived breach of racial faith simply reinforces black women's preexisting
suspicion that feminism fails to address minority women's unique con-
cerns. If African-American women feel more alienated from the wo-
59. See, e.g., Estelle B. Freedman, The Manipulation of History at the Clarence Thomas Hear-
ings, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1992, at B2; Ellen Goodman, Year of Male-
Female Power Struggles: Undertone of the Champ and Woman Who Brought Him Down, DES MOINES
REG., Feb. 14, 1992, at 13A.
60. Freedman, supra note 59.
61. Deep irony exists in Clarence Thomas's invocation of the image of racial discrimi-
nation to protect himself. As Judge Higginbotham states in his open letter to Clarence
Thomas, Thomas has criticized and refused to support the very civil rights advocates re-
sponsible for removing racially discriminatory barriers to Thomas's own professional and
personal successes. Higginbotham, supra note 32, at 1014-15.
62. Goodman, supra note 59.
63. Professor Freedman notes:
Viewing the Senate's response to Anita Hill in light of these historical precedents
suggests that the predominant stereotypes influencing the outcome of the hear-
ings were the stereotypes involving black women. Gender-specific racial myths
placed Professor Hill in the tradition of the promiscuous, lascivious black woman.
Furthermore, despite Ms. Hill's professional status, historical stereotypes of black
women, still familiar to most white Americans, portray black women as either
domestic servants or as welfare mothers.
Freedman, supra note 59. After identifying gender-specific stereotypes that worked against
Anita Hill's credibility during the hearings, Professor Freedman asks, "[g]iven these ste-
reotypes, just who was the 'uppity black' being punished in the Senate hearings?" Id.
64. Id
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men's movement as a result of the hearings, the movement has lost a
powerful force.
3. Blaming the Victim
While the captivity experience may not cause the prisoner to blame
himself for his plight, others may blame the victim. For instance Bet-
telheim notes that the German population generally proved unsympa-
thetic to Germans who had family members in Nazi concentration
camps. The German's strong need to trust that their world was gov-
erned by law and order led them to believe the prisoners must have
committed outrageous crimes and thus deserved their fate. 65 Bet-
telheim's observation receives support from current research exploring
how people sometimes blame the victim more than the perpetrator for
the victim's misfortune.
Researchers explain the tendency to blame victims by citing peo-
ple's need to protect themselves from psychic trauma and to perceive
the world as just.6 6 The Just World Theory posits that people struggle
to retain their belief in a just world because to think otherwise implies a
threatening lack of control over their environment. 67 The Defensive At-
tribution Hypothesis suggests that people attribute blame to the victim
to avoid the suggestion that they themselves might be vulnerable to sim-
ilar negative events. 6 8 Under this hypothesis, the greater the dissimilar-
ity between the observer and victim, the more the observer tends to
blame the victim. 69 Moreover the observer tends fo search for differ-
65. Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 440-41.
66. E.g., Judith A. Howard, Societal Influences on Attribution: Blaming Some Victims More
Than Others, 47 J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 494, 495 (1984); Kevin D. McCaul et al.,
Understanding Attributions of Victim Blame for Rape: Sex, Violence, and Foreseeability, 20J. APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 1-4 (1990); Bill Thornton, Defensive Attribution of Responsibility: Evidencefor
an Arousal-Based Motivational Bias, 46J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 721, 721-22 (1984).
67. McCaul et al., supra note 66, at 3.
68. As Thornton explains:
Moreover, these theorists claim that such undeserved victimization arouses a neg-
ative affective state in observers by threatening them with the prospect of simi-
larly capricious misfortune occurring in their own lives just as unpredictably and
uncontrollably. Thus, to maintain a sense of self-security, observers cognitively
defend against the threat by distorting their perceptions of the victim's causal
role in his or her own victimization. By determining that the individual was in
some way responsible, the threat can be reduced and a sense of understanding
and control over what would otherwise appear to be random, capricious events
can be achieved.
Thornton, supra note 66, at 721.
69. McCaul et al., supra note 66, at 2. Thornton explains this phenomenon:
Shaver further conceived of two distinct motives underlying defensive attribution:
that people are motivated to defend cognitively against the threatening prospect
of such unwarranted misfortune occurring to themselves; however, there is also a
need to defend against the threatening possibility of being held personally re-
sponsible were they to succumb to a similar fate. Subsequently referred to as
harm avoidance and blame avoidance motives, respectively, these two reactions
are differentially aroused by the apparent similarity between observer and victim
(e.g., attitudes, background, age, sex, etc.). Thus realizing situational similarity
with a personally dissimilar victim, observers may defensively attribute personal
responsibility to the victim in the interest of harm avoidance motives, acknowl-
edging that they are personally different from or would behave differently than
the victim and, consequently, could avoid a similar fate. Shaver proposed that
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ences between herself and the victim in order to avoid acknowledging
her similar vulnerability. 70
Combining this research with Bettelheim's observations may ex-
plain why some women seemingly ignored Anita Hill's victimization and
instead blamed her for failing to come forward earlier, for not quitting
her job and/or for following Thomas to the EEOC.71 They implicitly
assume that had Anita Hill behaved differently she could have avoided
victimization by Clarence Thomas. Thus the sexual harassment was
Anita Hill's fault.7 2 These defensive assertions allow women to con-
tinue believing their world is just-Anita Hill got what she deserved be-
cause she failed to act properly.73 They also encourage women to
ignore the hostile male culture in which they live and to avoid seeing
that a truly just world does not contemplate sexual harassment or at
least appropriately punishes such behavior when committed. Instead, as
the hearings made evident, sexual harassment is commonplace, alleged
perpetrators may receive promotions and victims who complain all too
often suffer ridicule and blame.
Attributing Anita Hill's victimization to her own behavior also pro-
motes a false sense of security in these women. They can assure them-
selves that had they been in Anita Hill's position they would have
when personal similarity to the victim cannot be denied, however, observers
would not be inclined to assign blame to the victim because they would not want
to be held similarly responsible had they caused or succumbed to similar conse-
quences. Indeed, to derogate or blame a personally similar victim under such
circumstances is presumed to be much like devaluing or blaming oneself. (cita-
tions omitted)
Thornton, supra note 66, at 721-22.
70. Id.
71. Acknowledging the pain and humiliation of others can create emotional discom-
fort in the empathizing person. As a result people sometimes deny the severity or reality
of the victim's pain. Meerloo explains, for instance, how some psychiatrists' reluctance to
address the true horror of Nazi prison camps caused them to underestimate the psycho-
logical damage done to the prisoners of those camps. Joost A.M. Meerloo, Persecution
Trauma and the Reconditioning of Emotional Life; A Brief History, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1187,
1187 (1969). Women's failure to acknowledge Anita Hill's victimization further protects
them by preventing painful empathy.
72. Pryor notes a study by Jensen and Gutek that found more traditional women
tended to blame themselves and other women more for incidents of sexual harassment,
believing they should have done something to prevent it. John B. Pryor, The Lay Person's
Understanding of Sexual Harassment, 13 SEx RoLEs 273, 276 (1985) (citing I. Jensen & B. A.
Gutek, Attributions and Assignment of Responsibility for Sexual Harassment, 38J. Soc. IssuEs 121
(1982)).
73. These defensive attributions ignore that had Anita Hill complained sooner, quit
her job or rejected the EEOC opportunity she probably could not have avoided victimiza-
tion. Young black female professionals were vulnerable to racial and gender discrimina-
tion at the time Anita Hill allegedly experienced sexual harassment by Clarence Thomas.
There was no assurance that Anita Hill could easily have replaced herjob. These attribu-
tions also are blind to the immediate financial vulnerability of quitting one's job when one
lacks resources upon which to fall back. Moreover, had Anita Hill not followed Clarence
Thomas to the EEOC she would have foregone the very opportunity for which she had
worked so hard. This too is a form of victimization-allowing the perpetrator's offensive
behavior to deprive the victim of the professional opportunities she deserves. The attribu-
tions of blame also ignore the impossibility of a young female associate successfully accus-
ing the head of EEOC of sexual harassment in 1981. Even now, in a different social
climate and with Anita Hill possessing significantly more power and status, that task
proved impossible.
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complained, quit their job or rejected the EEOC opportunity. Since
they would have behaved differently, the defensive thinking goes, they
would not have experienced sexual harassment or abuse by the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 74 Their perceived differences from Anita Hill ob-
scure their vulnerability-they believe, in essence, they are safe.
While these defensive attributions may quell the psychic storm in
women who witnessed the hearings, they threaten the women's move-
ment. Women who perceive their worlds as just will lack motivation to
work for reform. Moreover women who rely on artificial distinctions be-
tween themselves and Anita Hill to promote feelings of safety deny their
vulnerability to the abuses of male power exhibited during the hearings.
Their ignorance not only makes their individual victimization more
likely, it also weakens the solidarity needed among women for the move-
ment's ultimate success. To the extent then that women's responses to
Anita Hill reflect defensiveness they bode darkly for the women's
movement.
4. Identification with Captors
The adaptation to captivity for sorie POWs leads to identification
with their captors. 75 The prisoner sees his captors as benevolent 76 and
sometimes attempts to emulate their behaviors and attitudes.77 Identifi-
cation with those who hold them prisoner can become so complete the
prisoner ultimately refuses repatriation. 78 In criminal incidents hos-
74. People attribute more blame to rape victims who participate in occupations that
violate traditional female scripts. Krahe, supra note 44, at 51. Analogizing rape to sexual
harassment, perhaps Anita Hill's vulnerability to victim-blaming stems partly from her
professional position in legal academia where black female professors are rare. See also
Acock & Ireland, supra note 44, at 187 (study found subjects blamed raped women more
when the women violated sex-role norms than when they complied).
75. E.g., Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 447-52; Kitahara, supra note 47 at 191; Russell,
supra note 19, at 253. This phenomenon sometimes is referred to as the Stockholm Syn-
drome, named after an attempted robbery in Stockholm Sweden that resulted in a six day
hostage incident. Russell, supra note 20, at 252. The bond the hostages formed with their
criminal captors during their six days of captivity ultimately led them to condemn the po-
lice and defend their captors. Irka Kuleshnyk, The Stockholm Syndrome: Toward an Under-
standing, 10 Soc. AcTION & L. 37 (1984).
76. E.g., Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 451; Russell, supra note 19, at 253.
77. Bettelheim describes this phenomenon in Nazi concentration camp prisoners.
Longterm prisoners eventually mimicked the Gestapo's aggressive verbal expressions.
When put in charge of other prisoners, they s6metimes behaved worse than the Gestapo.
Prisoners who had been there for some time also implicitly accepted Gestapo ideology by
sometimes becoming instrumental in getting rid of "unfit" prisoners-those whose weak-
nesses posed dangers for other prisoners. Prisoners adopted the Gestapo model of slow
torturous killings in dealing with traitors. The identification of many longterm prisoners
was so complete they attempted to make their uniforms look like those of the Gestapo.
Even when Nazi goals and values conflicted with the prisoners' best interests they
accepted them. Prisoners, however, denied they accepted Nazi values and explained their
Nazi-like attitudes in terms of German nationalism. While noting the strong tendency for
longterm prisoners to identify with their Nazi captors, Bettelheim also makes clear that
these prisoners sometimes defied the Gestapo with extraordinary courage. Bettelheim,
supra note 4, at 447-51.
78. In describing longterm prisoners in Nazi concentration camps, Bettelheim notes
that they mainly concerned themselves with how to survive as well as possible within the
camps. Abandoning their initial denial, the old prisoners experienced everything as real.
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tages sometimes have hesitated to testify against those who detained
them7 9 and have visited their captors in jail two years after the
incident.8 0
Kitahara provides a fascinating and instructive account of how, dur-
ing the allied occupation after World War II, the Japanese came to iden-
tify with their captors. After overcoming their initial denial of their
surrender, the Japanese tried to resist or trivialize the occupation. 8 l In
order to induce the Japanese to take the occupation seriously, General
Douglas MacArthur communicated a strong authoritarian attitude to-
ward them by emphasizing their subservient position, inequality with the
allied powers and their inability to reject or negotiate allied orders.
8 2
MacArthur however combined this authoritarian attitude with paternal-
ism, evidenced in his concern that the Japanese people have sufficient
food and that they become civilized by learning democracy.
8 3
When they reached this stage they became afraid of returning to the outside world, ac-
knowledging their loss of original self and doubting their ability to adapt. Bettelheim, id.
at 437-38. Bettelheim relates the following:
The most drastic demonstration of this realization was provided by the case of a
formerly very prominent radical German politician. He declared that according
to his experience nobody could live in the camp longer than five years without
changing his attitudes so radically that he no longer could be considered the same
person he used to be. He asserted that he did not see any point in continuing to
live once his real life consisted of being a prisoner in a concentration camp, that
he could not endure developing those attitudes and behaviors he saw developing
in all old prisoners. He therefore had decided to commit suicide on the sixth
anniversary of his being brought into the camp. His fellow prisoners tried to
watch him carefully on this day, but nevertheless he succeeded.
Id. at 439.
When Bettelheim questioned some of the old prisoners about their disinterest in talk-
ing about a future life outside the camp, they admitted to him they could no longer envi-
sion themselves living outside the camp. Id. at 439. Not surprisingly many prisoners of
war experience high stress at repatriation. Ursano & Rundell, supra note 6, at 177.
Women who have experienced extended captivity'in a hostile male culture might also
experience a reluctance to accept freedom, distrusting their ability to adapt to a world that
requires a new conceptualization of self and an acquisition of long forgotten or never-
possessed skills. Particularly the reluctance of battered women to leave their captors
might be understood more sympathetically from this perspective.
79. Kuleshnyk, supra note 75, at 38.
80. Id at 40. The bonding that occurs between war or crime hostages and their cap-
tors parallels the traumatic bonding between beaten wives and their battering husbands.
Painter & Dutton, supra note 6, at 364 (1985). See also Romero, supra note 6 (author argues
that captors in both situations inflict psychological abuse in a violent context, create emo-
tional dependency in the captive, isolate the captive from support systems and successfuly
destroy the captive's self-identity). Painter and Dutton suggest that two factors explain the
traumatic bonding of the battered woman to her abuser: (I) a power imbalance between
the abuser and the abused in which the abused sees herself as subservient to the abuser,
and (2) the intermittent nature of the abuse. Painter & Dutton, supra, at 365.
Rather than diminishing her credibility, Anita Hill's continued contact with Clarence
Thomas after she left the EEOC seems entirely consistent with research on the Stockholm
Syndrome and the traumatic bonding of abused spouses.
81. Kitahara, supra note 47, at 195.
82. Specifically, Kitahara suggests MacArthur communicated his authoritarian attitude
by consistently reiterating that: (1)Japan is not equal to the allied powers, (2)Japan has no
right to occupy a position among civilized nations, (3) Japan has been defeated, (4) no
negotiations can occur between the Japanese and their captors, and (5) the allied Com-
mander gives orders to the Japanese government-negotiation occurs only among equals.
Id. at 195.
83. Id. at 195-96.
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Stopping here for a moment, the messages sent to the Japanese
during the allied occupation and the messages sent to women during the
hearings seem strikingly similar. Like the Japanese, women at first dis-
believed and resisted acknowledging their captivity by challenging the
SenateJudiciary Committee's refusal to take Anita Hill's allegations seri-
ously. The Committee seemingly deferred to women's interests by con-
senting to hold hearings on Ms. Hill's allegations.8 4 Yet rather than
consider the allegations seriously, during the hearings the Committee
seized the opportunity to send an authoritarian message to women quite
similar to the one MacArthur sent to the Japanese: You are not equal; we
shall not listen to your grievances and negotiate with you; you have no
choice but to obey our commands. 85 Moreover the Senate Judiciary
Committee, like MacArthur, sometimes mixed its messages to women,
momentarily abandoning authoritarianism when members either pater-
nalistically expressed their purported horror at sexual harassment or
treated women witnesses with paternalistic kindness.8 6
Kitahara argues the next step leading the Japanese to identify with
their captors was demonstrating to the prisoners the decline in their em-
peror's power and the corresponding increase in MacArthur's power.
The altered power positions became evident to the Japanese when the
Japanese newspapers printed a picture of MacArthur and the Emperor
together showing MacArthur relaxed and the Japanese Emperor rigid-
accepting his inferior status. MacArthur emerged, in the eyes of the citi-
zens, as the new Emperor ofJapan.
8 7
The hearings likewise brought the power of the women's movement
into question. While women successfully forced the Senate Judiciary
Committee to entertain Anita Hill's allegations, they could neither pre-
vent the Republican attack on Anita Hill, nor block the nomination of
Clarence Thomas. In contrast, the male Senate Judiciary Committee
flexed its muscles throughout the hearings and made evident the relative
powerlessness of women leaders. The closing snapshot of the hearings
depicted men as conquering emperors and women as their captives.
Kitahara argues the final ingredient that predisposed the Japanese
to identify with their allied captors was their perception of authority re-
lationships as similar to parent-child relationships. 8 8 Because of this un-
derstanding, the Japanese expected their authoritarian conquerors to
act as father figures, ultimately protective of their captives. In obliging
84. As Naomi Wolf indicates, women's outrage forced the men on Capitol Hill to take
Anita Hill's allegations seriously. Wolf, supra note 16.
85. See text supra pp. 7-9 for the messages sent to women during the Thomas/Hill
hearings.
86. While MacArthur's paternalism might have reflected a true desire to help the Jap-
anese, the SenateJudiciary Committee's desire to help women deal with sexual harassment
seems suspect when one considers the Senate's self-created immunity from sexual harass-
ment charges. Ironically the new civil rights act removes that immunity: a move the Senate
can well afford after informing women through the Thomas/Hill hearings what they can
expect if they dare to file sexual harassment charges against one of the powerful brethren.
87. Kitahara, supra note 47, at 196.
88. Id. at 196-97.
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childlike dependency, the Japanese sought to please MacArthur by mov-
ing toward democracy.8 9 The patriarchal society in which American wo-
men live similarly predisposes women to identification with their male
captors because it fosters women's expectations that men will provide
for and protect them. The analogy thus becomes complete and wo-
men's perceived dependency encourages their identification with their
captors.
Women who express their dismay at Anita Hill's destruction of
Clarence Thomas's personal and professional life, who indicate unques-
tioning acceptance of Thomas's statements, who believe the SenateJudi-
ciary Committee acted benevolently or who exhibit hostility toward
Anita Hill, thus may do so because they identify with their captors. The
negative ramifications for the women's movement seem apparent. Wo-
men who identify with their male captors will resist acknowledgment of
their captive status and participation in a movement antagonistic to their
captives' concerns. Rather they will perceive those who imprison them
as benevolent and remain loyal for years after the event that triggered
awareness of their captivity: the Thomas/Hill hearings. Their support
for the women's movement seems unlikely. Bringing these women into
the fold may prove especially difficult because devoted feminists may
look unfavorably upon women who have sympathized with their male
captors9 -- further discouraging these captives from joining the
movement.
5. Self-Destructive Behaviors
When the reality of captivity can no longer be denied, some POWs
commit suicide. The extreme stress created by their acknowledged help-
lessness and vulnerability as well as the disintegration of their individual
integrity predisposes POWs to suicide.9 1 Generally their inability to di-
rect anger safely at those responsible for their plight encourages cap-
89. Id. at 197-98.
90. As noted by Kuleshnyk, those experiencing the Stockholm Syndrome may have
difficulty upon release because their family, friends, public and the courts may look unfa-
vorably upon a hostage who has come to be sympathetic with captors. Kuleshnyk, supra
note 75, at 41.
91. When the Japanese could no longer deny that they had surrendered and that they
faced occupation, those who could not face reality committed suicide. Kitahara, supra note
47, at 194. Similarly middle-class prisoners in Nazi concentration camps proved least able
to withstand the reality of imprisonment as evidenced by their comparatively high suicide
rate. Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 427.
This predisposition does not end at repatriation. As Russell notes:
Data demonstrate that among the leading causes of death in former POWs are
traumatic accidents, suicide, and homicide. That a person who, at one time and
in many instances over a long period of time, had to use all his energy and deter-
mination just to survive would succumb to such behavioral trauma, carelessness,
or disregard for life seems contradictory and presents evidence in and of itself of
unresolved psychological conflict and psychiatric disorders. Keehn speculates
that the high incidence of death from trauma could reflect failure of former
POWs to resolve anxiety, the diminished sense of status, or the reduced sense of
meaning or direction in life developed in the captive experience.
Russell, supra note 19, at 251.
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tives to express their anger through self-destructive behavior.
92
And here my search to understand Betty's extreme reaction to the
hearings ends. Already traumatized by the loss of her parents, her male
companion, and job,93 the hearings that cast in bold relief her vulnera-
bility and the hopelessness of appealing to a male judge proved too
much. Rather than continue to endure the pain and degradation of her
captivity, like a demoralized POW, Betty understandably chose to end
her life. Though Betty's extreme reaction to the hearings is unusual
among women, the feelings her behavior expressed, as I argue through-
out, are not.
6. Resistance
The comparison of women to POWs however does not necessitate
an entirely negative diagnosis for the women's movement. Many POWs
resist their captors. 94 Similarly some women heard clearly the Commit-
tee's intimidating and demeaning messages implying that a life of captiv-
ity in subservience to men defines women's fate, but resisted-
expressing outrage and greater commitment to political activism.9 5 Yet
if the analogy of women as war captives has validity, only certain types of
women will resist strongly. Research on Vietnam POWs indicates that
resisters tended to be older, higher in rank, held captive longer, more
nonconforming and more extroverted.9 6 Anticipating women with simi-
92. Bettelheim, for instance, notes that in order to avoid getting into trouble with the
Gestapo, prisoners who spent extended time in Nazi concentration camps directed much
of their pent-up hostility against themselves rather than their captors or those on the
outside. Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 443.
93. Stressful life events generally are associated with attempted suicide. Zahara Solo-
mon et al., supra note 6 at 302 [citing E.J. Paykel, Contribution of Life Events to Causation of
Psychiatric Illness, 8 PSYCHOL. MED. 245 (1978)]. See also Dennis L. Peck, Post Traumatic Stress
and Life-Destructive Behavior, I1 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 876, 890 (1984) (From a content
analysis of investigative reports and suicide notes, the researcher concluded that the
breakdown in intimate relationships, the nonacceptance of situations controlled by others
and the recognition of one's powerlessness in effectuating one's interests provide motiva-
tion for suicide).
94. See generally Edna J. Hunter et al., Resistance Posture and the Vietnam Prisoner of War, 4
J. POL. & MIL. Soc. 295 (1976).
95. The recent rise in sexual harassment claims further illustrate women's resistance.
As reported in the Wall Street Journal:
SEX HARASSMENT CLAIMS rise after Anita Hill's charges at Thomas hearings.
General Motors Corp. reports a 50% increase in claims since last summer's hear-
ings... (though it sees no increase in lawsuits). Claims filed at the Boston office
of The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination tripled in November.
Sex harassment charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion increased to 1,244 in the first quarter of 1992 from just 728 a year earlier.
Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1992, at Al.
While the increase in sexual harassment claims illustrates a level of resistance, it does
not mean the complaining women would be willing to affiliate with the women's move-
ment or resist their oppression in other areas.
96. Ursano et al., supra note 50, at 710; Ursano & Rundell, supra note 50, at 177.
Perhaps, resistance occurs most frequently among higher ranked prisoners because they
have more to lose if they acquiesce, they are less accustomed to degrading treatment, they
are more uncomfortable with loss of control and their status promotes their internal sense
of power.
Length of captivity also seems to positively correlate with resistance. Hunter et al.,
supra note 94, at 301. In this study, the longer the men were held captive the more likely
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lar characteristics suggests that powerful elite women will be more in-
clined than less powerful women to resist.9 7 This assertion provides
little comfort.
Currently the women's movement suffers severe criticism for its al-
leged inability to relate to non-elite women.9 8 Outspoken resistance by
elite women thus might deepen the wedge between them and women
who do not want to understand their vulnerable status as captives. The
crucial task for feminists might be to shape resistance in a manner more
palatable to the majority of women.
I do not see this suggestion as patronizing. Quite the contrary.
Women's diverse reactions to the hearings graphically exposed the deep
divisions between women in the United States. As the Senate nervously
monitored opinion polls, most women told the Senators they could
safely vote to confirm Thomas. This essay attempts to shed light on
some reasons why so many women reacted this way.9 9 Yet regardless of
the reasons, what cannot escape recognition is that without the women
who supported Thomas the power of the movement is anemic. Active
attempts must be made by feminists to accommodate the diversity and
division among women, or women's struggle for equality will grind to a
halt. Accommodation thus need not be patronizing if it reflects a genu-
ine interest in, if not agreement with, the perspectives of others.
Drawing yet another lesson from the POW experience, placement
in a group, rather than solitary confinement, facilitates prisoner resist-
ance.10 0 From his study on Nazi concentration camps Bettelheim con-
cluded that the best way to break the influence captors had over
prisoners was to form democratic groups of resistance composed of in-
dependent, mature and self-reliant persons. For maximum effective-
ness, he argued, each member of the group should back up every other
they would avoid behaviors that the captors could use for propaganda purposes and would
avoid bargaining with the captors. Id. at 306.
97. Yet, while elite women have more power to exercise, they also have more to lose if
challenges to male hierarchy prove unsuccessful. Moreover, they experience isolation in a
masculine workforce where success pits them against one another. Wolf, supra note 16.
These forces combine to reduce political activism in privileged women.
98. A recent poll conducted by TIME/CNN proves symptomatic. The results showed
that 63% of American women do not consider themselves feminists, 54% think the wo-
men's movement has not improved their lives, and 50% believe the women's movement
does not reflect the views of most women. Nancy Gibbs, The War Against Feminism, TIME,
Mar. 9, 1992, at 50.
99. I realize this essay seems to patronize all women who supported Thomas's nomi-
nation because it suggests their support was motivated by fear rather than an unfettered
assessment of the candidate. Certainly room exists for a genuine difference of opinion
among women that is not borne of a defensive reaction to a traumatizing event. Yet while
I acknowledge the likelihood of genuine differences, I remain haunted by the commonality
between Betty's and my reaction, as well as the responses of many women with whom I
have spoken. Perhaps not all women felt trauma during the Thomas/Hill hearing, but I
remain convinced that many did, and that this essay can help us understand the common-
ality beneath our diversity.
100. Hunter et al., supra note 94, at 295, 301. In this study, resistance was measured by
(1) propaganda avoidance; (2) compliance under duress; (3) bargaining with captor; (4)
non-commitment; (5) [military] code non-utility; (6) non-revelation of information; (7)
non-liability; and (8) belligerence. Id. at 306.
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member's ability to resist. 10 1 Support for Bettelheim's assertion comes
from another study indicating that the formation of resistance groups by
POWs in Vietnam proved healthy because it introduced an element of
active mastery into the POWs captivity experience. 10 2 The formation of
women's groups thus should facilitate their resistance to oppression.
Again however I note problems inherent in this suggestion.
Resistance groups already exist in feminist circles. Members must
continue to recognize the critical importance of these groups in empow-
ering individual members to confront oppression.10 3 Yet, many women
vehemently deny association with the feminist movement and claim the
movement has betrayed and ignored the interests of most women. Per-
suading these women to acknowledge and struggle against oppression
proves difficult. Rather than attempting to force their integration into
preexisting feminist groups, concerned feminists might best begin the
process of persuasion by infiltrating non-feminist women's groups and
sharing information designed to raise consciousness on issues reflecting
oppression. Many issues not obviously subversive reflect women's op-
pression-the sexual and physical abuse of women and children, the ec-
onomics of divorce, workplace attitudes toward women (sexual and
economic), parental leave and the stresses of single parenting. Sharing
information on these issues, without demanding ideological commit-
ment to feminism, might promote activism among women who now do
not want to become members of the women's movement. Their activism
would help alleviate oppression and ultimately increase their own
awareness.
One last word of caution from the POWs experience-POWs who
firmly resist their captors bear the brunt of the enemy's pressure.1
0 4
101. Bettelheim, supra note 4, at 452.
102. Andersen, supra note 7, at 69.
103. Were it not, for instance, for the encouragement and support of my feminist (fe-
male and male) friends, as an untenured female law professor I doubt I would have written
this essay.
104. Hunter et al., supra note 94, at 295. See also Andersen, supra note 7, at 67 (strong
prisoner resistance brought the possibility of serious physical harm).
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JUDGING THE FUTURE: How SOCIAL TRENDS
WILL AFFECT THE COURTS
LARS FULLER AND CRAIG BOERSEMA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the next thirty years, technological and demographic changes
will be occurring more rapidly than ever.1 This reality challenges the
quality of justice provided by today's judicial system. Fortunately,
courts have the opportunity to prepare proactively for the changes that
have been forecast. Considered on the "cutting edge" in judicial admin-
istration, nine state judiciaries-including Colorado's-are conducting
or have completed long-range planning efforts (i.e. futures research),
which examine developing social trends and attempt to set direction
needed for the future.
2
Long-range planners recognize that the future provides the oppor-
tunity to achieve certain goals. These planners identify social trends in
order to better guide the achievement of those objectives. To organize
their goals, planners develop a singular ideal-a "vision." After the vi-
sion has been defined, the planners outline the steps necessary for its
implementation.
Consequently, long-range planning in the courts requires identifi-
cation of social trends that will shape the future.3 Futurists define a
* Lars Fuller and Craig Boersema staff "Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Fu-
ture," a project conducted by the Colorado Judicial Department. Lars Fuller is a Research
Assistant for the project and Craig Boersema is the Project Director. The study is funded
by the State Justice Institute (Grant SJI-90-05D-A-069) with matching funds appropriated
by the Colorado General Assembly. The authors would like to thank Dr. Joyce Sterling
and members of Task Force 4: "Judicial Responses to Social Issues" for their contribu-
tions to this article. Points of view expressed herein do not necessarily represent the offi-
cial positions or policies of the State Justice Institute.
1. Dr. Lou House, Address at "Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future" Execu-
tive Summary of the Task Force Training Session (January 18, 1991). Dr. House, the Di-
rector of External Research at U.S. West, in Englewood, Colorado, stated that
technological information in the world is doubling every three years. See MARVIN CETRON
& OWEN DAVIES, AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: OUR LIFE AT THE TURN OF THE 21sT CENTURY
(1990).
2. Five states currently have active futures projects: Colorado, California, Massachu-
setts, Maine and Georgia. Virginia, Arizona and Utah have recently completed futures
projects. Hawaii has institutionalized futures planning within its Judicial Department.
The Colorado project is entitled "Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future." It is
structured around four task forces (Quality ofJustice, Structure of the Courts, Administra-
tion ofJustice, and Judicial Responses to Social Issues), and is comprised of over eighty
task force members. The Colorado project is an eighteen-month effort, and a final report
was submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court on March 31, 1992.
3. Creating 21st Century Courts: Guidebook for Court Visioning (The Institute For Alterna-
tive Futures, The Hawaii Research Center For Future Studies, The National Center for
State Courts), Aug. 12, 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Guidebook].
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trend as being a pattern of change over time.4 Because demographics
quantify certain elements of the population, they are especially helpful
at identifying trends.5 Through demographics, it is possible to deter-
mine population numbers and ethnic and racial breakdowns. Further,
demographic statistics enable forecasting for workforce participation as
well as for demands upon education and health institutions due to the
impact of age and family statistics on those areas. Other topics, such as
technology and the environment, have demographic implications as
well.
Possible scenarios of how the future might look may be developed
from these trends. 6 Each different scenario represents the reality that
given society's influential factors, completely accurate prediction is im-
possible. Planners are able, however, to distinguish between probable,
possible and unlikely scenarios. The ideal judicial system is then envi-
sioned given those possibilities, and the final stage of the process identi-
fies the specific steps that will achieve the ideal. By distinguishing what
is truly desired and anticipating the developing trends, courts are able to
use long-range planning to shape their futures and deliver the quality of
justice expected by consumers.
This Article will address the first step of this methodology and iden-
tify major social trends that will impact the courts over the next thirty
years. Demographic changes and emerging technology will affect the
judicial system in many dramatic ways. 7 As caseloads increase with
populations and state legislatures have more difficulty finding funds for
the judiciary, the need for courts to plan for the future becomes particu-
larly imperative.
8
II. EDUCATION AND LABOR ISSUES
Both education and labor issues will play major roles in determin-
ing the status of future society. By the turn of the century, technological
changes will radically shift the workforce into predominantly service re-
lated jobs.9 Addressing this shift are today's educators, who are chal-
lenged to prepare students for workplaces and positions that currently
4. Id. See CLEMENT BEZOLD, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MACRO-
TRENDS AFFECTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1990).
5. Guidebook, supra note 3, at 5. See Elizabeth Ehrlich, Social Trends: How Will the Next
Decade Differ, Bus. WK., Sept. 25, 1989, at 142.
6. JAMES A. DATOR & SHARON J. RODGERS, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE AND THE AMERI-
CAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STATE COURTS OF 2020 (1991).
Seven court-related scenarios for the future were developed, which conceived of different
possibilities for society in 2020. Id.
7. For example, historically in Colorado a one-percent increase in population results
in a two-percent increase in district court filings. Daniel J. Hall, Address at State Court
Administrator's Office to Task Force 4 of "Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future"
(May 14, 1991). See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STA-
TISTICS 1984 ANN. REP. (1986); ARNOLD LINSKY & MURRAY STRAUSS, SOCIAL STRESS IN THE
UNITED STATES: LINKS To REGIONAL PATrERNS IN CRIME AND ILLNESS (1986).
8. James Austin, America's Growing Correctional-Industrial Complex, Focus, THE NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, Dec. 1990, at 1.
9. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 352.
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do not exist. 10 With the changes expected, the importance of preparing
the potential workforce for new types ofjobs has intertwined education
and labor issues. Four trends will affect the future quality of education
and labor in Colorado as well as the rest of the countiy, creating mean-
ingful issues with which the courts must deal.
A. Widening Skills Gap
The rapidly widening gap between the job skills required of and
held by the workforce is the most important emerging issue in the field
of education and labor."l As new positions materialize and new skills
are required, fewer workers will have the skills needed to fill jobs. 12 A
shortage of qualified workers could lower productivity and income
throughout society.' 3 Businesses are already concerned about the scar-
city of qualified "knowledge workers."' 4 In addition, the demand for
workers with highly technical skills may be hurt by labor shortages cre-
ated by a slow growth in the working-age population.15 The number of
entry level workers has been decreasing since 1976 and is not expected
to grow at all between 1988 and 2000.16
The skills gap will generate several critical changes in education.
17
Rapid technological advances and competition with younger and better
educated workers overseas will go unmet if the United States continues
to fail at teaching needed skills. 18 Lackluster test scores continue to
sound the alarm for educational reform, and as the skills gap grows
10. "In the year 2000, 85 percent of high school graduates will be going into jobs that
do not yet exist." Dr. Sharon Ford, Address at "Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the
Future," Inaugural Training Session (Jan. 18, 1991). See Elizabeth Dole, Help Wanted.
Skills for the '90s, HUM. CAP., Nov. 1990, at 14.
11. WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK & WORKERS FOR THE TWENTy-
FIRST CENTURY 95 (1987). The skill mix of the U.S. economy will increase substantially by
the end of the century. Id. at 98-99. See Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, A Nation
Running in Place: Tests Show No Progress in a Competitive World, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991, at
54. "[W]ithout more sophisticated math skills,'we'll be a nation of people completely out
of contention forjobs. We'll be a nation of unemployed people because most entry-level
positions today require some proficiency in algebra and high-level mathematics.'" Id
12. Dole, supra note 10, at 14. "The 'skills gap' would be disturbing and dangerous
enough on its own. But its danger is heightened by the fact that our work force is growing
at only 1% annually." Id.
13. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 425 (1990) [hereinafter CENSUS].
14. Companies surveyed are most worried about hiring "knowledge workers," or
technically skilled employees and professionals, and claim they will continue to be the
hardest to recruit. TOWERS PERRIN & HUDSON INSTITrUTE, WORKFORCE 2000 4 (1990).
15. Although three-quarters of all Americans will be of prime working age-24 to
55-in the 1990s, the growth of the U.S. labor-force is slowing perceptibly. Ehrlich, supra
note 5, at 142. See Howard Fullerton, New Labor Force Projections, Spanning 1988 to 2000,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1989, at 3, 5.
16. There will be .4 percent fewer workers age 16-24 in 2000 than there were in 1988.
Fullerton, supra note 15, at 4. See CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1.
17. Youth 2000 Task Force, Colorado's Competitive Edge, a Report to the Governor, Legislature,
Business Community and Citizens of Colorado 2 (1989) [hereinafter Youth 2000 Task Force]. See
Dole, supra note 10. "Today's jobs demand better reading, writing, and reasoning skills
and much greater competence in math and science." Id at 14.
18. See Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The Best Schools in the World, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 2, 1991, at 50.
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wider, radical changes may be proposed. 19 Slow growth in the working-
age population will also necessitate educating and retraining an aging
and diverse workforce.
20
Within the labor force, future job market opportunities could be a
boom for some and a bust for others. 2 1 Of the new jobs created over
the 1984-2000 period, more than half will require education beyond
high school and approximately one-third will be filled by college gradu-
ates.2 2 Today, only twenty-two percent of all occupations require a col-
lege degree. 23 The median number of years of education required by
new jobs created by the year 2000 will be 13.5, whereas the current
number is 12.8 days.24 The fastest growing jobs will require advanced
math, and more language and reasoning capabilities than jobs currently
available. 2 5 At the same time, the workforce will see a boom in service
related jobs not requiring higher education.26 However, in spite of this
growth, only four percent of all new jobs will be filled by individuals with
the lowest levels of language, reasoning and mathematical skills, com-
pared to nine percent of jobs requiring such a level of skills today.
2 7
Over forty percent of new jobs will require advanced skills, compared
with only twenty-four percent today.28 In light of projected lower levels
of migration into Colorado, the state's education system and employee
training programs must educate workers as to the skills required to suc-
ceed in the future.
2 9
The widening skills gap will increase the advantages of the econom-
ically privileged and emphasize the disadvantages of the poor. Those
able to attain these needed skills through high quality education will be
the most desired workers, creating an even more dramatic polarization
of the "haves" and "have nots."3 0 As employers continue to demand
better educated and skilled workers, the unequal distribution of educa-
tional services will have a particularly harsh impact upon minorities. In
particular, Blacks and Hispanics who lag significantly behind Whites in
education will face the greatest difficulties. 3 1 Consequently, the strug-
19. Id. See CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 349.
20. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 348. The increased use of automation and
computers that demand a high degree of literacy will force businesses to provide continu-
ous training for their workers in order to keep up with demands. Id.
21. TOWERS PERRIN & HUDSON INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 4.
22. JOHNSTON, supra note 11, at 95-103.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 98-99.
26. It is estimated that over the next decade approximately one million new jobs will
be created in the less-skilled and 'laborer' categories. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at
353.
27. Johnston, supra note 11, at 98-99.
28. Id.
29. Bill Kendall, Selected Colorado Trends, Report to Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Fu-
ture 2 (Mar. 14, 1991). See Reid Reynolds & Jim Westkott, Colorado's Changing Workforce,
Report from the Colorado Division of Local Government 2 (Oct. 1988).
30. See Emily Mitchell, Do the Poor Deserve Bad Schools?, TIME, Oct. 14, 1991, at 60.
"[T]he U.S. has created a caste system of public education that is increasingly separate and
unequal." Id.
31. The U.S. high school drop out rate is 25 percent (23 percent in Colorado); the
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gle of those groups to achieve economic parity with Whites will be fur-
ther restricted.
Educational reform continues to be a priority on both local and na-
tional political agendas.3 2 Poor test scores and budget concerns will
prompt calls for radical reform.3 3 Private firms will challenge public
schools to utilize technological advances in education, but experimental
programs may use up scarce resources, resulting in delayed reform.3 4
Programs that replace textbooks with computers and databases will be
the most effective means of keeping pace with rapid technological
changes. However, the inability of education to keep pace with the
changing demands of the workplace could create an even dearer stratifi-
cation of society. The potential is that within thirty years, possession of
marketable work skills could become the most notable distinction in the
separation of economic classes.
Impact Upon the Courts. The economic polarization caused by the skills
gap will increase civil disputes through continued increases in cases
caused by economic tension in society. Criminal courts will be more
greatly affected.3 5 Of particular concern is the potential for civil vio-
lence as rebellious "have nots" vent their frustrations against economic
"haves" and seek economic redress.3 6 With fewer government funds
available for social service, and with prisons already teeming, more law
abiding people will be victimized.
3 7
Deficiencies in education also affect crime rates.3 8 If the underpriv-
ileged are not better educated and given better opportunities, the courts
may be faced with an entire class of criminals for whom the laws of soci-
ety represent a conspiracy to maintain power. The growing numbers of
urban youth gangs perhaps represent the precursor to this. Dispropor-
dropout rate for Blacks is estimated at 40 percent, and for Hispanics it is estimated at 50
percent. Forty-one percent of minority youth are thought to be functionally illiterate.
Youth 2000 Task Force, supra note 17, at 2.
32. CETmON & DAVIES, supra note 1,:at 346-47.
33. Id. at 349-50.
34. Id. at 348.
35. Few would argue that the principal clients of the criminal justice system are
those who occupy the lower economic strata of our society. Offenders and vic-
tims have always tended to be young, male, Hispanic and Black, illiterate, and
unemployed .... Consequently, as the number of persons who experience se-
vere economic and social condition increases, we can expect further increases in
crime.
Austin, supra note 8, at 4.
36. John Bennett, Is There Violence In Our Future?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 27,
1990, at 4. Currently the U.S. is experiencing fundamental changes in the socio-economic
structure of society. At the same time, there has been a rise in correctional populations
and their associated cases. Austin, supra note 8, at 1.
37. Austin, supra note 8, at 6. "In economic terms, America is becoming a more frag-
mented and segregated society. Should these trends persist, there will be an associated
increase in the incidence of crime and other social problems." Id. See Alex Prud'homme,
Chicago's Uphill Battle, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 30.
38. Professor Lawrence Mead of New York University has noted that many ghetto
Blacks have responded to their dilemma by "seceding from mainstream institutions-
breaking the law, dropping out of school, not learning English [and] declining to work."
George Will, A Sterner Kind of Caring, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 68.
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tionate school dropout rates of minorities have played a strong role in
the high poverty levels of those groups. The growing demand for tech-
nical skills in the workplace may make the failure to educate minority
youths even more troublesome.39 Additionally, changes in the educa-
tion system brought about by louder calls for immediate reform, will
attract litigation from parents who are unhappy with how the changes
affect their children as well as from educational workers hurt by the
reforms .40
B. Increased Diversity
The composition of the workforce will have increasing proportions
of women, minorities and immigrants. 4 1 It will also be an aging
workforce, with many older workers desiring or needing to extend their
working life.4 2 Consequently, the traditional concept that education
ends when a person enters the workforce will be replaced by the realiza-
tion that older workers must be retrained.4 3 Further, the educational
system will be faced with the challenge of teaching more diverse
students.
4 4
Growing diversity in the workforce will create several potential con-
flicts. The increase in numbers of aging workers and women will multi-
ply disputes over health care benefits. 45 Businesses will feel the burden
of paying the cost for advances in medical technology through worker
benefits.4 6 Worker productivity will also be challenged to keep this di-
versity working together. The changes may bring about the potential
for continued discrimination in hiring, pay and promotion opportunities
as well as the possibility for social tension as threatened White males
react to their declining power base.4 7 As a result, the harassment of
39. Austin, supra note 8, at 6.
40. Mitchell, supra note 30, at 61. "[Mlany students from low-income families are in
schools where they are not encouraged to take rigorous academic courses or the courses
are just not offered." Anthony DePalma, Coaching Courses Hike SATs, Report Finds, DENv.
PosT, Dec. 18, 1991, at 2A.
41. "Women, minorities, and immigrants will account for more than 80 percent of the
net additions to the labor force between now and the year 2000." Youth 2000 Task Force,
supra note 17, at 2.
42. The growth rate for participation in the work force by civilians age 55 and older
was -1.0 percent between 1976-1988. Between 1988-2000 the growth rate is projected to
increase to .2 percent. Fullerton, supra note 15, at 5.
43. "The shrinking pool of entry-level employees, combined with the mounting skills
crisis among them, is already forcing many corporations to undertake in-house training
efforts or even outreach programs into their communities." Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 154.
44. Barbara Kantrowitz, A Isfor Ashanti, B Is for Black..., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1991, at
45.
45. JOHN NAxsBrrr & PATRICIA ABURDENE, MEGA TRENDS 2000 230 (1990).
46. Merian Kirchner, Who Pays For New Technology?, Bus. & HEALTH, Oct. 1991, at 25.
A 1989 survey by the National Association of Manufacturers found that the cost of provid-
ing health benefits already represented 37.2 percent of the average member's profits.
Joyce Frieden, Many Roads Lead to Health System, Bus. & HEATH, Oct. 1991, at 58.
47. Several new books argue that instead of racial hatred per se, white males fear that
affirmative action will channel jobs to minorities and women. Howard Fineman, Playing
White Male Politics, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at 27.
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women and minorities in the workplace will continue to be monitored. 48
The need to attract mothers to the workplace should force businesses to
deal with problems of combining family roles with work assignments.
49
Day care and elder care, for example, may become essential components
of a benefits package. 50 Socially, the increased economic status of wo-
men will reduce birth rates and impact divorce and marriage rates.
5 1
Impact Upon the Courts. With more women and minorities entering the
workplace, the courts can expect to face an increase in cases concerning
equal opportunity and treatment. Victims of job-related discrimination
may seek redress in the courts as diverse cultural and ethnic groups are
forced to work together in the workplace. Nevertheless, workplace dis-
crimination will persist, perpetuating disproportionate poverty levels
among minorities.5 2 Higher poverty among minorities will increase
crime. Workers will be willing to question discriminatory termina-
tions,5 3 and the courts may also be faced with aggressive counter reac-
tions by Whites to hiring quotas and equal opportunity programs.
5 4
Aging workers, confronted with economic concerns and better general
health, may react to forced retirements with litigation.
More complex health benefit packages, needed to attract women
and high caliber workers, will likely increase liability claims and disputes
over coverage. 55 Other indirect issues resulting from increased
workforce diversity will no doubt include divorce, parental responsibili-
ties in childcare and spousal abuse. As working women continue to
change the "traditional" family structure, society's dependence on them
as the principal parent for children will increase the numbers of family
cases.
Educational reactions to increasing diversity will be met with dis-
putes concerning equal rights. Minority parents whose children suffer
from unequal opportunities because of insensitive teaching practices or
policies will pursue their cause in court. 56 Tension may mount regard-
ing equal opportunity programs that favor minority status as economic
hardships increasingly affect the White middle class majority. Curricu-
lum or testing changes designed to make education more accessible to
48. Ted Gest & Amy Saltzman, Harassment: Men On Trial, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 21, 1991, at 38.
49. CrRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 356.
50. "With most middle-age women in the paid work force, 'eldercare' will be a hot
corporate benefit right alongside child care." Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 142.
51. CERroN & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 370.
52. Paul R. Krugman, Economic Outlook: The Painful Cost of Workplace Discrimination, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 63.
53. Richard Johnson, Most Age-Discrimination Charges will be pursued, EEOC Says, DENy.
POST, Dec. 3, 1991, at 1E. See Melinda Beck, Old Enough to Get Fired.... NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9,
1991, at 64.
54. Fineman, supra note 47.
55. Attractive benefit packages, particularly health care for employees and their de-
pendents, are the backbone of corporate strategies to fill the labor shortages. Jayne More-
house, High Turnover Anxiety, Bus. & HEALTH, Oct. 1991, at 96.
56. See Jerry Adler, African Dreams, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1991, at 42; Ehrlich, supra
note 5, at 144.
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diverse groups will be disputed in court by conservative parents who feel
that these changes sacrifice their children's educational rights. As social
diversity grows and economic hardship increases, the role that educa-
tion plays in enforcing ethnic and social division will come under scru-
tiny by the courts.
C. Organization
Structural changes in education will occur both in the way people
work and the manner in which students are educated. In the workplace,
home-based workers, flexible and part-time schedules and the numbers
of self-employed workers will increase.5 7 The employer-employee rela-
tionship will also be affected as traditional employer supervision be-
comes balanced with employee initiative. In education, the inability of
the current system to keep pace with foreign competitors will prompt
organizational changes in education.
One organizational change within the workforce is the decline of
labor unions.58 Because of the continued shift away from industrialjobs
where labor unions have traditionally thrived, the percentage of union
workers in the workforce will decline. The lack of labor representation
within many service industries is related to the multiple career changes
many workers face. The traditional notion of working an entire career
with the same company has been replaced by a desire to minimize forced
career changes. 59 Job instability will continue through a worker's career
as businesses continually move to streamline their operations.6 0 The
result is: many aging baby boomers will find themselves fired from jobs
from which they expected to retire.6 1 In addition to management effi-
ciency, companies concerned with huge expenditures in worker's pen-
sions will see the necessity of terminating long-time employees.
6 2
Businesses will need to scale back operations by laying off workers, while
facing a shortage of skilled laborers. Although businesses will compete
fiercely for top workers, those employees will compete just as fiercely for
those jobs.63 Along with the need to reduce pension and benefit ex-
penses paid to older workers, the trend of businesses downsizing their
57. "The number of people who work at home is projected to nearly double by 2000,
from 30 million in 1990 to 56 million in 2000." Jo Ann Tooley & Amy Bernstein, Measures
of Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 25, 1989, at 6-7. See Bruce A. Taylor, Innovations
in the Information Age, HUM. CAP., Nov. 1990, at 34.
58. "Only one in eight young men with blue-collar jobs belongs to a labor union; 20
years ago that number was three times as high." Marc Levinson, Living on the Edge, NEWs-
WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 25. See CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 358.
59. See, e.g., NAISBrrr & ABURDENE, supra note 45, at 221. "The average American
entering the work force today will change careers three times according to the Labor De-
partment. Private experts tell people to count on five different careers." Id.
60. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 362. See DorrieJacobs, Dealing With the Downsiz-
ing Dilemma, HUM. CAP., Nov. 1990, at 20.
61. Gene Del Vecchio, A Question of Loyalty, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1991, at 8.
62. Steven Findley, A Blow To Your Benefits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 21, 1991, at
100. "Some of the most tempting targets for layoffs are older, highly paid employees."
Beck, supra note 53, at 65.
63. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 361.
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management teams will continue. The traditional ladder of advance-
ment will be eliminated, and middle management level workers may see
narrow possibilities for promotion and increased job competition.
64
The elimination of middle management positions will occur simul-
taneously with the bifurcation ofjob opportunities. The lack ofjobs tra-
ditionally filled by the middle class could sharply effect society, the
economy and family structures. 65 As management level workers lose
their jobs, the majority of work opportunities will be in areas for which
they are overqualified-jobs requiring minimal education and offering
meager responsibility or opportunity for advancement. A significant
number of today's middle class will fall into poverty, while the highly
skilled workers will continue to thrive.
66
Impact Upon the Courts. Organizational changes occurring in education
and labor will continue to affect the courts. As businesses attempt to
streamline operations and cut costs, the courts will see growing num-
bers of wrongful termination suits involving employees' lost pension
funds. Working without the protection of a union, people will turn to
the courts to resolve employer-employee disputes. 67 Union decline will
also exacerbate economic stratification. 68 Such economic polarization
will lead to significant increases in the number of impoverished people
impacting the criminal system. The overburdened courts will respond
to the demands of a surge in criminal cases.
69
Courts may also need to resolve disputes involving job safety for
off-site workers and pay equity issues for part-time workers. Increased
international trade in goods and service and more foreign ownership of
U.S. based companies will create work organization dispute and may
create even greater stresses upon national and local economies.
70
Within education, changing structures will increase disputes be-
tween those eager to enact reforms and those hesitant to abandon tradi-
tion. Because of the importance that society places upon education,
much of the tension caused by changes in the workforce and the econ-
64. Id. See Del Vecchio, supra note 61, at 8.
65. "After wave upon wave of corporate restructurings and downsizings, even seem-
ingly well-situated families don't feel secure." Levinson, supra note 58, at 25.
66. The current recession has significantly hit the middle class. Nearly 600,000 of the
lost jobs belong to middle managers and other white-collar workers as companies slash
payrolls because of "slow sales, crushing interest charges and tough foreign competition."
John Greenwald, A Slump That Won't Go Away, TIME, Oct. 14, 1991, at 42-43.
67. Findley, supra note 62, at 100.
68. Harvard economist Richard Freeman reckons that the weakening of labor unions
accounts for one-fifth of the increase in the wage gap since 1978." Levinson, supra note
58, at 22.
69. The system is overburdened in at least two aspects--delay and prison overcrowd-
ing. The ABA standard for criminal dispositions is 100 percent of cases disposed in one
year. Craig Boersema, Report to Task Force 3, Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future, Civil
Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Sept. 1991). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (May 1990). The prison population has more
than doubled from 329,821 in 1980, to 703,687 at the close of 1989, an increase of 113.4
percent. Id.
70. Levinson, supra note 58, at 24.
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omy will be focused upon the weaknesses of the public system. As con-
cern and strain grow, the courts will remain an outlet for dissension.
D. Content
Changes are expected in the nature of the work much of the labor
force will perform because of the growth of information/knowledge in-
dustries and trade and service industries. Changes are also occurring in
the field of education. Accessing information to teach technical problem
solving skills will force a shift in traditional teaching curricula.
Technological advances will also dramatically influence the
workforce in the next thirty years. Society is experiencing an informa-
tion explosion made possible by quantum advances in technology.
7 1
With these advances, work will be completed more efficiently and less
expensively. 72 Because of the influx of information, professionals of all
fields are being forced to specialize their expertise. 73 This specialization
movement concerns some who feel that people will become disassoci-
ated from control of society. 74 Technology also represents an opportu-
nity for productivity to increase. 75 Nevertheless, a concern is that its
impact may not be as economically effective as previous production
gains-while technology can increase productivity, it may be at the ex-
pense of the laborers. As more workers are replaced by technology, the
greatest reward of higher production could go to business owners, while
the workforce could remain unaffected.
76
The shift from an industrial to a service-related economy may result
in a lower standard of living for many in the workforce. 77 The move-
ment to service sectorjobs will present two types of opportunities. First,
there will be a surplus ofjobs that demand highly skilled and specialized
workers. Businesses will aggressively compete for the relatively small
number of laborers qualified to fill those positions.78 Second, another
surplus of jobs will appear in positions where minimal education is re-
71. House, supra note 1, at 5.
72. John Schwartz, The Highway to the Future, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 56.
73. "Within professions (medical, legal, engineering, etc.) the body of knowledge that
must be mastered to excel in a particular area precludes excellence across all areas." CE-
TRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 352.
74. Id. at 354.
75. Id. at 331. "Economic growth will continue as technological gains in the manufac-
turing sector boost productivity, and as slow growth in the labor force is offset by workers
who remain in the labor force." Id. See Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 142.
[T]he 90s could turn out to be a period of extended economic prosperity. The
baby boom generation ... is reaching peak productivity. And with the growth
rate of the work force falling to one percent per year, the lowest since the 1950s,
employers won't have to absorb and train a flood of new workers as they have for
20 years. That frees resources to make current workers more effective.
Id.
76. Schwartz, supra note 72, at 57. "Without proper planning, network expansion
could widen the gap between rich and poor. The vast educational resources might only go
to the data-haves-such as computer owners-leaving the poor behind .... " Id.
77. "Service jobs have replaced the many well-paying jobs lost in manufacturing,
transportation, and agriculture. Low-paying and often part-time, these new jobs pay
wages at half the level of manufacturing jobs." CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 353.
78. Del Vecchio, supra note 61, at 8.
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quired. 79 Advancement. opportunities will be scarce in these jobs.
Traditional jobs in mining, construction and manufacturing that account
for more than one in six jobs in today's Colorado economy will be dis-
placed. They will provide for fewer than one in twenty of the new jobs
in the next twenty-five years.8 0
Educational systems will be evaluated by their ability to teach mea-
surable technical skills.8 1 The focus upon evaluating educational con-
tent will turn parents' attention toward those factors. The preliminary
result will be that financially empowered parents will be able to respond
to the change and grant their children a head start in becoming success-
ful in changing society. Education reformers will rely on technology to
increase the productivity of educators. However, the business sector
will take advantage of these new technologies before the public educa-
tion system is able to do the same. Further, other countries may be able
to adapt their educational systems more quickly to the emerging de-
mands of the global market.
Impact Upon the Courts. The shift in work content caused by information
and technology industries will affect the courts in several ways. Civil
rights principles and right to privacy issues will be repeatedly dis-
puted.8 2 Particularly volatile issues will be those theoretical and philo-
sophical ones that society has not yet resolved.8 3 These issues may
present opportunities to enjoin communities and raise the tolerance for
diversity. The concern remains, however, that society's inability to come
to agreement on fundamental values will make the introduction of many
new technologies difficult.
The management and operation of the courts will also be affected
by information and technology. Increased information can address
weaknesses in judicial services in areas such as access and communica-
tion. Improved access to information could eliminate the monopoly on
legal information held by attorneys. As a result, it may be possible that
some legal decisions will be made by non-attorneys.
III. GENDER, FAMILY AND RACE ISSUES
Both women and non-Anglo ethnic groups face particularly unique
challenges in American society, and issues concerning these groups will
79. Youth 2000 Task Force, supra note 17, at 2-3. Becauseof a shrinking labor pool of
16-24 year-olds, there will be a demand for workers to fill entry level positions. Id. See
CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 353 & 360.
80. Kendall, supra note 29, at 3.
81. Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 18, at 51.
82. See Richard Zoglin, Justice Faces a Screen Test, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 62; Joe
Schwartz, Educating Away Privacy Fears, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept. 1991, at 47. "Communi-
cation networks offer the promise of more personalized media and widespread telecom-
muting, but they also threaten individual privacy and increase the potential for
information discrimination." Scott Cunningham & Allan Porter, Communication Networks: A
Dozen Ways They'll Change Our Lives, THE FUTURIST, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 19.
83. Lance Morrow, When One Body Can Save Another, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 54.
"Technology is developing so rapidly that new practices are outpacing society's ability to
explore their moral implications." Id. at 56.
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continue to mark a trend toward equalization and cultural diversity.
Principles of equality may influence the next twenty years more than any
epoch since the Civil War. Uniquely tied to the changes that the asser-
tion of women and minorities' rights will bring in the future is the role
of the family. How family, gender and race issues evolve over the next
thirty years will form the basis for the American community in the year
2020, and the courts will be asked to play a vital role in shaping this
development.
A. Gender
Economically, women are confronted with distinctive challenges
and hardships because of disparate pay scales. Women also face une-
qual opportunities not only in acquiring certain positions, but in advanc-
ing to executive and supervisory positions. As more women move into
the workforce, the makeup of the family will continue to change, and
attention will be paid to the disproportionate burden of divorce and sin-
gle-parenthood upon women. As women assert a redefined role in the
community, more energy will be spent on eliminating the obstacles that
prevent them from accessing leadership and management positions in
society.
The woman's changing role will greatly affect the workplace. 84 As
women become an equal percentage of the workforce, the disparity be-
tween their incomes and the incomes of men will continue to be a point
of contention.8 5 A report by the National Committee on Pay Equity
concludes that the wage gap is one of the major causes of economic
inequality, and that discrimination is the cause.8 6 In 1981 the National
Academy of Sciences found that less than twenty-five percent of the
wage gap is due to differences in education, labor force experience and
commitment, suggesting that wage differences are primarily gender
based.8 7 In 1985, the United States Bureau of the Census reported that
differences in education, labor force experience and commitment ac-
counted for less than fifteen percent of the wage gap between women
and men.
88
Women are also limited in their opportunity to pursue different
professions. Although women have entered male-dominated occupa-
tions in increasing numbers, they nonetheless remain concentrated in
traditional clerical and service occupations. 8 9 The opportunity to ad-
84. Nationally, men will remain a majority of the labor force, but when growth rates
are compared, the male labor force is projected to grow by only 11 percent over the 1988-
2000 period, compared with a projected growth of 22 percent for women during the same
period. Fullerton, supra note 15, at 7.
85. Women still earn on an average 60-70 percent of what men typically earn.
Workforce 2000 and Beyond: Jobs and Workers for Colorado's Future, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 1989,
at 8.
86. PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, RACISM AND SEXIsM: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 71 (1988).
87. Id. at 73.
88. Id.
89. Report of the Commission of Women in the Profession: Part 1, THE BUs. LAW. UPDATE,
Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 6, 7. In 1986, women were only 4.4 percent of all dentists, 6.0 percent
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vance to leadership positions will remain limited by the "glass ceiling"
phenomenon.90 As with the wage gap disparity, this reality will be the
focus for reform.
Another cause of the "stunted" economic status of women is the
values that society continues to impose on them. Despite the massive
influx of women into the workforce through the 1970s and 80s, many
still perceive that women should obtain their professional status while at
the same time remaining at home to raise children. 91 Working women
are also expected to be the primary parent.92 However, as the trend of
independence continues through the turn of the century, traditional val-
ues will fade and the family structure of the 1950s will become a relic.
93
Working women will still take the lead in establishing child care oppor-
tunities, however, and while the demand for such care has dramatically
increased, child care of acceptable quality remains difficult to find or
afford.9
4
The issues of economic inequality are compounded by divorce. Sin-
gle parent women suffer poverty in disproportionate numbers because
of the failure of fathers to adequately support children.95 Although the
average Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payment to a
family of four rose approximately fifty-two percent between 1974 and
1988, prices almost doubled during the same period, causing single-par-
ent women to experience a real decline of more than twenty-five percent
in their financial resources. 96 Even women without dependent children
are disadvantaged by divorce. The consequences of divorce are worse
financially for many women because they tend to lack adequate marketa-
ble skills-a consequence of their position as homemaker during the
marriage.97
of all engineers, 18.1 percent of all lawyers andjudges, 4.8 percent of all police and detec-
tives, and 17.6 percent of all physicians. In the same year, however, women comprised 99
percent of all clerical workers, 94.3 percent of all registered nurses, 96.5 percent of all
child care workers, 87.9 percent of all telephone operators, 85.2 percent of all teachers
(excluding colleges and universities), and 91.1 percent of all data entry operators. RoTH-
ENBERG, supra note 86, at 69-70.
90. SARAH HARDESTY & NEHAMAJACOBS, SUCCESS AND BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS OF WO-
MEN IN CORPORATE AMERICA 209 (1986); See Carol Hymowitz & Timothy D. Schellhardt,
The Glass Ceiling: Why Women Can't Seem to Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them from the
TapJobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1986, § 4.
91. ROTHENBERG, supra note 86, at 70.
92. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 3, 43 (1988). "In most marriages, one parent,
normally the mother, assumes day-to-day primary care." Id.
93. Jo Ann Tooley & Amy Bernstein, Measures of Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 25, 1989, at 6.
94. "The nation's child-care centers are increasingly crowded and supervision is de-
clining, depriving millions of children of attention they need at a critical age. Since the
1970s, enrollment at childcare centers has increased four-fold." Janet Bingham, Child Care
Centers 'Overcrowded, Understaffed', DENY. POST, Nov. 8, 1991, at IA.
95. CENSUS, supra note 13, at 459,462. Between 34 percent and 45 percent of families
with a female householder, no husband present, were below the poverty level in 1987. Id.
96. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 86, at 81.
97. COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, GENDER
&JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS 13 (1990) [hereinafter GENDER BIAS].
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Women suffer most disproportionately in terms of violence.98 It is
estimated that one-quarter to one-third of married women experience
serious violence in their homes, and some studies estimate the number
as high as seventy percent. 9 9 Some form of violence happens in one-
fourth of all marriages. 10 0 One woman is raped in America every six
minutes. 10 1 Approximately two-fifths of women have been sexually mo-
lested by a member of their family, and over one-third of women have
been raped.
10 2
The failure of society to regard the physical protection of women as
a fundamental right has just begun to change.' 0 3 Although women will
continue to insist this victimization cease, the tendency of males to re-
spond to female independence with violence seems likely to persist.
Impact Upon the Courts. With more women moving into the workforce,
there will be an escalating focus on women and workplace issues, such as
sexual harassment. ' 04 Unequal workplace issues such as disparate wage
practices will be individually litigated through the judicial system. 10 5
Scarce and inadequate child care will also be treated as a rights issue
affecting women disproportionately.
Gender issues will also greatly impact family law. The disparate fi-
nancial impact of divorce will lead to alternatives that protect women
and their families to a greater degree.1 0 6 The courts' participation in
the feminization of poverty will also be a major target of reformers.
Many feel the judicial system's inability to adequately enforce child sup-
port payments has played a major role in the institutionalization ofjuve-
nile delinquency and the poverty of single mothers. Finally, as more
women become political leaders, violence against women should be-
come a priority in the judicial system.
B. Families
The fundamental institution of American society is the family, from
which each generation learns the values and behavior it will assume.
The family, as an institution, is undergoing massive restructuring. The
number of families living in poverty is also a major concern, as the im-
98. See Robert Prentky & Ann W. Burgess, Rehabilitation of Child Molesters: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 60(1) AM.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 108, 114 (1990).
99. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 24 (1987).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. See BARRY M. MALETZKY, TREATING THE SEXUAL OFFENDER 222 (1991).
103. Eloise Salhotz, Sex Crimes: Women On Trial, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1991, at 22.
104. Annetta Miller & Dody Tsiantar, Mommy Tracks, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1991, at 48.
See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that in determining whether sexual harassment is sufficiently severe to be
actionable, the court should focus on the female victim's perspective, and not a man's
point of view (i.e., the reasonable woman standard versus the reasonable man). Id.
105. Vicky Cahan, Women At Work, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 28, 1985, at 80, 82.
106. Statistics show that nine out of ten men granted joint custody or visitation rights
pay only some child support. Half Of All Child Support Payments Fall Short, Census Finds,
DENY. POST, Oct. 11, 1991, at A13.
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pact of financial hardships continues to burden the courts.107 Another
consideration for the judiciary is the victimization of families by crime.
With society so dependent upon the family's ability to maintain order
and happiness, the lack of protection that many families experience
bears a significant impact.
The decline of the "traditional family" (i.e. dual spouse, single wage
earner) is the most notable transition occurring. The number of single-
headed households increased during the 1980s.10 8 In 1960, sixty-one
percent of households were single wage-earner, traditional families. To-
day that figure is twenty-two percent. 10 9 With more children being
placed in child care, many people are concerned about how current and
future generations of children will be raised. 1 10 The family role of
teaching values and providing a sense of community to children will be
transferred to churches and schools. 1 1  Traditional families will consist
of fewer children, 1 2 and several "generations of" family members may
live under the same roof. 1
3
The need for dual parent incomes to accommodate even a mini-
mally comfortable lifestyle will result in more single parent families liv-
ing in poverty. 1 4 As income inequality continues to increase through
the year 2000, two income families will increase, while single parent
households will fall further behind.' 15 Nearly one-third of all children
were living below poverty in 1990, 116 and the numbers of children who
are growing up poor will affect the criminal courts through an increase
of cases. An underclass of impoverished children presents an even
greater variety of concerns, however. 17 Economics play a critical role
in a child's future, and the lack of opportunities facing children at the
lower end of the economic scale is a considerable family and societal
107. Austin, supra note 8, at 4. Between 1980 and 1988 the number of persons living in
poverty increased from 26 million to 32 million, a 23 percent increase. Id.
108. Austin, supra note 8, at 4. The number of single parent families increased from 22
percent in 1980 to 27 percent by 1988. Id; CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 372. See
Barbara Kantrowitz, Breaking the Divorce Cycle, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 48.
109. Martha F. Riche, The Future of the Family, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1991, at 44.
110. "We as a society will pay the cost in children who are not prepared to function
effectively later-either socially or in school. Skills gained in the preschool years are the
foundation for all learning that follows in school and in life." Bingham, supra note 94, at
IA.
I 11. See Taylor, supra note 57, at 37 (noting that schools have been enforced to assume
the role of parenting).
112. See CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 369.
113. See Outlook '90, THE FUTURIST, July-Aug. 1989, at 39.
114. See CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 372. Between 1970 and 1980 the propor-
tion of families in poverty who were maintained by women rose from 36 percent to 50
percent-a net increase each year of approximately 100,000 families. ROTHENBERG, supra
note 86, at 80.
115. Children of Divorced Snubbed, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 4, 1991, at 7.
116. Richard Thomas, Middle-Class Blessings: Another View, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at
25.
117. Jean Seligmann, An 'F'for the Nation's Kindergartners, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1991, at
59. More than a third of all children aren't ready to learn when they start school. The
president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching says that largely
because of poverty too many children "are already shockingly restricted even before their
first formal lesson." Id.
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concern. 1 18
Crime will substantially threaten family living. Approximately one
in every four households will be victimized by at least one crime of vio-
lence or theft each year. 119 Accompanying the detrimental effects of
the victimization itself is the perception that the judicial system does not
offer families any protection from crime. A general mood of societal
insecurity is neither a credit nor a benefit to the courts. Questions also
exist about the ability of the judicial system to constructively deal with
juveniles. Studies indicate that current treatment simply habituates
adult criminal behavior and that alternative sentencing may be more
appropriate. 12
0
Inter-family crime is also particularly destructive. Over two million
children were reported abused in 1987.121 These reports, however, of-
fer only a fraction of the actual abuse occurring. Especially in cases of
sexual abuse, it is difficult to determine whether such abuse is on the
rise. 122 Although the numbers may vary, it is evident that a significant
number of children are being victimized.
1 23
Impact Upon the Courts. If the concerns of some sociologists are justified,
changing family structure will lead to more disputes in the future.
124
The disproportionate ethnic breakdown ofjuvenile offenders correlates
to ethnic economic levels, suggesting that poverty plays a large role in
delinquency. 12 5 Criminal courts should anticipate more cases, as a sig-
nificant percentage of children move into adulthood with minimalized
opportunities. 1
2 6
The failure of the justice system to adequately protect families from
118. ROTHENBERG, supra note 86, at 55-56. Economic status, rather than brains,
predicts a child's future. Id.
119. See generally ARTHURJ. LURIGIO, WESLEY G. SKOGAN & ROBERT C. DAVIS, VICTIMS
OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS (1990).
120. SeeJames Austin & Barry Krisberg, The Unmet Promise of Alternatives to Incarceration,
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, July 1982, at 374-409. "The effectiveness of ['an eye for an
eye'] for the redress of wrong doing has its limitations .... Those of us who have acquired
some expertise in modifying behavior, whether we are parents, teachers or therapists, ap-
preciate the liabilities of wanton punishment in effecting long-term behavioral change."
Prentky & Burgess, supra note 98, at 115.
121. Christine Gorman, Incest Comes Out of the Dark, TIME, Oct. 7, 1991, at 46, 47. It is
estimated that perhaps 80 percent of the 200,000-360,000 cases of child sexual abuse that
occur each year involve incest. "Surveys in California and Massachusetts in the 1980s
found that as many as 1 in 5 girls and 1 in 7 boys under the age of 18 had been sexually
abused by a relative-anyone from a father to a mother or an in-law." Id.
122. CENSUS, supra note 13, at 176.
123. Prentky & Burgess, supra note 98, at 114. "Perhaps the most critical hidden im-
pact is the suspected cyclic perpetuation of child sexual abuse. While it may be overly
simplistic to conclude that abuse necessarily begets abuse, the link between sexual abuse at
an early age and inappropriate sexual conduct in adulthood has been frequently noted."
Id.
124. Regarding the changing structure of the family, Johns Hopkins sociologist An-
drew Cherlin says that "[w]e're in the midst of a huge social experiment. We don't know
what the long-term effects will be." Kantrowitz, supra note 108, at 49.
125. In 1987, the nonwhite delinquency case rate (68.1 percent) was 75 percent greater
than the White rate (38.8 percent). U.S. Dep't. Just., Juvenile Justice Bulletin: OJJDP Update
on Statistics, July 1991, at 4.
126. RICHARD LAMM, MEGATRAUMAS: AMERICA AT THE YEAR 2000 84-89 (1985).
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crime will also persist. Resulting public unrest will put more pressure
on the courts. Alternatives to protection by the police and the judiciary
will be private security and citizen responses, the legality of which may
be challenged in courts. 12 7 Every class will feel the effect of having to
seek protection from criminal victimization, resulting in a society that
feels unprotected, apprehensive and unsettled.
128
C. Racial and Ethnic Groups
Minority racial and ethnic groups are also expected to fight for
rights long kept from them. Like women, minorities will constitute a
growing proportion of the workforce. Similarly, they will continue to
face a conspicuous gap in wages. The disproportionate percentage of
lowerclass minorities will continue to rise, raising concerns and ten-
sions. Particular attention should be directed at the causes of the dispa-
rate participation rates in the criminal justice system. Minorities will
exert more political influence as the population of Blacks, Hispanics,
and Asians increases to 23-28% by 2000.129 During the 1980-1990 pe-
riod, the nation's minority group populations increased nearly five times
the rate of the Anglo population.1 3 0 Similarly, while Anglos are still ex-
pected to maintain a nearly four-to-one majority in the workforce by the
year 2010, increases in the numbers of minorities will trigger changes in
workforce composition. 13 1 Both Blacks and Hispanics continue to enter
the workforce at faster rates than Whites.' 3 2 Between 1988 and 2000,
the minority workforce is expected to grow at three times the rate of the
Anglo workforce.13 3 These demographic changes promise to bring
about modifications in the White-dominated status quo, changes that
could increase disputes over unfair labor practices. Part of the conflict
will come from Whites reluctant to give up power and control, making
the transition potentially turbulent.'
3 4
Accompanying the influx of minorities into the workforce is a signif-
127. See generally BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE
STATE (1990).
128. See supra note 127.
129. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 337.
About 20 million people of Latin American background now live in the U.S. In
the 1980s, their numbers have grown five times as fast as the non-Hispanic popu-
lation. High levels of immigration and high birthrates are expected to keep that
growth going well into the next century. Hispanics, now 8 percent of Americans,
may be the largest ethnic minority by 2015, surpassing blacks.
Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 144.
130. CENSUS, supra note 13, at 14-16. By 2010, minority groups will comprise 30 per-
cent of the national population. Id. at 14-15.
131. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 357. See also TOWERS PERRIN & HUDSON INSTI-
TuTE, supra note 14, at 1. "The proportion of blacks in the labor force is projected to rise
to 12 percent by 2000, compared with 10 percent in 1976 and 11 percent in 1988. Hispan-
ics are projected to increase their share of the labor force from 7 percent in 1988 to 10
percent by 2000." Fullerton, supra note 15, at 3.
132. Fullerton, supra note 15, at 4.
133. Id.
134. Scott Minerbrook & Miriam Horn, Side By Side, Apart, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
Nov. 4, 1991, at 44.
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icant gap in their earnings compared to earnings of White workers.' 3 5
In 1985, Black and Hispanic men who worked full-time had average
earnings of $17,479, while the average salary for a White man was
$25,062.136 The disparity for minority women is even greater. The av-
erage full-time salary for White women in 1985 was $15,796; for Black
women it was $14,308; and for Hispanic women it was $13,066.13 7 A
1987 study done by The National Committee on Pay Equity concluded
that in New York state, a five to six percent increase in Black and His-
panic representation in a job was accompanied by a five percent salary
decrease for the position.'
3 8
The wage gap, however, is only one of many factors that contributes
to the high numbers of minorities in poverty. Between 1962 and 1982,
Blacks gained in education, political representation and white-collar em-
ployment, but not in overall jobs or income.13 9 The burden of poverty
falls on families headed by minority women. 140 Almost three-fourths of
poor minority families are headed by women. 14 1 Minority women not
only bear the economic disadvantage of unequal racial practices, but of
unequal gender practices as well. 14 2 Consequently, one out of every
two Black children and one out of every three Hispanic children are liv-
ing in poverty.14
3
The unequal number of poverty-stricken minorities is created in
part by the lack of opportunities available through traditional means of
improvement. Racial and ethnic minorities have been subject to more
educational, health, crime, drug and alcohol-related stresses than the
White middle class. 144 This trend has worsened in recent years.145 Un-
equal opportunities between Whites and minorities will be exacerbated
135. ROTHENBERG, supra note 86, at 55. "[T]he employment,'earnings, and social mo-
bility gaps separating blacks and whites in this country have scarcely changed in a cen-
tury." Id.
136. Id. at 71.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 82-83. See also Krugman, supra note 52, at 63.
In 1970 the median income of black families was 60 percent of white family
income; by 1990, the ratio had actually fallen to 58 percent. Over the past 20
years, unemployment among blacks has risen higher in each successive recession
and fallen less with each recovery. In 1970, black unemployment was 8.2 percent;
by 1990, it had reached 11.3 percent. Black impoverishment hasn't fallen either.
In 1990, almost 32 percent of blacks lived in poverty, up from about 30 percent in
1974. And black men who work full time earn 30 percent less than white male
counterparts, a gap that has grown since the 1970s. Working women are an ex-
ception. Black women who hold full-time jobs earn just 10 percent less than
white women.... It is virtually impossible to look at the economic state of blacks
today without turning to issues of family and social cohesion-and it is next to
impossible to raise those issues without touching raw nerves. And, with 45 per-
cent of black children living in poverty and 62 percent born out of wedlock, these
problems are likely to get worse.
Id.
140. GREGJ. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY: THE CHANGING ECONOMIC
FORTUNES OF AMERICAN WORKERS AND FAMILIES 63 (1984).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Austin, supra note 8, at 4.
144. Often overlooked in the disproportionate numbers of Hispanics and Blacks that
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by the coming changes in the workplace. 14 6 Prospects for professional,
technical, managerial, sales and service jobs will be more prevalent than
opportunities in other fields more dependent upon education.1 4 7 De-
spite labor shortages, the unemployment rate for Blacks is more than
twice as high as the rate for Whites.14 8 Additionally, the number of mi-
norities participating in the labor force (i.e. employed or looking for
work) has been steadily declining.
149
The racial and ethnic disparities found in education, labor and eco-
nomics are also found in the criminal justice system.1 50 Minorities re-
ceive higher sentences in criminal cases than do Whites charged with the
same crime. 15 1 The numbers of Black and Hispanic males that are
either incarcerated or on probation or parole on any given day are
grossly disproportionate to their percentage of the population.
152
Although crime rates increased by only two percent in the period during
1979-88, the number of prison inmates doubled during that time-in-
mates that were disproportionately non-white.
1 5 3
As the political and social strengths of minorities grow, they will
demand that equality become a reality, not a goal. The civil rights victo-
ries of the 1960s were helped along by the apathy of many unaffected
Americans. With today's technology, the media enjoins everyone in the
country in majority-minority confrontations. 154 Few will be exempt
from responding to the growing diversity, and it is not yet clear whether
the majority will prove itself to be more or less amenable to equalizing
minorities rights than past generations.
15 5
Impact Upon the Courts. The influx of minorities into the workforce could
create friction from Whites unprepared for the growing diversity. Mi-
norities may use courts to counter White dominated management when
business practices are discriminatory. Blacks and Hispanics may also ad-
dress inequalities in wage levels more aggressively as cultural diversity
begins to infiltrate into all areas of leadership.
participate in the criminal justice system is that ethnic and racial minorities are dispropor-
tionately victims of crime. Id. at 4.
145. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 86, at 88-98.
146. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
147. See JOHNSTON, supra note 11, at 95-103.
148. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OPPORTUNITY 2000 65-69 (1988).
149. Id.
150. Austin, supra note 8, at 2.
151. See JOAN PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM Viii
(1983).
152. Over one out of every ten Hispanic men (10.4 percent) in the age group 20-29 is
either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole, while almost one in four (23 percent)
Black males in the same age group is participating in the criminal justice system on a given
day. For White men, the ratio is considerably lower-one in 16 (or 6.2 percent). Austin,
supra note 8, at 2.
153. Austin, supra note 8, at 2.
154. See, e.g., Gregory Cerio, Did Gates Get the Message?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1991, at 44;
Maria Newman, 'ictim of Bias Attack, 14, Wrestles With His Anger, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 9, 1992, at
Al.
155. See Matthew Cooper & Darian Friedman, Governor Duke?, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 42.
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The disproportionate number of minorities in poverty, however,
seems likely to persist. Further, the high number of impoverished mi-
norities will continue to distort racial issues. The probable economic
hardships and workforce changes will hit minorities more severely than
Whites. The cycle of poverty will continue to draw disproportionate
numbers of minorities into the criminal justice system. Economic strain
exacerbates cultural and ethnic disputes, and the result may be an irrec-
oncilable polarization of separate groups. Instead of striving toward co-
operation and an integration of diversity, groups may choose the
protection of self-interest.
156
As the minority population increases, so to will the number of mi-
norities involved in law and politics. Until minorities feel they have at-
tained equality, however, disputes will remain over methods that
attempt to correct the inequality problem. With the demography of so-
ciety in transition, emotions tied to racial and ethnic issues will be hard
pressed as ever to remain non-violent.
The courts themselves are not well-prepared for the social diversity
of the future. Dealing with group conflict will be expected, but the cred-
ibility of the justice system hinges on its ability to be accepted by the
growing numbers of minorities. These groups may demand that the
courts in both rulings and makeup reflect a more contemporary reality.
The judiciary has always been able to couch itself as being independent
of the will of citizens, and many of its principles are dependent upon
that status. But society's failure to equalize rights and opportunities for
all citizens will result in courts sharing in the backlash of reform, per-
haps to the point where fundamental judicial principles are lost.
IV. HEALTH AND AGING ISSUES
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, health concerns have be-
come more important to Americans. People are changing their lifestyles
in an attempt to become healthier. Further, medical technology has re-
mained one of the most dynamic fields for invention and discovery, and
at the current rate medical knowledge is doubling every eight years.15 7
Medical technology will create new opportunities to extend the length of
life over the next thirty years.' 5 8 These advances, however, will outpace
answers to the legal and moral questions accompanying the new discov-
eries.' 5 9 One result of these advances will be a population that lives
longer. 160 The other dynamic transformations that will accompany such
advances may result in disputes which have significant impact upon
courts.
156. See John Schwartz, A Screenful of Venom, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 48.
157. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 365.
158. Id. at 371.
159. Id. at 346. See Morrow, supra note 83, at 56.




Developing technology will open new healthcare possibilities.
However, technology will not be able to respond quickly enough to the
growing dilemmas of AIDS and mental illness. While AIDS will con-
tinue to be one of the most publicly debated health care concerns, there
will be growing anxiety about mental health as economic hardship forces
the mentally ill onto the streets. The cost of these medical advances and
health treatments will be borne by all, exerting economic stresses upon
society.
Medical advances will offer startling opportunities for better health,
but will be accompanied by ethical concerns. For example, human re-
production will undergo drastic changes, creating ambiguities about the
definition of "parenthood."' 16 1 Sexual intercourse is no longer neces-
sary for reproduction, due to technology-mediated reproduction, prena-
tal diagnosis, genetic intervention, sex pre-selection and
commercialization of human reproduction. 162 However, along with
these advances come ethical questions about the possibility of having
genetically designed children.
163
Other probable advances include artificial blood, human growth
hormones, memory-recall drugs and newborns with particular disease
immunities. 164 Medical advances will include artificial body parts. 16 5
Elimination of a great deal of exploratory surgery will occur through
computer-based imaging tools which provide cross-sections of soft and
hard tissues.1 6 6 Laser surgery will decrease patient trauma and the
length of hospital stays, thus lowering some medical costs. 167 Experi-
mental brain cell transplants may soon be available to aid victims of re-
tardation and head trauma. 168 An injured heart may be repaired by
using muscles from other parts of the body. 169 We can expect develop-
ment of better bionic limbs and hearts, drugs that prevent disease and
161. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 58. A number of
bizarre court cases have cropped up as a result of ambiguities in the rules governing new
technologies. In one peculiar case, a wealthy couple died in a plane accident, leaving two
frozen embryos as the couple's only direct heirs. A court decided that the embryos could
not inherit the estate. In a case that is still pending a divorced Tennessee couple is bat-
tling over whether the woman has the right to make use of frozen embryos created while
the couple was still married. Id. at 63.
162. ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULAING REPRODUCTION 6-9 (1990).
163. Shannon Brownlee &Joanne Silberner, The Age of Genes, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 4, 1991, at 64, 76.
Society's knotty decisions will become even more tangled as the massive
Human Genome Project lumbers toward its goal of mapping the location of every
human gene, including those that govern such traits as intelligence, coordination
and grace. That knowledge will expand the potential of genetic engineering far
beyond the correction of disease and push it toward the realm of social
engineering.
Id. at 76.
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body monitors that are able to warn of trouble.1 70
It is estimated that more than 100 billion dollars will be spent
before the next decade on genetic engineering. 17 1 Common medical
practice may include replacing defective genes with healthy substi-
tutes. 172 "By the year 2010, every family will probably have a member
who has undergone such a treatment."1 7 3 It is possible that the day will
come when as much as fifty percent of a human body contains techno-
logical implants.' 74 One result of technology is that people are being
forced to explicitly define their values. Ultimately, this forced awareness
may help society better clarify its resolutions and beliefs.
In recent decades infectious diseases caused only one percent of
deaths in people over the age of seventy-five, although that percentage
may be affected by the AIDS virus. 175 Chronic and degenerative dis-
eased patients are generally what fill hospitals.176 Most common dis-
eases are multifactorial due to a combination of internal and external
causes.1 77 Future technological developments may identify 80-100 dif-
ferent disease-predisposing genes by testing one sample from an
individual. 1
7 8
Health goals at the beginning of this century were oriented towards
avoiding epidemic disease, escaping tuberculosis and living to age sixty-
five.' 79 We have a vastly different perspective in the 1990s, where
reaching age eighty-five can be a goal for most people and infectious
diseases are largely controlled. 180 We now must struggle against epi-
demic disease generated by lifestyle, such as coronary heart disease and
lung cancer. 18 1
AIDS will remain a national concern. By the year 2000, $50 billion
will be spent on AIDS research and treatment. By the turn of the cen-
tury, every taxpayer will pay $500 a year to care for AIDS patients.18 2 It
is estimated that ten million people worldwide are infected with the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS. 183 Scientists
agree that a cure or vaccine for AIDS is at least five years away, although
drugs like AZT and genetic-engineering techniques provide some
hope. 184 Within that time span it is estimated that over 175,000 people
170. Id.
171. Id. at 346.
172. See Outlook '90, THE FUTURIST, May-June 1989, at 57.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. P. A. Baird, Genetics and Health Care: A Paradigm Shift, 33 PERSPECTIVES IN Bio. AND
MED. 203, 205 (1990).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 206.




182. CETRON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 367.
183. Jerry Adler, Living With the Virus, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 63.
184. SUZANNE LEVERT, AIDS IN SEARCH OF A KILLER 128 (1987).
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will die from AIDS related infections.18 5 AIDS has already polarized
people's opinions because of its association with homosexuals and intra-
venous drug users. As the'disease crosses into the lives of heterosexuals
and the mainstream, the ignorance and helplessness of many people will
raise tensions in society.
186
Mental illness will also be a concern. Discontinued funding of pub-
lic mental health services was a significant cause of the rise in homeless-
ness during the 1980s. 18 7  Colorado's former director of the
Department of Institutions estimated that half of the state's homeless
were mentally ill and displaced from institutions because of budget
cuts.' 8 8 The inability of the mentally ill to care for themselves and the
reluctance of most insurance companies to cover mental health claims
suggests that more homelessness resulting from mental illness may oc-
cur in the future.18 9 Another concern is the impact that growing num-
bers of elderly will have on mental health services. Forecasts of an aging
population will bring along an increase in mentally ill senior citizens. 190
The rising cost of health services is an issue that will impact all citi-
zens. Health care cost $685 billion in -1990, up from $618 billion in
1989 and $559 billion in 1988.191 After adjusting for inflation, health
care expenditures have risen since 1950 at annual rates of 5.5% overall
and 4.1% per capita. Since 1950 the personal health care proportion of
GNP has nearly tripled and total health care is forecasted to reach fifteen
percent of GNP by the year 2000.192 Although health care costs will
hinder families by a reducing their disposable income, businesses may
be most stymied by these costs, where the burden of health benefits is
noticeably sapping profits and prohibiting expansion. 193 Concern
about rising costs have brought about calls for massive reform of the
medical industry, but it is unlikely that the cost of expensive health serv-
-ices can be dramatically reduced. 194 Suggestions for reducing costs in-
clude rationing to those who are either insured or able to pay for
185. Id.
186. Adler, supra note 183, at 64. "It is a disease that lends itself to proselytizing, both
because it is so easily prevented and the needs of its sufferers are so great." Id.
187. RAELJEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS 1-4 (1990).
188. Henry Solano, Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future, "Aging, Health & Homeless
Subgroup Report 2 (Apr. 11, 1991).
189. Geoffrey Cowley, Money Madness, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 50. The welfare of
patients is being eclipsed by marketplace incentives and pressures. Says the former presi-
dent of the American Psychiatry Association, "it is the major issue in psychiatric care today.
Psychiatric standards are on a slippery slope as hospitals try to survive." Id.
190. Ann Schrader, Mental Health Crisis Foreseen for Growing Elderly Class, DEN,. PosT,
Dec. 4, 1991, at 5B.
191. National health expenditures have increased steadily at an average rate of 11.5
percent annually since 1970, during which time health care, as a percent of GNP, increased
from 7.4 percent to 11.1 percent. Kirchner, supra note 46, at 20.
192. Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us,
247 SCIENCE 418 (1990). The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the percentage
of the federal budget spent on health care, which stood at 10.5 percent in 1980, will rise to
almost 20 percent by 1996. Id.
193. Frieden, supra note 46, at 38.
194. Id.
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services.' 9 5 However, while many see rationing as a necessary and logi-
cal step, the issue may likely invite litigation of discrimination and ine-
quality disputes.
Impact Upon the Courts. The most important issue for the courts is that
medical advances will become reality before the legal and ethical impli-
cations have been considered. 196 Accompanying technological ad-
vances will be legal questions concerning how to equitably distribute
medical capabilities as well as when to terminate extraordinary life-sup-
port efforts. Society has become increasingly dissatisfied with letting
courts decide the answers. The judiciary has functioned independently
in large part because the vast majority of citizens have never had reason
to question it. The courts enforced what were essentially common laws.
But as people see technology making miracles possible, they will not be
satisfied with courts deciding the legality of certain treatments, espe-
cially if a particular ruling violates deeply held moral beliefs.'
9 7
Individuals denied treatment for any number of reasons will turn to
the courts and fight discrimination suits.1 98 Moreover, disputes will
arise over insurers refusing to pay for treatments.1 99 Insurers, trying to
avoid the costs associated with new technology in health care, will ex-
pand the definition of "experimental treatment," which is usually not
covered.
20 6
Growing concern over AIDS will also bring about disputes over the
allocation and approval of treatments. The courts will have to deal with
195. Id. at 63. "It comes down to a fundamental issue of health care rationing in the
minds of those who feel experimental treatments should not be underwritten by private
industry." Jeffrey L. Lenow & Stephan Quentzel, Experimental Treatment: Who Pays?, Bus. &
HEALTH, Oct. 1991, at 104.
196. See Morrow, supra note 83, at 56; Thomas H. Murray, Ethical Issues in Human Genome
Research, 5 THE FASEB J. 55, 58 (1991).
197. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 162, at 58.
The new techniques have also given birth to once unimaginable ethical dilemmas.
Do sperm and egg donors have a claim on their biological offspring, and vice
versa? Do embryos, frozen or thawed, have a constitutional right to life? How
much manipulation of genetic material will society be willing to permit?
Id.
198. Brownlee & Silberner, supra note 164, at 66. There is concern that because of
genetic advances health insurers, employers and the governments will gain access to ge-
netic information and unfairly discriminate against people on the basis of their genes.
[Twenty] percent of companies already use genetic tests on employees, in part to
hold down corporate health-care costs. In addition, 15 percent of 400 employers
surveyed by an insurer intend to screen prospective employees' dependents.
While such practices may make economic sense, ethicists worry that they are dis-
criminatory, particularly since genetic traits often cannot predict with certainty if
or when their bearer will fall ill.
Id.
199. See Kirchner, supra note 46, at 20.
200. Lenow & Quentzel, supra note 196, at 104.
It comes down to a fundamental issue of health care rationing in the minds of
those who feel experimental treatments should not be underwritten by private
industry .... It's likely that employers will see increased sophistication on the part
of insurers with regard to experimental and investigational language, and to for-





cases concerning the rights of HIV or AIDS inflicted people who are
discriminated against. There will be an increase in incidences of crime
as well as the fear of AIDS results in violence, both by and against peo-
ple infected. 20 1 The courts will hear civil and criminal claims by people
who unknowingly acquire the virus from an infected person. Other dis-
putes will arise because of abuses in mental health institutions and
services.
20 2
The rising costs of health care will multiply disputes and litigation
as individuals, businesses and insurers struggle to deal with the burden
of paying these costs. 203 Individuals will use the courts to demand in-
surance coverage, while employers and insurers attempt to limit their
coverage obligations. As many as seventy million Americans lacked
health insurance at some point during 1991.204
The fear of medical malpractice will continue to raise health care
costs and create additional second level issues and disputes. 20 5 Doctors
fearing malpractice suits for improper diagnoses may use unnecessary
technology and tests to ensure safety.20 6 Insurers subjected to the ad-
ded costs and individuals subjected to the unnecessary tests will use the
courts to individually litigate their disputes. Health care reformists will
continue to attack the costs of malpractice suits and will press for
changes in the litigation of those cases. 20 7 Further, many believe that
the health care business supports itself with inappropriate and unneces-
sary use of expensive technology.
20 8
B. Aging Population
One of the most direct results of the advances in medicine is the
201. James N. Baker, Battling the Bias, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1991, at 25. A man infected
with AIDS was arrested in Cincinnati, and claims that he was beaten by county corrections
officers. The officers say the man intentionally spewed blood from a nosebleed on four
people. The man is scheduled to stand trial for attempted murder with the AIDS virus.
The increasing violence against gays may be caused by mounting fear and anger over the
spread of AIDS. Monitoring incidents in six major cities showed that bias crimes against
homosexuals jumped by 42 percent between 1989 and 1990. Id.
202. Geoffrey Cowley, supra note 189, at 50, 51. In response to shrinking allocation of
insurance dollars to mental health claims, some private psychiatric hospital have resorted
to kidnapping patients and holding them against their will in order to extract higher fees.
Id.
203. "The welfare of patients is being eclipsed by marketplace incentives and pres-
sures... [h]ospitals are trying to make money. Employers are trying to save money. In that
tug of war, all sorts of extremes have happened." Id.
204. See Frieden, supra note 46, at 38.
205. Id. at 65. According to American Medical Association estimates, medical malprac-
tice costs add an extra $3 billion to the nation's health care bill. Id.
206. The high cost of medical malpractice is one of the more visible contributors
to the high cost of medical care, both in terms of expensive malpractice insurance
premiums-the cost of which physicians must pass on to payers-and the amount
of 'defensive medicine' performed in case of a possible lawsuit.
Id.
207. "Most health care reformers address medical malpractice issues in their propos-
als, largely through suggestions for reform of the tort system. The most common sugges-
tions by far include increasing the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques." Id.
208. "Forty percent of the annual rise in total health care costs come from the use,
misuse and overuse of high tech treatments." Kirchner, supra note 46, at 20.
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trend of an aging population. By 2020, seventeen percent of the na-
tional population will be over sixty-five and the number of people over
eighty-five will have doubled.20 9 By 2010, 38-44 million people will be
sixty-five or over. 2 10 By 2020, the number of people in this age bracket
will have increased to 49-58 million, having a significant impact on the
resources of the Social Security Administration. 2 1 1 The number of
Americans over age seventy-five will grow by almost thirty-five percent
by the year 2000, greatly increasing the numbers who are physically and
mentally disabled.2 12 Growing numbers of elderly will also have an im-
pact upon the workforce. Businesses will offer older workers and retir-
ees flexible work schedules and retirement options to reverse the trend
of early retirement and retain skilled laborers.213 Companies will recog-
nize the need to provide more "eldercare" benefits-similar to child-
care benefits-to assist those who must care for older relatives.
2 14
The aging population will also create shifts in the economy. Tradi-
tionally, the prime working age population has been between ages
twenty-five and forty-four. This group makes up the majority of workers
and first-time home buyers and also provides the bulk of resources
needed to supply services to the young and elderly.215 Although the
percentage of people in this age bracket will remain stable over the next
fifteen years, after 2005 they will drop as a share of total population.
2 16
By 2010, only forty-one percent of the population will be between the
ages of twenty-five and forty-four, and this number will continue to
drop.2 1 7 Families already under economic stress will be further taxed by
the need to support their elderly parents, creating a "sandwich
generation."
Accompanying those pressures are concerns about the economic se-
curity of seniors. There are doubts about Social Security and its re-
sources and a developing problem with pension funds. 2 18 Even if
pensions and Social Security are healthy, most fixed-income seniors will
live on significantly less than what they earned while employed, forcing
many below the poverty level. 2 19 Health care costs will further reduce
209. By 2000, 20 percent of the state's population will be over 55 compared with 17
percent today. By 2015 this percentage will have risen to 29 percent, caused by a dramatic
surge of baby boomers entering their sixties. Kendall, supra note 29, at 1.
210. See ROBERT E. KENNEDY, JR., LIFE CHOICES 129 (1986).
211. Id. at 129, 131 & 133.
212. See Outlook '90, supra note 113, at 39.
213. Id.
214. See Miller & Tsiantar, supra note 104, at 49.
215. Kendall, supra note 29, at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Schwartz, The Grasshopper and the Ant: A Retirement Fable, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS,
Mar. 1991, at 9, 10. Only 23 percent of baby boomers (aged 26 to 44) have a secure
feeling about Social Security. See Levinson, Retire or Bust, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1991, at 50.
The instability of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal agency that in-
sures the pensions of 40 million workers, is growing into an "S&L-type" dilemma. Id.
219. SeeJohn Tull, Meeting the Future Need for Legal Services By the Elderly Population. Can
We Do It? (paper prepared for AARP Conference, Nov. 1989), at 2.
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the availability of discretionary income for the older population. 220
These trends signal a dramatic increase in the indigent elderly, espe-
cially among minority women.
22 1
Impact Upon the Courts. If seniors are faced with serious financial hard-
ships, funding may become scarce for government services, including
the judicial system. The growing class of seniors is becoming more or-
ganized as a political lobby, and elderly citizens are asserting their rights
in court.2 22 A collapse of financial security for such a significant portion
of the population would greatly increase social unrest.
Although the elderly are less likely to commit violent crimes, family
cases and other disputes brought in response to mentally ill seniors
should be expected. Other conflicts regarding living wills, prenuptial
agreements, the independence of the elderly and the regulation and su-
pervision of nursing homes, mortuaries and cemeteries are all issues
that will continue to be disputed in court as the percentage of seniors
grows. Increases in probate and estate cases and serious traffic viola-
tions are also anticipated. 2 23 Divorce and the potential loss of home,
retirement money, pension plans and medical plans will continue to be
meaningfiul issues with implications unique to the aged. In addition, the
elderly will need the protection of the courts from economic fraud and
physical abuse. 2 24 Seniors may also bring about changes in the courts
themselves, with calls for more accessible courthouses and simplified
legal processes.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Environmental issues will be of great interest to society in the next
30 years.2 25 Futurists predict that activist baby boomers will call for cor-
rections of major environmental problems such as air pollution, acid
rain, loss of forests, depletion of the ozone layer, global climate change,
toxic chemicals in food and water, soil erosion, extinction of species and
pollution of beaches, oceans, reservoirs and waterways. 2 26 Potential re-
sponses could affect the restructuring of many aspects of society.
22 7
220. Id.
221. Paul Saffo, Institute for the Future, The Family in the Future, Families in Court: A National
Symposium, National Council ofJuvenile and Family Court Judges (1989).
222. Katrine Ames, et al. Grandma Goes to Court, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 67.
223. The youngest (aged 16 to 24) and oldest (aged 65 and older) drivers have the
highest rankings for fatalities, accidents and costs to insurance companies per mile driven.
Because they are more frail, older drivers also suffer more than younger drivers when they
are involved in an accident. Dan Fost, Who's Too Old to Drive, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept.
1991, at 8.
224. See Hilary Stout, God Send for Many, Home-Care Industry Also Has Potential for Fraud
and Abuse, WALL ST.J., Nov. 21, 1991, at B1. The burgeoning home health-care industry
that services many seniors also has been the vehicle for physical assault, theft and fraud. Id.
225. Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 154.
226. CEMON & DAVIES, supra note 1, at 367.
227. Sharon Begley, Bring Back the Ozone Layer!, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 49. The
EPA predicts that UV-induced cataracts and skin cancer will cause an extra 12 million
cancer cases among Americans over the next 50 years. Already skin cancer rates have
doubled since 1980. Id.
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As businesses respond to increased regulation and vocal consumer
demand with environmentally helpful practices, economic growth may
be stagnated. 228 Over the next ten to fifteen years, business will go
through the expensive process of conforming their activities to govern-
ment standards. Were this the only effect of environmental issues upon
the future it would still be significant. The huge cost of environmental
regulations upon corporations was a contributing factor to the late '80s
recession. It is well argued that corporations should make their prac-
tices environmentally sound. Doing so, however, will present significant
social costs, which may cause people to lose sight of the need to immedi-
ately address environmental issues. Although popular spirit is currently
high for protecting the environment, as the economy continues to suf-
fer, many may find their ideological preference for a healthy Earth in-
compatible with their immediate economic needs. Inevitably, this
tension between a profit-based economy and a sound environment will
be balanced by the courts. Regardless, the impact of environmental is-
sues upon the economy will accompany the economic concerns created
by the trends in health and labor, and exacerbate the potential for socie-
tal tension and increasing poverty.
At the state and local level, environmental conflicts will exist be-
tween those who want to preserve natural resources and those who wish
to use them for leisure, manufacturing products and creating jobs.
2 2 9
As economic trends affect more individuals and communities, calls for
short term economic solutions will be pitted against long term environ-
mental issues. State economies, more dependent upon their fragile eco-
systems than the nation as a whole, will be hit first if environmental
mismanagement comes to bear. Between now and the year 2020, state
law makers will respond to citizens demanding environmental rights
with legislation intended to safeguard the depletion of the earth's re-
sources. Federal regulatory agencies will also make additional rules, as
they seek to enforce a safe and clean environment.
23 0
The environmental doom forecasters have clearly outlined the ef-
fects of environmentally destructive practices. There also remains the
possibility that the harmful practices of past generations will begin to
show their effects within the next thirty years. 2 3 1 If this is true, the
grumbling from profit-stymied industries will be faint compared to that
of the rest of society suffering life under various collapses of the ecosys-
tem. 23 2 Although the Government has practice in cleaning up a few
228. Thomas, supra note 116, at 25. Much of the economic growth of the 1980s was
spent on the environment, rather than on wages. Id.
229. Michael Satchell, Any Color But Green, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 21, 1991, at
74-76.
230. See Eugene Linden, Hot Air at the Earth Summit?, TME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 77. Many
conservationists believe the prospect of lost opportunities in the global marketplace will
persuade the Bush Administration to be more forthcoming in initiating environmental leg-
islation. Id.
231. Begley, supra note 227, at 49.
232. Brook Larmer, Life Under the Ozone Hole, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9. 1991, at 43.
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man-made spills, it has no experience combating irreversible, large scale
environmental damage. t
Current popular opinion is strong enough to inspire measures to
deal with these potential disasters, and the courts will be the forum in
which to enforce these measures. However, with so many other immedi-
ate, albeit short-term, issues becoming prominent over the next fifteen
years, the potential exists that environment concerns will not remain a
priority.
233
Impact Upon the Courts. In addition to handling specific environmental
cases, the courts will be affected by increased concern and debate over
environmental regulation. 23 4 As this ,topic becomes more prominent,
the courts can expect an increase in disputes. 23 5 When consumer de-
mand increases and natural resources are depleted, courts will be asked
to address a number of environmental issues concerning our air, water,
topsoil and waste as well as deforestation and negligent land use.
Environmental disputes could stretch beyond state and national
boundaries. 23 6 Many may need to be addressed on a global, multilateral
basis. In addition, dangers in the industrial environment will compel
review of environmental law in the context of personal injury and public
and corporate responsibility. People physically or economically hurt by
environmental mismanagement will use the courts to redress that harm.
Governments and businesses will be held liable for unsafe work or
school environments. These increased demands may bring about a
need for specialized, regionally-based environmental courts.
The multi-jurisdictional nature of these issues will create more fed-
eral regulatory agency involvement in environmental matters. Federal
agencies will enforce safeguards for a clean and safe environment. State
courts will have the responsibility to determine rights to local resources.
Colorado's water courts, which resolve property disputes over water
rights in the state, are a good example. At the state'and local level dis-
putes may also arise over land use. In Colorado, the recreational use of
land is creating conflicts between hunters and wilderness advocates, and
snowmobilers and cross-country skiers. Since there will be less land per
person as the population increases, future land use disputes could in-
clude zoning, housing and transportation conflicts as well as disagree-
ment over the long term use of pesticides for cultivation and the
recreational use of land.
233. Stephen Budiansky, The Ultimate Security Risk, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 17,
1992, at 6.
234. Id.
235. Frank E. Allen, Few Big Firms Get Jail Time for Polluting, WALL ST.J., Dec. 9, 1991, at
B1. For fiscal 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency had 125 indictments, 72 convic-
tions and $14.1 million in fines. Convicted defendants served prison terms totaling 550
months, an increase of 121 percent from the prior fiscal year. However, the article cites
concern that smaller companies are much more likely to receive jail time for polluting than
big firms. Only nine percent of large-company offenders had any of their people sent to
jail, while 25 percent of small companies had people ordered to serve time. Id.
236. Linden, supra note 230, at 77.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Futurists suggest there are a number of ways in which the future
could unfold. While social and demographic trends may seem to lead to
a distinct destination, unforseen events can always alter that course. Re-
gardless of that possibility, important future trends must be identified.
By studying changes in society, futurists can paint a portrait of what the
future may consist.
The question arises, however, why plan for change? Courts have
survived social change throughout history. If Thomas Jefferson stepped
into a courtroom today, the settings would not seem unfamiliar.23 7 The
physical structure of a courtroom is much the same as are the rules of
evidence and the adjudicative process. It would seem that knowing and
understanding the implications of future trends upon the courts would
be helpful, but hardly essential information.
The importance of future social trends is tied to accepting the need
to plan for the courts. If it is accepted that thejudiciary's responsibility
is to be affordable, accessible and responsive to the needs of the public,
then it is essential that courts plan because their ability to perform these
functions will face significant obstacles in the years ahead.
237. Judge John J. Daffron, Virginia Superior Court, in speech given to members of
"Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future," January 18, 1991.
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A DAY IN THE LIFE OF S. BRECKINRIDGE
TUSHINGHAM
as recorded by ERIK M. JENSEN*
The law school building had been riddled with gunfire. Bodies lay
in disarray, their arms and legs horribly distended. Hungry buzzards
circled overhead.
While you catch your breath, let me assure you that the first para-
graph has nothing to do with the rest of this work. The language, which
would have made even Bulwer-Lytton gag, is a come-on. It does noth-
ing more than alert you to the fictional nature of our journey and to my
long-term goal: to be the Robert B. Parker of law reviews.
Law reviews have always printed a lot of fiction, hidden among the
"with respect to's" and "take account of's."'I But in the past, little of
the stuff met FTC labelling standards. Now the pretense is gone. Every-
one's telling stories, often short ones that must have been dashed off on
a long weekend.
2
If everybody else is getting away with emoting in legal journals and
books-publishing fabricated life stories as scholarship3 and beefing up
simple points with extended dialogue-hey! I want to jump on the band-
wagon before the wheels fall off. I can "hear the call of stories" as well
as anyone.4 (In fact, I hear one now.)
I haven't been to prison yet,5 but there ought to be a place for sto-
ries from WASPs with no arrest records, too. And I'm willing to drop an
occasional footnote so that this will look sufficiently law-reviewish for
the purists.
6
My name is Samuel Breckinridge Tushingham, "Breck" for short.
(It had to be something for short, and one of the alternatives was far
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
1. At The New Yorker, law review prose is valued for its elegance-further evidence of
that once great journal's decline. See Briefly Noted, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 21, 1991, at 134
(reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991))
("The author... writes like a law professor, constructing tight arguments whose precision
offers aesthetic as well as intellectual pleasure.").
2. See Arthur Austin, The Waste Land, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1241 ("the new fad
of storytelling was the newest scam in legal scholarship"). Naturally, the quoted line ap-
pears in a story.
3. Cf. AMANDA CROSS, THE PLAYERS COME AGAIN 228 (1990) ("It doesn't have to be
the truth, just your vision of it, written down .... ").
4. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991).
5. See Mumia Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between Life and Death, 100 YALE L.J.
993 (1991) (essay by death row inmate); Joseph M. Giarratano, "To the Best of Our Knowl-
edge, We Have Never Been Wrong'" Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J.
1005 (1991) (essay by death row inmate).
6. See supra notes 1-5 and infra notes 7-34.
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worse.) 7 My bloodlines are good. Some of my ancestors came over on
the Mayflower, heaving their guts out along the way. They could have
formed chapters of Great-Great-Great-Grandfathers and grandmothers
of the American Revolution, if only they'd had a better idea of what was
to follow.
I was once a lawyer, and you know how that can be. Or, if you
don't, consider yourself blessed. One 500-page set of lease documents
too many became my designated driver, and I hit the road to drink. I
was regularly crashing parties of the first, second and third parts, and my
eyeballs glowed in the dark. My life, like my drinks, was on the rocks.
Therefore, be it resolved-like alcohol, some words get in the
blood-I began to think of other pursuits. Why not law teaching? I
know I'm supposed to care about the life of the mind and all that, and I
would like to be a real academic-maybe a history professor or some-
thing-but that isn't going to happen.
Besides, law teaching has its special attractions. Law professors get
paid real money; their take per hour approaches Michael Milken's. In
addition, to salve their consciences, they can make contributions to the
starving historians' fund.
8
An academic job was attractive, too, because I remember my own
law school teachers' lifestyle. I never understood how our tuition could
be so high when the school had no overhead costs. Every office light
seemed to be off by 3 p.m., and the electricity consumption on weekends
wouldn't have powered Pin Point, Georgia, for a minute.
This is starting to sound as if I care only about money and free time,
and that's not true. Another factor drew me to law teaching: law profes-
sors hate lawyers. Where else but in a law school could I be paid to do
what I'd do for free: dump on the people I despise?
Anyway, I wanted a new job, so I went to the annual "meat market"
run by the Association of American Law Schools. On two dreary No-
vember days in 1989, a Washington hotel was filled with law professors
on expense accounts and us would-be academics paying our own ex-
penses. I marched from interview room to interview room, drinking
beer and acting as if I cared about the clinical programs and building
projects at a zillion schools.
My wit and charm paid off. (What else could it have been? I'm a
white male, remember, and I haven't yet disclosed any out-of-the-ordi-
7. Cf. F.T.S. Assoc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 207 (1972), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 2 (col-
lapsible corporation formed to develop and sell disposable toothbrush called "Tush").
8. Of course, law professors don't really make contributions (or do anything else
high-minded, for that matter). But see 'What Did You Do During the 1960s, Daddy?, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 4, 1988, Ideas section, at 3 (describing admission of Supreme Court nominee, Doug-
las Ginsberg, that he had smoked marijuana while a Harvard Law School professor). Just
try getting them to agree that law school money should help support the history depart-
ment. But a little hypocrisy is fine with me. I'm a believer in the suburban liberal principle
that abstract whining is better than out-of-pocket cash flow any day.
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nary sexual preferences.9 ) I was invited to visit half a dozen campuses
for full day interviews. Scoff Law School was to be the first, and this is
the record of my day there.' 0
The invitation from Scoff was welcome. I wanted to make sure that
my first teaching job was at an institution good enough to satisfy my
intellectual appetites. They weren't many-I was perfectly willing to go
light on the heavy stuff-but I wanted some sustenance.
I had heard Scoff was an up-and-coming school. Yes, I heard it
from the Scoff Law interviewing team, but I did hear it. And, you know,
it's comforting to be at a place where everyone pats everyone else on the
back, over and over. Almost every school in the country, except over-
rated Yale, tells itself it's underrated: "If only the rest of the world knew
how good we really are," etc., etc. You've heard it before.
So I gratefully accepted Dean Dean's invitation, and I arrived in un-
derrated Scoff on a blustery January Thursday when the city was under a
blanket of snow. I had wanted to come on a Friday, Which would have fit
better into my work schedule. But Professor Leyser, the chairthing of
the apparently genderless Appointments Committee, pulled no
punches: "You should get here before we close down for the weekend.
Monday or Tuesday would be best, but definitely don't come on
Friday."
Thursday it was to be.
The dean picked me up at 7:30 at the Scoff airport. As we drove to
the campus, he chatted about the local sports successes and about the
weather. (What would people talk about if there were no weather?
What do people talk about in San Diego?) I started to doze off until we
began sliding precariously close to one car after another. As I sweated
in the subzero temperatures, the dean joked about "slippery slopes."
When we pulled safely into the dean's parking space, I gave a silent
prayer, which I tried to make as consistent as possible with constitu-
tional principles. Kissing the ground was out of the question. I needed
my mouth that day, and I couldn't afford to leave it on the frozen
surface.
The law school building was not quite as imposing as I had hoped,
but bricks and mortar can't substitute for good people. I later learned
that good people-or bad people-can't substitute for bricks and mor-
tar, either, but that's another story."
Before my interviews began, the dean gave me a tour of the facility.
He was trying to put the institution's best foot forward, and he wanted
me to think that foot had never been touched by a loafer.
The cafeteria was one of the finer points in the building. "We try to
9. I'm thinking about it. How would anyone check? Hm-m-m-m, maybe I'd better
think some more about this.
10. The names have been changed, but you know who you are. But see infra text
accompanying note 34.
11. "Oh, good," I hear you say, "another one's in the works."
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put our resources into those activities that generate the most student
interest," the dean explained, "and we learned from a survey that stu-
dents spend much more time eating than studying." The dean also told
me, off the record, 12 that there used to be a separate faculty dining
room, until the food fights got out of hand.
The cafeteria did have its pedagogical value-and not only because
law is a seamless web, or a webless seam, or whatever. Among other
things, it was used as a training ground for a course in restaurant law.
Building on prior successes-desserts ranked tenth on the Gourman Re-
port, and the pass rate on the salad bar exam was high-the dean hoped
to develop an LL.M. program in the subject.
The dean was proud that the school's library had been compressed
into one old classroom, with a storage closet serving as the "rare books
room."1 3  "With everything on machines, we need terminals, not
books," he said. "The book is as outmoded as chivalry. Happily,"-
here he laughed-"we have neither."
I grinned weakly. When I expressed some hesitancy at cramming
western thought into a microchip, 14 the dean ridiculed my neanderthal-
ish thinking. His jab to the ribs was gentle, but pointed: "Breck, I sup-
pose you get some tactile pleasure from holding a book in your hands."
I do, of course. The Tushinghams raised me properly. Books are
sacred. Do law professors read books?, I asked myself (and only my-
self). 15 I continued to smile in what I hoped was a noncommittal way. I
was trying to get a job offer, after all, and I kept thinking about those
500-page lease documents.
As the time approached 9:15, the dean walked me to my first inter-
view. On the way to the faculty wing of the building, we passed the
moot court room, where a trial practice class was meeting. It may have
been my imagination, but I swear strains of Swan Lake were wafting
down the corridor. The trial lawyers-to-be must have been practicing
their pirouettes at the barre.16
We also passed by the law school conference room, where raucous
laughter poured through the transom. The dean told me that the
faculty's Committee on Harassment was meeting to consider the ethnic
jokes heard in the hallways during the preceding week. The dean ex-
pected the committee to issue a strong statement condemning such rep-
rehensible behavior.
Just as we reached the faculty offices, I saw a blur and felt a gust of
12. So sue me, Mr. Dean.
13. The "room" contained one dusty set of Coke's Commentaries and the publications
of the Scoff faculty, which are, I learned later in the day, rare indeed.
14. Cf. JOHN MORTIMER, RUMPOLE A LA CARTE 101 (1990) ("The library [at Gunster
University] was another concrete block. We went up in a lift to a floor which hummed with
word processors and computers and even had shelves of books available.").
15. I now know the answer to that question: No.
16. Cf. JOHN MORTIMER, RUMPOLE AND THE AGE OF MiRAcLEs 72 (Penguin ed. 1988)
("I have always found a knowledge of the law to be a positive disadvantage in a barrister's
life .... ).
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wind. The dean laughed. "That's our newest faculty star, Professor
Rush, a young scholar in Caribbean semiotics. We recruited him from
Ottabia Law."
"Caribbean semiotics must be a fascinating subject," I replied,
although I had no idea what a semiotic is and I could think of nothing
Caribbean except Harry Belafonte. "I'd like to learn more about it," I
added. "What has he written?"
"Well, nothing yet," replied the dean. "Great work can't be rushed,
and we know he's working. You saw how fast he walked, Breck, and he
was carrying a legal pad."
The pad was good recyclable white paper, too. The dean went on
to explain his theory that the less a person has written, the more likely it
is that the person has thought deeply about a subject. By that standard,
Rush was an extremely thoughtful young man.
I must admit I wasn't convinced. I had recently read David Lodge's
description of the once-promising Professor Masters. 17 And I
remembered my first sergeant in the army, who walked around with a
clipboard. No one ever saw him do anything with it, but he always
looked ready for business. He probably still does.
But I suppose I was being unfair with those impure thoughts. Who
was I to question Professor Rush's efforts? I was an academic neophyte,
unaware of all the pressures facing intellectuals-such as getting out of
bed in the morning (or afternoon).' 8
Ideas take time to germinate, and Rush was still wet behind his aca-
demic ears. 19 Ears dry slowly in the ivory tower climate. Rush had
been teaching for only ten years, and during that decade he had only
one sabbatical and a couple of research leaves. And summers are short,
with all the yard work to do. The rest of the time Rush was burdened
17. '[Masters is] a great man, really, you know,' [Busby] said, with faint reproach.
'He is?' Morris [Zapp] panted.
'Well, he was. So I'm told. A brilliant young scholar before the war. Cap-
tured at Dunkirk, you know. One has to make allowances...'
'What has he published?'
'Nothing.'
'Nothing?'
'Nothing anybody's been able to discover. We had a student once, name of
Boon, organized a bibliographical competition to find something [Masters] had
published. Had students crawling all over the Library, but they drew a complete
blank. Boon kept the prize.'
DAVID LODGE, CHANGING PLACES 89 (Penguin Books 1978) (1975).
18. Herbert Hoover was not always wrong: "I do not know of any other profession, or
calling in the whole wide world where laziness and incapacity are wrapped up in the sacred
garment of perpetual tenure." Quoted in Stuart Creighton Miller, 2 ACAD. QUESTIONS, 83,
85 (summer 1989) (reviewing GEORGE H. NASH, HERBERT HOOVER AND STANFORD UNIVER-
srry (1988)). See also MICHAEL MALONE, FOOLSCAP 47 (1991):
Tenure was a choke hold whereby the faculty who grabbed it were never to be
shaken loose unless so senile they couldn't locate their classrooms, or so de-
praved they debauched dogs in public. Short of those sins, the whole university
had itself turned into one big sanctuary harboring the merely mad, the simply
slothful, and the routinely immoral, ignorant, inept, obtuse, and inebriated.
19. Please excuse the mixed semaphores.
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with classes; he had been left with only twenty or so hours per week to
work on his multi-volume project.
I learned that the Scoff faculty was filled with scholars professing
massive works-in-progress (hence the title "professor," I guess). The
faculty's publication list for the prior year was short: Professor Dallas
(about whom, more later) had several pieces in major reviews, and Pro-
fessor Moot (ditto) had a couple of notes in the Grazing Law Digest. That
was it. Nevertheless, one of these years, I'm sure, a publishing explo-
sion will occur at Scoff. The Dead Sea Scrolls will be transcribed, too. 20
But I digress (or do I?). Before getting caught in Rush's academic
cyclone, the dean and I had been on our way to my first interview. At
about 9:30, the dean introduced me to Professor Chips.
I had assumed that few members of the Scoff faculty would be will-
ing to admit to no work-in-progress, but Chips, a student of law and
appliances, 2 ' was refreshingly forthright: "Teaching is our raison d'etre-
pardon my French. Writing articles wastes time that could be devoted
to our students and to writing memos."
Professor Chips's enthusiasm was catching; I had hopes for a vigor-
ous discussion of legal education's faults and strengths. Unfortunately,
shortly after my arrival, he looked at his watch and gasped: "We should
talk about this at length, but I'm afraid I don't have time now. I must
run to the grocery store and then clean the house. Errands are just all-
consuming, you know; r barely have time for my sauna. I do hope we'll
see each other again."
Chips's departure left me with free time before my next appoint-
ment. Looking for excitement-or what passes for excitement in
academe-I wandered toward the placement office.
I found more than a little activity. Students were demonstrating
against an employer that was interviewing on campus. The employer
had refused to follow the school's guidelines urging that hiring deci-
sions be made without regard to students' academic records. "Reject
Ableism" read one sign;2 2 "Hire the Braindead" read another.
As I understood the students' position (and I confess I was unable
to appreciate all the subtleties), thinking is Eurocentric, as well as male-
centered. 23 I moved quickly past the demonstration, afraid that the stu-
20. Son of a gun. As I was writing this, it happened, sort of. SeeJohn Noble Wilford,
Monopoly Over Dead Sea Scrolls Is Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, at 1, col. 3 (describing
decision of Huntington Library to make available nearly complete set of photographs of
scrolls).
21. Cf. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A TENURED PROFESSOR 50-51 (1990) (to avoid
charges of "spread[ing] himself too thin," economics professor becomes world expert in
refrigerator pricing).
22. See Smith College Office of Student Affairs, Smith's New Guide for the Perplexed, re-
printed in 4 ACAD QUESTIONs 80, 81 (Spring 1991) ("ABLEISM:--oppression of the differ-
ently abled, by the temporarily able.").
23. See Perry Meisel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, § 7, at 25, col. 1 (reviewing SUSAN
RUBIN SULEIMAN, SUBVERSIVE INTENT: GENDER, POLrrIcs, AND THE AVANT-GARDE (1990))
("Feminist criticism, it appears, like feminist fiction, must be a kind of writing that refuses
the straightforwardness of male writing, including its armory of values such as clarity, con-
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dents might convince me on the merits.
At 10 o'clock, I climbed over piles of rubbish2 4 to get into the office
of Professor Oldham, student of Roman law, good food and fortified
beverages-and a-fine archeological specimen himself. Oldham fit the
professorial role perfectly, rumpled and bursting at the seams.
Oldham's ample shirt showed a few dribbles of food, and it ap-
peared to have once been very good food indeed. Wine spots also
seemed to be vintage. "Uh-h-h-h, Breck, uh-h," Oldham began, "how
was your-uh-trip-uh, uh-travel-uh, uh-junket-uh, uh-to
Scoff?" My trip apparently reminded Oldham of some principle of
canon law-it sounded to me like lax lux lex et ox 25-and he discoursed at
some length on that subject.
By the time Oldham had uttered two or three other questions about
legal matters, the hour was up, and we had barely reached the tenth
century A.D. The spread of the Danelaw was not yet finished.
I wanted to stay; the aroma of last night's repast was intoxicating.
But Professor Oldham was insistent: "You must-uh, uh-get on-uh-
with your shed-uh-h-h-h-yule."
To be fair to Oldham, I should note that the delay was not entirely
his fault. We were interrupted twice during the hour by Professor Bolt.
"Lightning" Bolt, a member of the faculty building and grounds com-
mittee, was performing his institutional service by checking for burned
out bulbs. No light was burned out, either time.
And we were also interrupted by a deeply tanned guy in shorts and
sandals, who came in looking for a cigarette. Professor Hunque (pro-
nounced "hoon-kay") had just returned from the Virgin Islands. "Hun-
que's on sabbatical," Oldham informed me. (In the interests of
conservation, I'll leave out the Oldhamic "uh's" this time.) "He's con-
tinuing his summer research on skin cancer, one of today's burning legal
topics." Hunque and I briefly discussed the possibility of suing the Vati-
can for its failure to print warnings about the effects of sunshine.
At 1-1 a.m., I left as Oldham was filling in the "uh's" between
"Good" and "by." I moved next door to the office of Professor Ma-
donna, whose bookshelves were stocked with girlie magazines from the
past forty years. He was working on a pornography study, which he told
cision, and pointedness, all of which can be interpreted as masquerades for the male lust
for power, replicating the structure of male sexual pleasure.").
24. One can learn a lot from piles in faculty offices, as Donald McCloskey has noted.
Waiting in Gerschenkron's office for an interview one day a graduate student
received from the nearest of numerous stacks of books and magazines a lesson in
the scholarly life, the sort of lesson professors forget they give. The stack con-
tained a book of plays in Greek, a book on non-Euclidean geometry, a book of
chess problems, numerous statistical tomes, journals of literature and science,
several historical works in various languages, and, at the bottom of it all, two feet
deep, a well-worn copy of Mad magazine. Here was a scholar.
DONALD N. MCCLOsEEY, IF YOU'RE So SMART: THE NARRATIVE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE 75
(1990). Oldham's piles taught different lessons, however, most having to do with munici-
pal health codes.
25. I think it means "lazy lighted law on a bagel."
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me, is likely to conclude that pornography is a good thing for society
and is, in any event, a lot of fun for readers like him.
Madonna and I talked a lot about constitutional law. Madonna's
knowledge of the details of post-1985 cases was profound. I expressed
my admiration for someone who had immersed himself in the
Constitution.
"The Constitution?" he replied, with a puzzled look. "Oh, yes. I
read that in high school."
"But, but. . ." I tried to interject a word in favor of the Founding
Fathers, to no avail. In Madonna's universe, nothing important hap-
pened before 1950.
"Who cares about history?" thundered Madonna. "We have a liv-
ing Constitution, and most life forms, after all, have no interest in their
past. Do you think the polliwog gives a damn about James Madison,
Breck? Of course not! Nor do I." The good professor2 6 paused.
"Now Dolley Madison is another matter," he added with a knowing wink.
I questioned Madonna about legal publication: how would he go
about getting his pornography study into print? He was not clear on
many journal practices, having last published something in 1971. But
that fact did not prevent him from trashing law reviews: "Student edi-
tors don't know what they're doing; they can't understand the subtleties
of my arguments. If I were to send them something, it would be way
over their heads."
The hour ran out before I could learn how Madonna planned to
deal with his law review difficulties. Actually, I suppose I had already
found out his plans, just not the official version. In any event, I escaped.
Madonna waved goodby and pulled out a 1960s era Penthouse for closer
study.
The appointments committee had arranged for me to visit a couple
of classes during the day. At noon, I sat in on a professional responsibil-
ity session. The Scoff curriculum in professionalism was state-of-the-art,
dealing with many questions that had previously been ignored in law
school settings.
Because of Scoff's repudiation of the printed word, students had no
reading assignments. Instead, they were required to watch L.A. Law and
reruns of Car 54, Where Are You?, and to be prepared to discuss the ethi-
cal issues raised by each week's episodes.
This particular PR class considered an important, but understudied,
issue-whether a lawyer should have sex with his or her clients.2 7 Like
any difficult question, this one seemed to have no clear answers. The
26. Cf. MAE WEST, GOODNESS HAD NOTHING TO Do WITH IT: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MAE WEST 156 (1959) (describing the movie, Night After Night, in which West responded to
a hat check girl's exclamation--"Goodness, what beautiful diamonds!"--with the dis-
claimer, "Goodness had nothing to do with it, dearie."); see also Jack Mathews, Movie Begin-
nings: First Came the Words, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1987, § 6, at 7 (describing quote in more
detail).
27. Study of the issue has been restricted to specialized areas of the law. See, e.g.,
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students had obviously thought a great deal about sex, and their rapt
expressions confirmed that they had brought their thinking caps to the
classroom.
One student commented on the safety precautions that should be
taken before lawyer-client sex. The instructor, Professor Reich, skillfully
used those remarks to lead into a discussion of whether the lawyer, the
client, or both have the responsibility to take protective measures.
Another student suggested that his participation in sex would de-
pend on who the client is and on how many clients he has at the time.
Still another pointed to the scheduling problems that could develop if
some clients were singled out for special treatment: "I would refuse to
keep my other clients waiting." Many raised questions about how time
spent in sexual frolics should be billed.
28
The discussion turned to whether lawyers might have affirmative
obligations to engage in sex. If the "duty of client contact" ever is ac-
cepted, I have no doubt that Scoff will be known, as its birthplace. But
this question, too, is fraught with conceptual (and contraceptual) diffi-
culties. For example, one student pointed out the extraordinary physi-
cal demands that might be made on a lawyer prosecuting a class action.
The "dialogue," as we academics say, was robust. Student hands
were in the air throughout the hour. (Given the subject matter, that was
probably the safest place for them to be.) The session ended when one
student took the opportunity, to Professor Reich's obvious pleasure, to
comment on the repressive American regime of the 1980s.
If I smoked, I would have wanted a cigarette after that class. Com-
pletely drained by 1 p.m., I was taken to the student happy hour (really a
"happy day") for lunch. One good thing about happy hours is that you
don't leave them drained.
It turned out that some of my afternoon appointments had been
canceled. "Well, as I told you, Thursday is a down day," Chairthing
Leyser reminded me. A few faculty had been dragooned into staying to
talk with me, but their mood was not pleasant, to say the least.
At about two, I swayed into an office where Professors Moot and
Jeffiies were waiting impatiently. I had done my homework about Scoff
Law, and I knew the questions to ask to show my interest in the school-
or so I thought. Reading ten years of Scoff alumni publications and
plugging "Scoff" into Nexis should have counted for something.
Lawrence Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits?, 1 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHIcs
585 (1988).
28. See Kathy O'Malley & Dorothy Collin, O'Malley & Collin Inc., Cm. TRIB., July 18,
1991, C28:
Attorney Albert B. Friedman got bad news recently: The Illinois Appellate
Court ruled that a female client whose divorce he handled didn't have to pay his
full $15,500 bill because some of the time he billed her for was time the two of
them spent having sex.... Attorney Albert B. Friedman got good news recently:
He was appointed to the Illinois Supreme Court's Committee on Character and
Fitness.
Query: If Mr. Friedman had engaged in group sexual activity, would he have billed several
clients for the same time period?
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I asked the two professors about the work of Scoff Professor Dallas,
which I had read about in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times.
Dallas had developed a method to evaluate legal writings in terms of
adverbial and adjectival density, and he was beginning to apply his anal-
ysis to the works of William Faulkner. Journalists were amazed, and
amused, at Dallas's ingenuity.
"You must be proud to get that kind of exposure," I innocently
suggested.
"Proud? It's an embarrassment to the school!" Moot roared.
"What does this crap have to do with legal scholarship? Who cares what
newspapers think, particularly about some southern cretin like Fal-
coner? That idiot Dallas will probably start writing stories soon."
The temperature in the office had risen ten degrees. Moot contin-
ued: "Here! Look at this list of citations." He handed me a sheaf of
papers with references to over 200 Wyoming court decisions in which
his work on grazing law had been noted. "That represents real work."
"And you know what?" Moot wouldn't stop. "Dallas once criticized
me for thinking like a lawyer! I consider that the highest compliment.
Everything lawyers need to think about can be learned by studying graz-
ing law. 'No more than 3.6 cows per acre may be grazed in Montana at
elevations above 4,000 feet.' That's what law is all about."
I was impressed-I was embarrassed not to have boned up on Wyo-
ming and Montana jurisprudence-but I expressed some surprise that a
colleague's success could cause such a reaction. My remark was met
with silence-a very loud silence.
2 9
We exchanged a few more unpleasantries for the rest of the allotted
time. When I left the Moot-Jefflies office near three, the stale hallway
air felt like a mountain breeze (with nothing grazing in the vicinity).
Except for the student happy hour, which was still going on, the
building seemed empty at 3 p.m. I would have been lost if the dean had
not arrived to thank me for coming and to escort me to another class,
this one in feminist jurisprudence.
When I commented on the quiet, the dean mumbled that the faculty
was hooked up at home to every conceivable electronic research device.
Working at home is as easy as working at the school building, he empha-
sized, and without the distractions. Sleeping at home, I noted mentally,
is even easier.
Ordinarily there wouldn't have been a class taught so late in the day
so late in the week-three o'clock on a Thursday afternoon, for heaven's
sake-but student enthusiasm for alternative legal analysis required fit-
ting a course like feminist jurisprudence in somewhere. Professor Tay-
lor, an untenured woman, had been brought in from "LaLa Law," one
of the California law schools, to teach the course.
I asked the dean whether the school required that feminist jurispru-
29. See A.N. WILSON, C.S. LEwIs: A BIOGRAPHY 181 (1990) ("There is nothing like
worldly success on the part of one academic to make all the others hate him or her.").
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dence be taught by a woman. "Of course," replied the dean. "Could a
man possibly understand the female way of thinking?"
I responded that many of my old army buddies had the same
doubts, without realizing that their thoughts were to become the wave of
the future.
The dean must have been a good ol' boy at heart. He pulled me
aside for a confession: "Don't tell anyone I said this,3° Breck, but the
trusts and estates slots were already filled, and we are under pressure to
hire more women. They have to teach something, and if they want their
little ghetto, it makes things easier for the rest of us." Professor Taylor
was the only woman faculty member I saw at Scoff.
"Well, here's classroom A; go to it, boy."
Quite a few nasty glances were directed my piggish way as I entered
the classroom.
The class hour was devoted (probably not the right verb to use) to
evaluating the effect of sexual activity on the separation thesis.3 ' What
this seemed to mean was sex, sex, sex-and in graphic detail. I learned
more about copulative verbs in that hour than I ever learned in high
school English.
The name "Dworkin" was bandied about throughout the session. I
hadn't realized old Ron had written on these topics,3 2 and I certainly
didn't recognize the usual Dworkinian language.
The f-word has apparently become a term of art, and it has lost
something in translation. When I was an undergraduate, prowling Bos-
ton's Combat Zone, I paid good money to hear women use words like
that on stage. Now the words come with no extra charge, but they're
buried in a lot of sociological bafflegab. (And who's this guy, Herman
Newdics, that everyone talks about?) The material was certainly
presented in a clearer, more straightforward fashion in the Combat
Zone.
In classroom A, I felt alone. These folks did speak in a different
voice, and I wasn't convinced it was deeper.
When I left the classroom, I was really all alone, except for the cus-
todian, Jim Adam. Lacking the protection of tenure, he had to stay no
matter what, even on a Thursday afternoon.
I had been abandoned by the faculty, and I needed to get to the
airport. After we had chatted for a while, Adam volunteered to take me:
"No one is here to even know I'm gone."
Adam, it turned out, is an occasional scholar himself, one of the
30. See supra note 12.
31. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988)
("[wlomen are in some sense 'connected' to life and to other human beings during at least
four recurrent and critical material experiences: the experience of pregnancy itself; the
invasive and 'connecting' experience of heterosexual penetration...; the monthly experi-
ence of menstruation...; and the post-pregnancy experience of breast-feeding.").
32. I now know that he hasn't, at least not for public consumption. Andrea Dworkin
has. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORIUN, INTERCOURSE (1987).
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army of humanities majors doomed to academic unemployment. On the
way to the airport, he told me about his frustrating life in the law school.
He had kept library discards and had built a substantial collection in the
school basement. "I love books," he said, "and it's good to have some-
one to talk to about books and other serious matters. I miss that at the
law school."
Nice guy. I promised Adam that I would read any draft articles that
he sent me. I'm happy to report that, except for his failure to integrate
the rich literature on grazing theory, Adam's two most recent pieces are
first-rate.
And so I left Scoff and the Scoff Law School, never to return.
Although I did get an offer from Scoff, I took ajob at one of the institu-
tions I visited later.33 I'd like to say that I made my decision based on
some grand principle, but money was the tipping factor. Grand princi-
ples canceled each other out. The other schools turned out to be exactly
the same as Scoff Law.
3 4
33. Therefore, I write from experience. Cf. Barbara Gamarekian, Authors Muse on the
Sense of Place, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at C12 (quoting novelist-historian Shelby Foote:
"[Faulkner] was a Southern writer because it was a place he grew up in and knew. Any-
thing else would have required research, which was something he could not abide.").
34. See supra note 10.
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FALUDI FIGHTS BACK: A REVIEW OF BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
MERLE H. WEINER*
Perhaps it is too much to say that Susan Faludi's Backlash: The Un-
declared War Against American Women 1 is to the 1990s what Betty Friedan's
The Feminine Mystique2 was to the 1960s. Faludi's book probably will not
revolutionize women to embark on a feminist journey; yet it does cap-
ture, as Friedan did, an unspoken truth about the interrelationship of
society and its women. It is this naming the unnamed, as Friedan origi-
nally did, that makes Faludi's book well worth reading.
3
The simplicity of Faludi's premise, that a backlash against women's
rights and feminism is occurring, is both one of the book's strengths and
one of its weaknesses. While Faludi amply demonstrates the existence
of a "backlash," she never tells the reader how to reverse it. Instead,
Faludi uses her four hundred-plus pages of text to provide a plethora of
examples, merely establishing that an attack on women's equality exists.
Faludi focuses primarily on popular culture for her support, finding ma-
terial in the media, movies, television, fashion industry and cosmetic in-
dustry. She also documents her thesis by entering the domains of the
new right community, politics and scholarly and popular writers. By the
end of Faludi's book, one either is convinced of her premise by the sheer
number of examples provided or feels exhausted enough to agree.
4
Reading this Pulitzer prize-winning journalist's tome awakens one
to the truth of its underlying message. One starts to see examples of the
backlash everywhere. For example, a recent article by Sally Quinn states
that feminism, like communism in the former Soviet Union, is dead:
Feminism is "anti-male, anti-child, anti-family, anti-feminine," and
* Merle Weiner received aJ.D. from Harvard University and an LL.M. from Cam-
bridge University. Currently, she is an attorney at the Georgetown University Law Center
Sex Discrimination Clinic, Women's Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program. The au-
thor wishes to thank Tom Linninger for his help, although any grammatical errors are her
own.
1. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
(1991).
2. Brn FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
3. Faludi might wince at the comparison with Friedan. In discussing Friedan's THE
SECOND STAGE, Faludi shows quite a bit of disdain for the author, calling her a "fallen
leader," angered by her loss of power. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 322 (citing Brn FRIEDAN,
THE SECOND STAGE (1981)). Faludi accuses Friedan of "yanking out the stitches in her
own handiwork," and Faludi calls THE SECOND STAGE a "thinly documented book that
often reads as if it were dictated into a tape machine," muddled in both language and
logic. Id. at 319, 321, 324.
4. While Faludi was awarded the National Book Critics Circle award for general non-
fiction, some board members understandably felt, "(t)he writing was clunky and had too
much filler." David Streitfeld, Smiley, Roth Win Book Awards, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1992, at
DI.
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therefore, has nothing to do with most women. 5 Feminism, Quinn as-
serts, outlasted its usefulness. Quinn accuses movement leaders of be-
ing hypocritical, of overlooking the "deepest, most fundamental needs
of their constituency," such as women's need for men, children and cre-
ating a happy home atmosphere. She faults feminists' insensitivity to
these needs as "creating a backlash" against abortion rights, earning
power and job promotion in the workplace, and cites Faludi's book for
support.
After reading Backlash, one recognizes that Quinn's message is
twisted. It is an illustrative exercise to imagine how Faludi might ad-
dress Quinn's argument. A technique that reappears throughout
Faludi's book is her bombardment of the enemy (i.e., the reactionary
forces) on all fronts. Faludi's tactics include revealing counter-exam-
ples, exposing methodological flaws, identifying personal short-comings
and magnifying irony. This approach makes her book effective and
characterizes her probable response to Quinn.
Apart from criticizing Quinn for citing her book out of context,
Faludi would directly dispute the content of Quinn's message that femi-
nism is no longer relevant to most women. Faludi, in fact, did challenge
a similar claim when she discussed Sylvia Ann Hewlett's book, A Lesser
Life: The Myth of Women's Liberation in America,6 and its contention that the
feminists failed women by ignoring motherhood. Faludi points out that
most women do not share this belief: "When the Yankelovich pollsters
in 1989 specifically asked, 'Is the women's movement antifamily?,' the
vast majority of women, in every age group, said 'no.'"7 Faludi also
would indicate that Quinn gives no statistics or other evidence to sup-
port her claims regarding women's feelings about feminism.
Faludi then would detail how the women's movement, in fact, works
to help women manage their often dual roles as mother and labor force
participant. Faludi wrote, for example,
In the early '70s, feminists campaigned forfive day care bills in
Congress. Three of the eight points of NOW's original 1967
"Bill of Rights for Women" dealt specifically with child care,
maternity leave, and other benefits. In the following years,
NOW and other women's groups repeatedly lobbied Congress,
staged national protests, and filed class-action suits to combat
discrimination against pregnant women and mothers ...
[W]hen feminists pushed for women's rights in other areas -
employment opportunities, pay equity, credit rights, women's
health - mothers and their children benefitted, too.
8
Next, Faludi would provide support for the antithesis-that it is the new
right and conservatives who are really anti-family:
5. Sally Quinn, Who Killed Feminism? Hypocritical Movement Leaders Betrayed Their Own
Cause, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19, 1992, at Cl.
6. SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN
AMERICA (1986).
7. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 316-17 (citing Yankelovich Clancy Shulman poll (Time/CNN
television broadcast, Oct. 23-25, 1989)).
8. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
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[T]he real 'antimotherhood' crusaders weren't feminists,
either; they were New Right leaders, conservative politicians,
and corporate executives, who not only ignored mothers' rights
but attacked them. It was, after all, Phyllis Schlafly, not Gloria
Steinem, who led the opposition to congressional child care
and maternity leave bills for two decades. 9
Finally, she would use her justifiably irreverent style to show the
hypocrisy in Quinn's argument, given Quinn's own personal life choices.
Quinn's life does not reflect that home, family, or traditionally feminine
ideals define women's "deepest, most fundamental needs." Nor does
Quinn's privileged background permit her to speak about what is impor-
tant for most women. For example, after her graduation from Smith
College in 1963, Quinn embarked on a variety of professions: actress,
public relations consultant, political campaigner, newscaster and jour-
nalist. 10 She became a reporter for the Washington Post in 196911 and
published two books, Regrets Only and Happy Endings. One reviewer
called this last book a reflection of Quinn's own "mired truths of mar-
riage and motherhood: . . . Superwoman conflicts of career and
home."12 Quinn's home life, like her career path, has not been "tradi-
tional" either. Without benefit of marriage, Quinn lived with Benjamin
Bradlee, then Executive Editor at the Washington Post, from 1973 until
they eventually married in 1978.13 Even after marrying Bradlee, Quinn
kept her own name. As far as being pro-family and pro-child, Quinn
admitted, "The idea of having a baby was just horrifying.... There were
other things I wanted to do with my life."
14
Quinn's emphasis on family has always been qualified. When she
finally became pregnant at age forty, she confessed, "If there had been
any problems [after amniocentesis], I would have had an abortion ....
Absolutely. No question. It would have been a tough thing to go
through, but I would have done it. I see no reason to bring a retarded
child into the world when you don't have to." 15 When Quinn gave
birth, she immediately hired a baby nurse and an Irish nanny.' 6 So
much for traditional mothering, at least for Quinn. Unfortunately, her
young son suffered heart failure at three months, and now has a congen-
ital heart defect. 17 Quinn admits, "I've hated every minute . . . .
But to a feminist lawyer, Faludi's book signals an area ripe for femi-
nist legal scholarship; although Faludi does not develop her premise in
9. Id. at 317.
10. Margie Bonnett Sellinger, Sally Quinn, The Shark of Washington Society Reporters Makes
a Splash with a First Novel, PEOPLE MAG., Aug. 18, 1986, at 80.
11. ALMANAc OF FAMOUS PEOPLE (1989).
12. Patt Morrison, Hanky Panky on the Potomac, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1991, at 9 (book
review).
13. Thomas B. Rosenstiel, End of a Paper Trail, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1991, at El.
14. Dolly Langdon, Sally Quinn Misses A Deadline but Delivers her Best Story Yet: A Baby Boy,
PEOPLE MAG., May 17, 1982, at 57.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sellinger, supra note 10.
18. Ralph Novak, Staring Mothers, PEOPLE MAG., May 25, 1987, at 16.
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the legal arena. Another author should document the backlash's exist-
ence in this area and expose its impact on women's lives, focusing both
on the setbacks encountered by female legal actors and the harm to wo-
men's equality generally. This sequel to Backlash should discuss harmful
court opinions and reactionary new laws and detail the politics behind
these restrictive measures. The sequel also should expose the clients,
lawyers, judge and politicians contributing to the backlash. And, unlike
Faludi's book, it should attempt to answer how to stop the backlash from
continuing.
While indicating at the beginning of her book that she might be
exploring the backlash in the world of law, 19 Faludi focuses primarily on
popular culture. She asserts that the media and mass marketing,
ushered in with the Victorian era, are "two institutions that have since
proved more effective devices for constraining women's aspirations than
coercive laws and punishments."
20
Faludi does acknowledge the law's historical importance in reflect-
ing the backlash. 2 1 Moreover, she claims that the present backlash af-
fects women's current legal status:
[O]nce again, as the backlash crests and breaks, it crashes hard-
est on these two shores [employment and fertility] - disman-
tling the federal apparatus for enforcing equal opportunity,
gutting crucial legal rulings for working women, undermining
abortion rights, halting birth control research, and promulgat-
ing 'fetal protection' and 'fetal rights' policies that have shut
women out of lucrative jobs, caused them to undergo invasive
obstetric surgeries against their will, and thrown 'bad' mothers
in jail.
2 2
Yet, Faludi merely dabbles in the law, leaving the legal reader want-
ing more detail. The legal reader wants Faludi to invoke her distinctive
style and discuss fully decisions like Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio, 23 Grove City College v. Bell,2 4 Rust v. Sullivan,2 5 Webster v. Reproduc-
19. For example, in her introduction, Faludi tempts the reader with facts about legal
scholarship ("[l]egal scholars have railed against 'the equality trap' ") as well as lawyers
("less than 8 percent of all federal and state judges, less than 6 percent of all law partners"
are women). FALUDI, supra note 1, at xii-xiii. She also teases the reader with statements
about women's legal status. She states (1) opponents of women's rights claim women are
so equal an Equal Rights Amendment is unnecessary, id. at ix, and (2) the current equality
laws are inadequate or ineffective. Id. at xiv-xvii.
20. Id. at 48.
21. Faludi cites, for instance, "the rise of restrictive property laws and penalties for
unwed and childless women of ancient Rome, the heresy judgments against female disci-
ples of the early Christian Church, or the mass witch burnings of medieval Europe." Id. at
47. She also discusses the reaction to the 1848 Seneca Falls women's rights convention,
which triggered the passage of restrictive divorce laws, the prohibition by Congress of the
distribution of contraceptives and the criminalization of abortion in many states. Id. at 48-
49.
22. Id. at 55. Among other things, she contends (1) our reproductive freedom is in
greater jeopardy today than a decade earlier, id. at xiv; (2) Title IX is not being imple-
mented, id. at xiv; (3) marital rape and domestic violence laws are inadequate, id. at xiv; (4)
sexual discrimination in the work force is rampant, id. at xvi; and (5) average child support
payments have fallen. Id. at xvii.
23. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (In Title VII actions, specific discriminatory employment
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tive Health Services, 26 just as she discusses EEOC v. Sears,27 Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,28 Lorance v. AT&T Technologies 2 9
and Christman v. American Cyanamid Co.
30
For example, Faludi's discussion of EEOC v. Sears reveals the type of
marvelous information she can employ to make a case come alive.3 ' In
Sears, the EEOC claimed that Sears discriminated against women be-
cause men held over 90% of commission sales jobs, although at least
40% of the qualified job applicants were women. The average commis-
sioned salesman made twice as much during his first year on the job as
the average non-commissioned female salesclerk, regardless of senior-
ity. Sears defended itself by claiming that women's interests differed
from men's and that women did not want such "demanding" jobs.
Faludi discredits Sears's defense. She discloses, for example, that
once the EEOC started investigating Sears, Sears's management
doubled the proportion of women working in commission sales in one
year. She also quotes several former female Sears employees who
wanted commission work. One woman, Alice Howland, wanted to sell
appliances because it paid more and she was bored in women's clothing
sales, but Sears never allowed her the opportunity. Faludi even con-
ducted her own experiment at a Sears store, interviewing women that
desired, but were refused, commission sales positions.
Faludi provides illuminating information about some of the players
involved in the Sears case. For example, Faludi focuses on Sears's wit-
ness Rosalind Rosenberg, a women's history professor at Barnard Col-
lege, and a friend of Sears's chief defense lawyer. Faludi discusses
Rosenberg's research errors, including her unsupported assumption
that most saleswomen did not contribute significantly to their house-
hold's income. She reveals that Alice Kessler-Harris, a feminist labor
historian at Hofstra University, accused Rosenberg of twisting the mean-
ing of Kessler-Harris' work through the creative use of ellipses. Faludi
undermines Rosenberg further by rhetorically asking the reader how
practices must be shown to have a significantly disparate impact on employment opportu-
nities and once a prima facie disparate impact case is established, employers have only the
burden of production to establish a legitimate business justification for the practice.).
24. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (federal funds only trigger coverage under Title IX for the
specific program or activity receiving federal money, not the entire institution).
25. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, regula-
tions prohibiting recipients from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, or mentioning
abortion as a birth control option do not violate the First Amendment free speech clause
or a woman's due process right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy). See
FALUDI, supra note 1, at 412 (brief mention of this case).
26. 492 U.S. 490 (1989)(state, inter alia, can prohibit governmental aid for abortion
related purposes). This "famous" decision is mentioned by Faludi only in passing. See
FALUDI, supra note 1 at 277, 412.
27. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Il1. 1986). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 378-87.
28. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 388-92.
29. 409 U.S. 900 (1989). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 394.
30. 578 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. W. Va. 1983). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 440-53.
31. See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 378-88 (discussing EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264
(N.D. I1. 1986)).
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Rosenberg's claim that women "are less likely to make the same educa-
tional investments as men" relates to selling sofas.
Faludi reveals that the government shifted its position in the case
once Reagan became President. Clarence Thomas, then chair of the
EEOC, publicly enunciated such an anti-prosecution stance that Sears's
lawyers considered calling him as a witness. She makes Judge John
Nordberg look ridiculous by explaining how Nordberg demanded that
EEOC attorneys demonstrate that American women ever faced any em-
ployment discrimination. Nordberg, ultimately ruling for Sears, found
that the women at Sears preferred lower-paying jobs.
Contrast this in-depth discussion of EEOC v. Sears with her discus-
sion of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. Faludi explains, and this is
it, that Webster is a "famous... decision restricting women's right to an
abortion .... ,,32 which "ironically, [was handed down] on the eve of
Independence Day."' 33 The statement's brevity masks Webster's signifi-
cance to the backlash analysis.
Webster is not important or "famous" for its substantive outcome.
The plurality opinion, as even Justice Blackmun admits, did little that
was new: "For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed."
3 4
Rather, it is the surrounding politics that provides insight into the back-
lash. First, most women did not support the restrictions Missouri im-
posed on abortion availability. Even Justice Scalia acknowledged the
"carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators,
urging us... to follow the popular will."13 5 Over twenty million women
exercised their abortion right since 1973 and millions of women spent
their entire childbearing years under the umbrella of Roe v. Wade.
3 6
Backlash's sequel should contrast this popular sentiment with the inter-
ests comprising the amicus curiae filed on behalf of the State of Mis-
souri. Such an exercise would provide excellent ammunition for a
Faludi-style attack on the Court's decision.
3 7
Also, backlash analysts want the media's role in the Webster decision
explored. The popular media often criticized the Roe 38 framework as
being "unsound in principle" or "unworkable in practice," although
some scholars claim that these criticisms do not withstand serious scru-
tiny. 39 Certainly, Justice O'Connor's role in Webster needs explaining.
While upholding Missouri's abortion restrictions, Justice O'Connor re-
32. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 277.
33. Id at 412.
34. Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 (1989) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
35. Id at 3065-66 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
36. Brief for Appellees at n.18, Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (No. 88-605).
37. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 685 (1990) (arguing that judges should be influenced by political pressures).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Walter Dellinger and Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and The Supreme Court: The Retreat
from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83 (1989).
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fused to look beyond the statute before her.40 For this, Justice Scalia
chastised her,4 1 scholars called her the "lowest common denominator of
the majority" 4 2 and others felt she was critical to influence in the fu-
ture.43 The addition of Justices Souter and Thomas to the Court may
render her position, as well as most women's opinions on abortion, ir-
relevant. The irony is there to expose.
The lawyer craves a chapter analyzing the credibility that men like
Clarence Thomas and Charles Stewart 44 . have in the legal system, in
comparison to women like Elizabeth Morgan 4 5 or Nancy Cruzan.4 6 Ad-
ditionally, who are the players in the legal arena contributing to the
backlash? The legal reader desires a chapter exploring institutional
legal opponents to women's equality that emerged in the 1980s,4 7 e.g.,
the Solicitor General's office,4 8 business interests4 9 and conservative
legal foundations.
50
40. Webster, 492 U.S. at 526 (O'Connor., J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
41. lId at 532-33 (Scalia., J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
42. James Bopp,Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
157, 159-60 (1989).
43. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989).
44. After Charles Stewart's pregnant wife was murdered in Boston as they left a child-
birth class, Stewart called police from his car phone and said he and his wife had been
robbery victims. Stewart was not a suspect in the death until two and one-half months
after the incident. When he learned of the investigation, he committed suicide by jumping
offa bridge. The MacNeil/Lehrer New Hour, (broadcast, Jan. 4, 1990) (transcript #3639 on
file).
45. Dr. Jean Elizabeth Morgan was incarcerated over 23 months for civil contempt
when she refused to follow a court order that directed her to return her daughter to either
her former husband (Dr. Eric Foretich) or the court's social service agency. Dr. Morgan
alleged Dr. Foretich had sexually abused the child. Although the court heard twice (16
months and 22 months after Morgan's incarceration) that Morgan would never turn over
her daughter and that she felt jail was the only route to protect her daughter, the court
refused to find its contempt power no longer useful. Finally, the appellate court found
"unsupported by the record most of the reasons the trial court gave.., for disbelieving
Morgan's testimony that she would not comply with the court's August 1987 order." Mor-
gan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. App. 1989).
46. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (adult woman's
wish that she forego continued medical care if she were ever to become a "vegetable" not
honored by Supreme Court for lack of "dear and convincing proof" of the patient's desire
once she entered persistent vegetative state).
47. See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, Women's Rights Litigation in the 1980s: More of
the Same? 74JUDICATURE 314, 321 (1991) (a wide range of groups opposed women's rights
groups in the 1980s, unlike in the 1970s).
48. The Solicitor General took an active role in the attempt to limit women's rights
during the 1980s. See id. at 320 (the Solicitor General filed against women's rights in 8276
of the cases as amicus curiae under the Reagan and Bush adminstrations). See also Segal,
Courts, Executives and Legislatures, THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL AsSESSMETrr (Charles
Johnson and John Gates eds. 1990); LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUsTICE (1987).
49. Faludi mentions one such interest:
It was the Chamber of Commerce, not the National Organization for Women,
that was the single most effective force behind the defeat of the 1988 Family and
Medical Leave Act. (The Chamber triumphed largely by claiming that the legisla-
tion would cost businesses at least $24 billion a year; the General Accounting
Office later put the cost at about $500 million.)
FALUDI, supra note 1, at 317.
50. These would include, inter alia, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Landmark Legal
Foundation and the Northeast Legal Foundation.
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The lawyer also desires an exploration of thejudiciary's role in the
backlash, a topic that could fill a book on its own. Faludi does mention
how some judges try to dissuade young women, who must use state
judicial "bypass" procedures with parental notification requirements for
minors, from having abortions. 5 1 Yet this only leaves the legal reader
wanting more. Perhaps she should probe into the personal life of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who between 1969 and 1981 opposed gender claims
84% of the time for cases in which he participated.5 2 What personal
background prompts this animus toward women? The legal reader
wants Faludi to expose Massachusetts's Somerville District Court Judge
Paul Heffernan, who mishandled battered-woman Pamela Nigro Dunn's
case. Speaking to Ms. Dunn's batterer regarding the court's denial of
police protection for Ms. Dunn, the judge declared: "You want to gnaw
on her and she on you, fine, but let's not do it at the taxpayers' ex-
pense." 55 Pamela Nigro Dunn ended up dead in the town dump.
5 4
While the above examples could be used to support Faludi's thesis,
it would be more challenging for her to explain a number of judicial
inconsistencies. During the backlash period, the Supreme Court de-
cided many cases that advanced women's equality. For example, in dis-
cussing fetal-protection policies, Faludi mentions United Automobile
Workers v. Johnson Controls.5 5 In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court
found that the company's fetal-protection plan did violate the 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. How does this decision, as well as the
decisions in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,5 6 Califor-
nia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,57 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son,58 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,59 United States Jaycees v. Roberts,60 or
51. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 420.
52. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Sex and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of Judicial
Support for Gender Based Claims, 64 Soc. Sci. 0. 327, 328 (1983). After his ascendancy to
ChiefJustice, the Court adopted the women's rights position in 69%5 of the cases, whereas
before 1986, it had adopted the women's rights position in 77% of the cases. See George &
Epstein, supra note 47, at 321.
53. Eileen McNamara, 'No Quick Fix' in Abuse Case, Judge Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13,
1986, at 1.
54. Eileen McNamara, Judge Criticized After Woman's Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21,
1986, at 1.
55. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
56. 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (affirmative action plan upheld under Title VII where em-
ployer looked to a conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories, and
not to its own prior discriminatory practices, to justify its affirmative action plan and con-
sideration of female employee's gender in its decision to promote her to road dispatcher).
See FALUDI, supra note 1 at 388-93.
57. 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (California law requiring employers to provide leave and re-
instatement to employees disabled by pregnancy was not pre-empted by or inconsistent
with Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Disability Act, in that it met Title VIi's pur-
pose of removing barriers, which favored an identifiable group of employees over other
employees and helped achieve equal employment opportunity). Not all feminists see this
as a pro-women's rights position. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy & the
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 325, 351-70
(1984-85).
58. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) ("hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII.).
59. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII covers employment decisions about partnership;
employer may escape liability under Title VII for sex stereotyping only by establishing that
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Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle6 1 fit into Faludi's statement
that "the courts may have undermined twenty-five years of antidis-
crimination law"? 62 In fact, one study found that the Supreme Court in
the 1980s proved more hospitable to women's rights claims than during
the 1970s.63 Faludi does not address these inconsistencies.
Faludi needs to account for other contrary evidence as well. The
Reagan Administration undeniably disengaged from many programs
that helped women and it did so "on the sly." 64 Simultaneously, an ex-
plosion of government funding for battered women's shelters oc-
curred,6 5 and a proliferation of state laws were enacted to combat
domestic violence.66 Moreover, how does one reconcile the result in the
William Kennedy Smith trial with that in the Mike Tyson trial, or the
positions of feminists arguing for and against pornography?67 How can
one square the increase in the "fathers' rights" lawsuits brought to stop
abortions,6 8 and the Supreme Court's rejection of such a veto power?
69
Another book is needed, focusing on the legal arena, to add depth and
texture to Faludi's thesis that "a powerful counter-assault on women's
rights exists, a backlash, an attempt to retract the handful of small and
hard-won victories that the feminist movement did manage to win for
women."
70
The question remains-who should write the legal sequel? Prefera-
bly, the next book should be written by a feminist legal scholar, one who
can evaluate the state of the law and its impact on women's equality
from an informed perspective. Faludi does not appear up to the task
because she sometimes states facts erroneously or in a misleading way.
legitimate factors alone would have motivated it to make the same decision at the time the
employment decision was made).
60. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination
did not abridge Jaycee members' freedom of speech or expression, nor was it unconstitu-
tionally vague or overbroad).
61. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (RICO action per-
mitted against persons who trespassed on abortion clinic property, destroyed property
and threatened employees and patients).
62. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 454.
63. George & Epstein, supra note 47, at 314-15 (Supreme Court adopted the pro-
rights position in 727o of the 42 cases it decided with full opinion between 1981 and 1990;
whereas between 1969 and 1980, the Supreme Court supported the women's rights posi-
tion in 58% of the 63 disputes resolved).
64. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 363, 369. See also Merle H. Weiner, Disengagement as a
Political Behavior: President Reagan and Title IX (1985) (unpublished Senior Honors' Thesis,
Dartmouth College) (on file with author).
65. Merle H. Weiner, From Dollars to Sense: A Critique of Government Funding for the Bat-
tered Women's Shelter Movement, 9 LAw & INEQ..J. 185 (1991).
66. Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv.J. ON LEGIS.
61 (1984).
67. For feminists who take a pro-pornography stand, see e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae,
Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Book Note, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S
L. J. 215 (1986)(reviewing WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985)).
68. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 403.
69. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976).
70. FALUDI, supra note 1, at xviii.
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For example, when she discusses in passing Stallman v. Youngquist,7 1
Faludi states, "In Illinois, a woman was summoned to court after her
husband accused her of damaging their daughter's intestine in an auto
accident during her pregnancy. She wasn't even the driver." 7 2 In fact,
the mother was driving.7 3 More importantly, Faludi omits telling the
reader that the Illinois Supreme Court, in a very strong opinion, sup-
ported the women's rights position. Affirming summary judgment in
the mother's favor on her child's claim, the court held a woman could
not be liable for unintentionally injuring her fetus. The Court would
not subordinate a woman's right to control her life to that of the fetus. 74
In fact, it recognized the impossibility of developing a judicial standard
to adjudicate acts and omissions by the mother. It also recognized the
existing prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs about women's reproduc-
tive abilities that might improperly influence a jury.75 Faludi's style
makes her a persuasive polemicist, but it is too imprecise for legal
analysis.
Finally, this criticism indicates Faludi's method of documenting her
research, like her selective use of facts, makes the reader doubt her intel-
lectual honesty. Part of the problem is that Faludi does not use foot-
notes in the classic sense. Rather, a reader is confronted with the
arduous chore of flipping to the back of the book any time he or she
wants to see Faludi's source for a statement. As Faludi employs a system
of notes that relies on the page number and the first few words of a
sentence for identification, she can interweave documented statements
with undocumented statements and no one, other than a diligent editor,
ever knows what is "fact" and what is "fiction." This technique under-
cuts her credibility somewhat, especially when one recognizes some im-
portant statements are not documented 76 and that Faludi's criticism of
others often relies on their faulty methodology. 77
Nonetheless, the shortcomings of Backlash should not detract from
its value as a book that synthesizes and describes the current reactions
against women's attempts to achieve equality. Moreover, Faludi estab-
71. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
72. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 425.
73. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 504 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
74. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
75. Id. at 360.
76. For example, Faludi claims that "in the popular imagination, the history of wo-
men's rights is more commonly charted as a flat dead line that, only twenty years ago,
began a sharp and unprecedented incline." FALUDI, supra note 1, at 46. No citation is
given for her characterization of popular belief. As she often criticizes others for undocu-
mented representations of popular belief, her failure to offer some support for the state-
ment appears hypocritical. Faludi also makes some references to legal reform efforts,
which are undocumented. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 236.
77. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 9-18 (discussing the Yale/Harvard Study, which
asserts that a marriage crunch for baby-boom college-educated women exists because of a
man shortage); see also LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) (au-
thor's undocumented conclusions regarding women and divorce). Faludi often accepts
certain studies' conclusions without exploring, or at least sharing with the reader, the
study's methodology. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 16.
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lishes, albeit indirectly, the need for a feminist legal scholar to document
the backlash thesis in the legal arena, research that could help women
move forward in the 1990s.

DUMPING IN THE MOUNTAINS: INSURERS PAY DEFENSE, NOT
CLEANUP, COSTS IN HECLA MINING Co. V. NEw
HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1800s, Colorado's vast natural resources have lured
prospectors and mining companies' to the area's mountainous regions.
Mining activity increased as state and federal legislatures enacted laws to
promote exploitation of minerals.2 In return, the mining industry pro-
duced billions of dollars in revenue for the state's coffers. Policies that
promote industry, however, have traditionally conflicted with a growing
public policy concern-the need to protect the environment. Thus, leg-
islative support of the mining industry often clashes with the public de-
sire to safeguard the environment, particularly in Colorado's wilderness
areas. To balance these conflicting interests, the Colorado legislature
enacted laws that both encouraged and restricted mining activities.
3
In Heda Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,4 the Colorado
Supreme Court favored the mining company's interests in a declaratory
judgment action. The court held the insurance company had a duty to
defend Hecla Mining Co. in a lawsuit filed under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), to which the original named defendants joined Hecla. 5 The
CERCLA pollution damages resulted in part from Hecla's continuous
discharges into an improperly maintained mining tunnel. Hecla's insur-
ance policies attempted to exclude coverage for pollution that was not
"sudden and accidental."
1. The focus of this Comment is the mining industry. Although the mining industry
is not the only industry producing hazardous wastes from its business activities, nor neces-
sarily is it the primary offender, a detailed analysis of other industries is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
2. The most recent example of Colorado legislative promotion of mineral exploita-
tion is found in the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 34-32-
101 to 125 (1984 & Supp. 1991). See also Colorado Surface Coal Mining Reclamation Act,
CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-33-101 to 137 (1984 & Supp. 1991). Similar federal legislation
includes the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1988) and the Mining Law of 1920,
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-187 (1988).
3. The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled against Hecla by interpreting the Colorado
Mined Land Reclamation Act (Act) to express an intent to "aid in the protection of wildlife
and aquatic resources.., and promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the peo-
ple of this state." New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154, 1157
(Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 34-32-102 (1984)). The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the Act provided constructive notice to mine operators that mining
could cause environmental damage. Id.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument: "The court of appeals reason-
ing is in error.... Contrary to the court of appeals analysis, the Mined Land Act proclaims
that mining is a necessary and proper activity and should be promoted by the state of
Colorado." Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
4. 811 P.2d at 1083.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9607 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
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The Hecla dispute began in 1983, when the State of Colorado filed
suit against Asarco Resurrection Mining Co. and Res-Asarco Joint Ven-
ture in federal district court under CERCLA. 6 In January 1985, Asarco
joined Hecla and over 200 individuals and companies 7 seeking contribu-
tion for the cleanup costs. The third-party complaint against Hecla led
to the present controversy regarding whether New Hampshire Insur-
ance (NH) and Industrial Indemnity (Industrial) had a duty to defend
Hecla in Colorado's CERCLA lawsuit8 under a series of comprehensive
general liability (CGL) insurance policies, which contained clauses ex-
cluding pollution damages.
The Colorado Supreme Court held the allegations in the CERCLA
complaint did not fall within the pollution exclusion clause 9 and, there-
fore, the insurers had a duty to defend.1 0 The Hecla decision: (1)
broadly construed standard language in the CGL, 11 (2) held the policy
exclusion clauses were inapplicable to the insurers' duty to defend a
CERCLA lawsuit, 12 and (3) changed established procedure in Colorado
insurance law. The court also stated insurers should litigate declaratory
judgment actions after defending insureds in underlying CERCLA ac-
tions. The court cited case law and rules of contract interpretation to
support its policy-based decision that the Colorado Mined Land Recla-
mation Act' 3 proclaimed mining "a necessary and proper activity (that)
should be promoted by the state of Colorado." 14 This Comment fo-
cuses on whether the Hecla decision properly resolved either the insur-
ance contract dispute or the conflict between mining and environmental
protection and cleanup.
This Comment briefly summarizes the evolution of the standard
CGL insurance policies in environmental litigation. It then reviews the
drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause and summarizes case
law construing policy language. Finally, this Comment criticizes the
Hecla holding because the precedent may potentially increase litigation
and create incentives to pollute. This Comment also argues that by find-
ing a broad duty to defend against a CERCLA complaint, 15 the Hecla
court may have fallen short of the goal to promote mining for two rea-
sons: environmental insurance costs may now escalate and mining com-
panies may still be denied coverage in subsequent declaratory judgment
actions.
6. See Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985)
7. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1085.
8. The federal government has also filed suit against Hecla and other mining compa-
nies. United States v. Apache Energy & Minerals Co., No. 86-C-1675 (D. Colo. 1986).
The duty to defend the federal lawsuit is not at issue in this declaratory judgment action.
9. Hecla, 811 P.2d 1088.
10. Id. at 1092.
11. Id. at 1088, 1092.
12. Id. at 1092.
13. See supra note 3.
14. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1088.
15. See id. at 1088-89.
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II. CERCLA: THE GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM AGAINST POLLUTERS
Congress tried to ameliorate years of contaminating industrial re-
leases into the environment by passing CERCLA in 1980.16 The basic
principle behind CERCLA is to place responsibility for cleanup on the
polluters while furnishing money for cleanup' 7 and study of contami-
nated federal sites. 18 CERCLA identifies several broad categories of po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs) who may be liable for cleanup of
hazardous chemical contamination. PRPs are any past and present own-
ers of contaminated property, operators of contaminated facilities, per-
sons transporting hazardous materials to the property or arranging for
treatment and disposal, or others accepting the substances for transport
to a contaminated site.1 9 The Environmental Protection Agency or any
person, including a state's attorney general, may request an injunction
against PRPs,20 who may be strictly liable for cleanup costs of the con-
taminated site.2
1
Broadly construing CERCLA liability, courts apply retroactive lia-
bility for "contamination caused before the effective date"2 2 of CER-
CLA and permit joint and several liability to apply to "one or a few PRPs
to recover all of the cleanup costs."' 23 As another means of extending
16. Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988 & Supp. 11989)). Six years after its enactment CERCLA was significantly revised by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). See Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613.
The focus of this Comment is CERCLA. Congress has enacted many other laws to
protect the environment by imposing financial liability on polluters. See, e.g., Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (1988 &
Supp. 11989); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988). A
discussion of the use of the Hecla holding as precedent for future insurance litigation
under these other statutes is beyond the scope of this Note, but case law can be read to
support an argument analogizing the statutes. See, e.g., Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (pollution exclusion clause in
RCRA based suit did not exclude coverage when insured intended the release of pollu-
tants but not the resulting damage).
17. Superfund, a federal trust fund created by CERCLA, pays for government lawsuits
against responsible parties in order to recover cleanup costs which are then deposited
back into the fund. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON et. al. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
.PoucY 614-15 (2d ed. 1990). Remedial costs for short-term emergency responses and
removal costs for long-term deanup are both recoverable by the EPA under CERCLA. Id.
A state may take remedial action only by entering into a cooperative agreement with EPA
to pay 10 percent of the cleanup cost. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1988). The Department of
Justice may bring suit whenever there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment." lId § 9606(a) (1988).
18. Id. § 9604(b)(1) (1988).
19. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
20. See id. § 9606(a). See also id. § 9601(32).
21. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(a)-(d). Removal and remedial costs at a single hazardous waste
site averages between 30 to 50 million dollars. EPA estimates the total liability for 19,000
sites nationwide could total over 100 billion dollars. Stephanie E. Pochop,Jones Truck Lines
v. Transport Insurance Co.: More Fuel for the Heated Debate Over insurance Coverage for CERCLA
Clean Up Costs, 35 S.D. L. REV. 298 (1990).
22. Richard L. Griffith, The Impact of CERCLA Liability on Real Property Transactions, 17
COLO. LAW. 471 (1988) (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986)).
23. Id. at 471 (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983)).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
liability for pollution damages, courts liberally interpret "owner" and
"operator" in determining which parties are liable for contaminated
property.24 CERCLA provides only a few defenses, such as the "inno-
cent purchaser" defense 25 and qualification for de minimis settlement.
26
The Hecla dispute provides a typical fact scenario for a CERCLA lawsuit
because Congress intended to remedy situations such as the California
Gulch contamination when it enacted CERCLA.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL COVERAGE ISSUES
Insurance transfers, spreads and allocates risks27 from a single busi-
ness to a group of businesses with premium costs directly reflecting a
business operation's level of risk.28 When the parties enter into an in-
surance contract, an insurance company assumes part of the business
risk and the insurance proceeds become a resource that enables contin-
ued business operations "without the outlay of internal capital or assets
to reach a level of self-insurability." 2 9 Insurance provides a method for
businesses to survive financial losses from victim compensation or pollu-
tion cleanup, and is most efficient when the losses are statistically pre-
dictable within an industry, but are not pervasive.30 Environmental
protection statutes complicate this risk allocation and calculation be-
cause the liability, which may be ultimately imposed, is usually unfore-
seeable when most insurance policies are written. 3 1 For example,
"[n]either insured nor insurer anticipated the impact of CERCLA,
SARA or SUPERFUND" before the laws were passed. 32 Insurers reluc-
tantly insured for environmental damage due to the uncertainties in cal-
culating costs associated with cleanup.33 Although insurers redrafted
the policies several times to accommodate the new environmental risks,
"[u]ncertainty has plagued the insurance industry at each stage because
courts have interpreted policy language inconsistently and imprecisely.
24. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (liability found
against present owners of site whose actions did not contribute to contamination); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (lenders holding
title for four years who foreclosed on contaminated property were liable); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987) (corporate officers who were
stockholders responsible for hazardous waste disposal at the property were liable under
CERCLA); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (D.N.M. 1984)
(where lessee caused contamination, owner and lessor of site held liable). Griffith, supra
note 22, at 471-73 n.9-16.
25. This defense is available only when a third-party's act or omission caused the con-
tamination and the PRP safeguarded against any such acts that were foreseeable. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
26. IdM § 9622.
27. M. Jane Meridian, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damages, in 3 THE LAW OF
DISTRESSED REL ESTATE, 30A-1, 30A-6 (Baxter Dunaway ed., 1990).
28. Id. at 30A-6 (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 946 (1988)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 30A-7.
32. Id.
33. Fred Feinstein & Carolyn Hesse, C532 ALI-ABA 1403, 1417 (1990).
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Consequently, insurers have been left to speculate as to their future
liabilities."
3 4
A. The Evolution of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
The drafting history of insurance policies for pollution-related dam-
ages reveals several attempts by insurers to clarify contract intent and
establish certainty in risk calculations, after courts inconsistently con-
strued contract language and expanded coverage liability. In early envi-
ronmental litigation, courts held CGLs covered pollution "damages,"
which were not explicitly enumerated in the policies. When insurers re-
vised policies to provide coverage only for pollution damages that were
accidents and occurrences, courts again reinterpreted the contract lan-
guage to expand coverage. Eventually, these largely unsuccessful at-
tempts at clarifying coverage intent forced insurers to specifically
exclude pollution damages from coverage.
1. Are Pollution Damages Covered?
Initially, courts shifted pollution clean-up costs from polluters to
insurance companies by construing "damages" in general CGL policies
to encompass all pollution-related damages.3 5 Courts easily rational-
ized this cost-shifting because the word "comprehensive" in the title of
CGLs implied that total coverage was provided.3 6 Further, the purpose
of the policies was to protect the insured against liability from third-
party damages and to defend the insured against bodily injury and prop-
erty damage claims.3 7 It followed that insureds bought CGLs in order
to gain broad protection against personal injury and property damage
resulting from pollution caused by regular business activities. 38 CGL
policies exclude first-party damages because other insurance policies
cover these losses3 9 (e.g., automobile no-fault insurance covers first-
party damages). 4O Nonetheless, many commentators argue insurers
never intended to cover pollution damages that resulted from risks the
34. E.Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass,
74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986).
35. With heightened public awareness of environmental problems, pollution was at-
tacked in the courthouse when "the public 'turned to the courts for the environmental
protection that [it] did not always obtain through legislative bodies, administrative agen-
cies, or political pressures.'" Id. at 1237 n.2 (quoting Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of
Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 FORUM 762 (1976)).
36. Maria Jo Aspinwall, Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous
Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984).
37. Robert D. Chesler et. al. Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for
Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS LJ. 9, 14 (1986).
38. Id
39. Id. at 14-15.
40. Id. at 15. Some policy coverage for pollution damages is available under Environ-
mental Impairment Liability policies, but these have yet to be judicially interpreted. See
Jonathan C. Averback, Comment, Comparing the Old and New Pollution Exclusion Clauses in
General Liability Insurance Policies: New Language Same Results?, 14 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV.
601, 602 (1987) (citing H.G. Sparrow, Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage: Unexpected Past,
Uncertain Future, 64 MICH. B.J. 169, 171-73 (1985)).
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insured knew of or intentionally assumed.4 1
Additionally, public policy disfavored insuring intentional behav-
ior.4 2 When CERCLA was passed, making PRPs strictly liable, insur-
ance liability quickly escalated despite drafting intent. The new policy to
fund cleanups replaced the former public policy not to insure for inten-
tional behavior. This judicial expansion of coverage to include pollu-
tion-related damages led insurance companies to revise the policies and
provide coverage only for pollution damages resulting from "accidents"
and then later, for strictly-defined "occurrences." Each change of policy
language provoked a fierce round of litigation between contracting par-
ties. Courts consistently held in favor of PRPs in order to help fund
cleanups under both the accident-based and occurrence-based policies.
2. Accident-Based Pollution Insurance Policies
Before 1966, CGL policies covered only accidental pollution dam-
ages. Referred to as accident-based policies, the name originated from
the operative clause: "To pay, on behalf of insured, all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
destruction of property . . .caused by accident." 43 What "accident"
meant to insurers was clear,4 4 but the companies did not define the term
in the policies so courts interpreted the seeming ambiguity. 45 Courts
held "accident" meant a variety of things, from unforeseeable 46 to un-
41.- See, e.g., Chesler, supra note 37, at 15-16; see also Soderstrom, supra note 35, at 767;
Sheldon Hurwitz & Dan D. Kohane, The Love Canal - Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Accidents, 50 INS. COUNS.J. 378 (1983).
42. It would be ludicrous to expect an insurance company to pay for damages that an
insured intentionally inflicted upon an innocent victim. For example, few would contend
that a grocery store owner who intentionally shoots a customer should collect from his
store insurance policy for the damages.
43. Chesler, supra note 35, at 15.
44. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1241 n.24 (citing Leslie, Automobile and General Liabil-
ity Insurance, 70 A.B.A. SEC. INs. NEGL. & COMPENS'N L. 84-85 (1962) (insurers made public
their intent)).
45. See Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property Dam-
age Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 19 Fo-
RUM 513, 515-24 (1984).
46. E.g., American Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv. Co., 270 F.2d 686,
691-92 (8th Cir. 1959) (damages occurring over more than six years from fertilizer manu-
facturing not covered because they were not unforeseeable or unexpected); Thomason v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1957) (damages caused by
mistake or error excluded from coverage); Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1957) (insured's failure to maintain sufficient
pressure in system excluded coverage for damages because they were the natural and
probable consequence of the acts); Kuckenberg v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 226 F.2d
225, 226 (9th Cir. 1955) (damages were not accidental because they were the normal and
probable consequence of building the road); Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 187
N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (foreseeable and natural and ordinary consequences of
an act are excluded from coverage); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Harris & Brooks,
Inc., 235 A.2d 556, 559 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (where it is foreseeable damage would
occur from smoke and soot, actor's conduct in burning trees was not an accident); Foxley
& Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Neb. 1979) (damages
that were the natural result of the policyholder's deliberate acts were not covered under
accident-based policy); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754, 758
(Okla. 1951) (damage from cement dust caused by policyholder's voluntary acts and negli-
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expected and unintended.4 7 A negligent act could also be considered
an accident4 8 and still be covered 49 because the courts adopted a loss/
act distinction. As long as the insured did not expect or intend the ulti-
mate loss,50 pollution resulting from negligent acts were covered in
some jurisdictions.5" Courts "may have taken the distinction too far"
52
by holding accidental pollution could flow from an intentional act.
In short, the fragmented judicial treatment of environmentally
related damage under accident-based policies left the insurer
unable to predict its potential liability. While the insurers have
gence were not accidental); Town ofTieton v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 380 P.2d 127, 130-
31 (Wash. 1963) (sewage pollution of well is expected and foreseeable).
47. Courts that held damages were included in coverage generally held that the loss,
not the act, was unexpected. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container
& Timber Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (D. Or. 1966) (unanticipated result of
expected act was "unexpected" and thus covered); Moffat v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.
Co., 238 F. Supp. 165, 172 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (foreseeability of damage does not exclude
coverage); City of Myrtle Point v. Pacific Indem. Co., 233 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (D. Or.
1963) (expected malfunction of sewage plant not excluded from coverage); Employers Ins.
Co. v. Rives, 87 So. 2d 653, 655-58 (Ala. 1955) (accident defined as chance happening is
not mere negligence and is not excluded); Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 295 P.2d 154,
156-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (unexpected and unforeseen damage from laundromat was
accidental); Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1963) (unex-
pected slippage of earth at strip mine is accidental despite foreseeability); White v. Smith,
440 S.W.2d 497, 507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (unintended resulting damage from inten-
tional acts were covered); City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.W.2d
632, 634-37 (Neb. 1973) (damage caused by pollution of groundwater from insured city's
lagoon was covered because it was unexpected); Lancaster Area Refuse Auth. v. Trans-
america Ins. Co., 437 Pa. 493, 496, 263 A.2d 368, 369 (1970) (damages caused by negli-
gence may still be accidental), rev ', 251 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969); Taylor v. Imperial
Casualty & Indem. Co., 144 N.W.2d 856, 859 (S.D. 1966) (damages from negligent acts
were covered because "the unintended consequences were caused by accident").
48. See, e.g., Employers Ins. Co. v. Rives, 87 So. 2d 653, 656 (Ala. 1955) (accident
means happening by chance or unexpectedly and does not exclude negligence); Minkov v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 149 A.2d 260, 263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (mere fact that
damage was caused by negligence in not a bar to coverage); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fred M.
Simmons Inc., 138 S.E.2d 512, 515 (N.C. 1964) (foreseeability of damage does not bar
recovery for negligence when it would render policy worthless to insured). But see Gray v.
State Dep't of Highways, 191 So. 2d 802, 815 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (to determine whether
something was an accident requires a determination whether the person to whom the in-
jury expected foresaw the damage), modified, 202 So. 2d 24 (La. 1969).
49. Courts wrestled with whether negligent conduct was included in coverage for acci-
dental pollution since "accident" normally implies foreseeability is absent. Rynearson,
supra note 45, at 515. The distinction between negligence and accident in tort law has
been the lack of fault in accidents. Id. Compare Lancaster Area Refuse Auth. v. Transamer-
ica Ins. Co., 263 A.2d 368, 369 (Pa. 1970) (negligent harm may still be caused by accident)
and Iowa Mut. v. Fred M. Simmons Inc., 138 S.E.2d 512, 515 (N.C. 1964) (to define "acci-
dent" as negligence makes the policy worthless to the insured) with City of Carter Lake v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058 (8th Cir. 1979) (coverage for some negli-
gent acts does not necessarily extend to all negligent acts).
50. White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (intended acts and
intended results are very different). But see Kuckenberg v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 226 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1955) (damages in excess of that forseen does not make
an incident an "accident"); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Gerrits, 65 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla.
1953) (where reliance on false information caused damages, they were not accidental be-
cause they were a natural and probable consequence).
51. Rynearson, supra note 45, at 517 (citing Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133
N.E.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921) (accidental injuries are determined for insurance purposes by
the results rather than by the causes)).
52. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1244-45.
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long since abandoned accident-based coverage, this spectre of
the 'accident' has continued to haunt the insurance policy in
each of its subsequent forms.
5 3
3. The Occurrence Limitation
In 1966, insurance companies responded to inconsistent judicial
construction, and the needs of industry to obtain more coverage,5 4 by
drafting new policies. 55 Referred to as occurrence-based, the new poli-
cies covered pollution damages caused by "an accident, including con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results, during the
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured."'56 Pollution damage from
gradual loss might be covered, 57 but coverage was excluded for clients
who flagrantly endangered public health,5 8 knowingly polluted5 9 or as-
sumed the risks as costs of doing business. 60 Courts failed to recognize
the insurers' intent to achieve clarity and instead focused on the "intent
to expand coverage." 6 1 Consequently, more judicial inconsistency fol-
lowed from these new occurrence-based policies. First, the foreseeabil-
ity of damages clouded court decisions in manyjurisdictions. Confusion
resulted because some courts read "expected" to mean a "substantial
probability" 6 2 damage would occur, while other courts precluded cover-
53. Id. at 1246.
54. In an effort to clarify and expand the scope of coverage under the CGL pol-
icy, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (NBCU) and the Mutual Insur-
ance Rating Bureau (MIRB) completely revised the standard-form policy in 1966
and dropped the phrase caused by accident from the coverage provisions of the
policy.
Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion,
and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia (citing American Home Products,
565 F. Supp. 1485, 1501 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
55. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1246.
56. Rynearson, supra note 45, at 513 (citing ROWLAND H. LONG, 4 THE LAW OF IABIL-
rry INSURANCE 29 App. & 53 App. (1981)).
57. The NBCU explained its intent in drafting the occurrence-based policy: "[Ilt is no
longer necessary that the event causing the injury be sudden in character. In most cases
the injury will be simultaneous with exposure. However, in some other cases, injuries will
take place over a long period of time before they become manifest." Malcom B. Rosow &
Arthur J. Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretative Problems of "Occurrence" in Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance, 16 FORUM 1148, 1151 (1981) (quoting Nachman, The New Policy
Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 18 THE ANNALS 3, 197 (1965)).
58. Soderstrom, supra note 35, at 764-65 (there should be no coverage for damages
resulting from an insured's business operations which are knowingly in violation of envi-
ronmental statutes and where the insured has failed to remedy such defects).
59. Robert M. Tyler & ToddJ. Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpreta-
tion and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 497, 500
n.22 (1981) (insurers did not intend to cover clients who intentionally polluted, further,
"occurrence" definition expressly excludes coverage for damages resulting from such
behavior).
60. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW BASIc TEXT 297-98 (1971) (Regular expenses of doing
business are excluded from insurance coverage because liability policies do not cover
highly expectable losses. Pollution damages may be such regularly occurring expenses
that they are costs of doing business, rather than risks to be insured.).
61. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1248.
62. Id. at 1249 (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d
1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979)).
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age for any forseeable loss. 6 3 Second, the word "accident" in the defini-
tion of "occurrence" caused further confusion. 64 Courts followed the
same loss/act distinction methodology used in interpreting accident-
based policies to distinguish between "intentional losses caused by the
insured's intentional acts and unexpected or unintended losses caused
by the insured's intentional acts."' 65 Pollution damages from willful dis-
charges were once again covered if the loss was neither expected nor
intended. Continued judicial expansion of coverage and the subsequent
increased litigation led to the insurance industry's final drafting re-
sponse-the pollution exclusion clause.
6 6
B. Judicial Construction of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
In 1973, insurers again revised policies to add exclusionary clauses,
which covered only pollution damages from occurrences that were "sud-
den and accidental." 6 7 Since occurrence-based policies could extend
pollution coverage to most situations, insurers added a clause to exclude
damages arising from regular, continuous business practices. 68 Even if
a polluter claimed it did not expect a loss, the policies would not cover
damage if it knowingly polluted or if discharges of pollutants continued
over time. 69 Insurers felt public policy supported their decision because
industry would have an incentive to become environmentally efficient if
coverage was denied.70 Unfortunately, the companies chose to draft the
exclusion* clauses with the same "accident" language that caused so
much confusion in the earlier drafts.
That unfortunate language, along with the incorrigible judicial
will to compensate blameless victims, plunged the pollution ex-
clusion further into ambiguity and uncertainty than either of its
63. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1249 (citing City of Wilmington v. Pigott, 307
S.E.2d 857, 859 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (an "accident" is that which happens fortuitously
and is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen)).
64. See James A. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Fo-
RUM 551, 559 (1980) (courts have established five diverse tests to define "occurrence":
effect, causation, time and space, operative hazard and popular meaning); Rynearson,
supra note 45, at 518-21 (reviewing split among courts regarding interpretation of "acci-
dent" in the occurrence limitation).
65. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1250 (citing Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (damages from manufacturing prac-
tices were unintentional even though caused by acts that were intentional)).
66. See id at 1251.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1252.
69. IA at 1253.
70. Id The president of the Insurance Company of North America (INA) stated that
only accidental pollution was covered (e.g. equipment breakdown) and insurers
[n]o longer [will] insure the company which knowingly dumps its wastes. In our
opinion, such repeated actions--especially in violation of specific laws-are not
insurable exposures .... We at INA hope that our anti-pollution exclusion may
help encourage many companies to take the first, crucial steps toward improving
their manufacturing process-the steps that will lead eventually to a cleaner,
healthier, and we hope, happier life for all.
Id. at 1253 n.82 (quoting a speech by Charles Cox, Liability Insurance in the Era of the Con-
sumer, Annual Conference of the American Society of Insurance Management (Apr. 9,
1970)).
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predecessors .... 71
When interpreting the pollution exclusion policies, courts were un-
certain as to how the CGL occurrence limitation integrated with the new
pollution exclusion and its exception. For example, the policy NH and
Industrial issued to Hecla limited the scope of coverage by excluding
pollution damages as follows:
This insurance does not apply . . to bodily injury or property dam-
age arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, li-
quids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants,
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water .... 72
The policy also contained an exception to the pollution exclusion, which
allowed coverage for pollution in certain circumstances as follows: "....
but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape
is sudden and accidental .... ,,73
1. The Exclusion Excludes Nothing
Regarding this form of exclusionary clause, courts basically held the
pollution exclusion clause to be coextensive with the occurrence limita-
tion and interpreted "sudden and accidental" to mean unintended and
unexpected. This made the exception redundant and the exclusion in-
distinguishable from the coverage. Courts also defined "sudden" in
terms of the expectation element of accident, rather than focusing on its
temporal significance. For example, in Jackson Township Municipal Utilities
Authority v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 74 the court held the seepage
of pollutants into an aquifer was "sudden and accidental" no matter how
many discharges occurred and even though they "may have been grad-
ual rather than sudden." 75 Other courts held the exception applied if
the pollution was either sudden or accidental, against the clear language
of the clause. Thus, the accident language used in these clauses trig-
gered coverage in almost any situation. By 1986, courts held pollution
exclusion clauses were ambiguous 76 and did not exclude passive pollu-
71. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1253.
72. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Colo.
1991)(emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 1086-87 (emphasis in original).
74. 451 A.2d 990 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
75. Id. at 994. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div.
1980) (although not instantaneous, leak from negligently installed gas tank was
"sudden").
76. Many courts that denied summary judgment left resolution of the ambiguity issue
for juries to determine whether the pollution was excluded from coverage based on the
facts (not pleadings). See, e.g., Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985) (issue
of fact whether insured had knowledge of toxics on his property); City of Northglenn v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1986) (genuine issue of fact whether
service station seepage was covered); State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064
(D. Idaho 1986) (genuine issue whether pollution damage was an "occurrence"); CPS
Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 886 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (genuine
issue whether harm was intentional or inadvertent); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning
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tion or gradual pollution occurring over twenty years or less.7 7 With
few exceptions, 78 courts ruled in favor of the insureds79 and made the
pollution exclusion clause "essentially superfluous by way of judicial
merger into the occurrence clause." 80
Co. v. Baiden, 632 P.2d 1377 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (issue of fact whether oversprayed paint
was a "liquid" within policy's pollution exclusion clause), aff'd, 643 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1982).
77. See R. Stephen Burke, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: The Agony, the Ecstasy, and the Irony
for Insurance Companies, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 443, 455 (1990).
78. Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.
1984) (pollution from regular business activity was excluded); Grant-Southern Iron &
Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 669 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (continuous plant emis-
sions were excluded), rev'd, 905 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1990); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (pollution from chemicals drained during
regular business operations excluded); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (continuous toxic waste dumping excluded); Healy
Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (pollution
from sinking oil barge excluded from coverage); Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins.
Group, 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (damages from discharges which decreased
visibility causing car accident excluded); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) (acid discharges which were part of business practice excluded).
79. FEDERAL COURTS:
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1985) (insurance
policy covers fire damages and contamination claims); National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (inspections did not
detect pollution problem, therefore, damages were not "sudden and accidental"); Payne v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (lack of control over
release of PCBs and denying EPA access to company property was not enough to find
intentional harm); Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978) (pulp mill
pollution included in coverage).
STATE COURTS:
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164 (Ala. 1985) (sewage
overflows from construction were not excluded); Molten, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977) (sand and dirt not excluded); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980) (duty to defend against class action
lawsuit exists where there is no allegation that the damages were "sudden and acciden-
tal"); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 146 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (dam-
ages from fuel tank leak covered);Jonesville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 402
N.W.2d 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (though discharge of chemical was continuous, com-
plaint did not allege it was expected or intended, thus, insurers had a duty to defend);
Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (long term contaminant leakage qualifies as an "accident"); General Ins. Co. of
America v. Town Pump, Inc., 692 P.2d 427 (Mont. 1984) (underground gas tank leak was
not intended, therefore, insurer could not prevail on summary judgment alleging that it
had no duty to defend or pay); Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (long-time pollution damage at
landfill was not expected or intended); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 456
N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 1982) (insurer had duty to defend gas station designer as the
designer was not the active polluter); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603
(App. Div. 1980) (seepage from storage tanks was "sudden and accidental"); Niagara
County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Niagra County 1980), aff'd, 439
N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981) (county charged with negligence for longtime toxic chemi-
cal dumping at Love Canal area); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294
(App. Div. 1978) (chemical spraying pollution was unintended); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio'Ct. App. 1984) (even if chemical
leaks were part of regular business practice, insurer had duty to defend); United Pac. Ins.
Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (underground
gasoline leaks were unexpected and unintended).
80. Burke, supra note 77, at 455.
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2. The Pollution Exclusion Works
In 1986, insurers prevailed when a state supreme court held the
pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous. In Waste Management of
Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co.,81 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held pollution damages from Waste Management's dumping of
contaminating substances into groundwater fell within the exclusion
clause, the "sudden and accidental" exception was inapplicable and
therefore the insurers had no duty to defend. The "sudden and acci-
dental" exception applied to the moment of pollutant release, whereas
the exclusion itself described the discharge, omission and polluting re-
lease into air, water or land.
The court held that an appropriate subject for summary judgment
was the issue of whether facts alleged in the complaint were covered in
the policies. The court also noted the duty to defend was broader than
the duty indemnify. 82 While the duty to defend is ordinarilly measured
by facts in the pleadings85 and the duty to pay is measured by facts de-
termined at trial,8 4 the acceptance of modem notice pleadings imposes
another duty on insurers. This duty, "to investigate and evaluate facts
expressed or implied in the third-party complaint[s]," 85 could poten-
tially relieve insurers of their duty to defend if facts are not arguably
within the policy coverage. However, they may otherwise have a duty to
defend the insured against groundless or baseless claims.8 6 In Waste
Management, the complaint alleged that (1) certain negligent acts con-
tributed to contamination of the aquifer, (2) did not allege the acts were
sudden and accidental, and (3) suggested seepage into the aquifer was
gradual.8 7 The deposition of a Waste Management employee describ-
ing the trash removal process suggested the dumping was both intended
and expected.
8 8
The court felt that, although it was possible to find ambiguity in the
policy, "it strains at logic to do so."'8 9 The exclusion narrowed the "lim-
itless class of events" that could be interpreted as occurrences to
"nonpolluting events or polluting events that occur 'suddenly and acci-
dentally.' "90 The court found the focus of the occurrence language was
intention and expectation, but the pollution exclusion was concerned
more with the nature of the loss than the act.9 1 The court stated:
81. 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).
82. Id. at 377.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court recognized, however, that there is a duty to defend if the pleadings
state facts showing the alleged injury is covered by the policy, regardless of whether the
insured is ultimately liable. Id. (citing Strickland v. Hughes, 160 S.E.2d 313, 318 (N.C.
1968)).
85. Id. at 378.
86. Id. (citing 14 CoUcH ON INSURANCE 2d § 51:46 (rev. ed. 1982)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 379.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 380-81.
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"When courts consider the release alone to be the key to the pollution
exclusion clause, the sudden and accidental exception can be boot-
strapped onto almost any allegations that do not specify a gradual re-
lease or emission."' 92 Such a construction of the clause is "so restrictive
as to vitiate the 'sudden and accidental' exception."
9 3
The court also pointed out "obvious" policy reasons for the pollu-
tion exclusion clause: "[I]f an insured knows that liability incurred by all
manner of negligent or careless spills and releases is covered by his lia-
bility policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his vigi-
lance. . . .In this case, it pays the insured to keep his head in the
sand." 94 The court noted that putting financial responsibility for pollu-
tion back onto the insured, rather than the insurance company, places
responsibility to protect against such pollution "upon the party with the
most control over the circumstances most likely to cause the
pollution." 95
The Waste Management court's rejection of ambiguity of the pollution
exclusion clause seems to have had some affect on the state courts,
96




96.' Between 1987 and 1990, more state courts ruled in favor of insurance companies,
holding that pollution was excluded from coverage. See, e.g., Hicks v. American Resources
Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1989) (seepage and runoff of contaminated water from strip
mine pit was expressly excluded); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Heda Mining Co., 791 P.2d
1154 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (Colorado mining act provides notice that mining company
knew or should have known that pollution from its operations would occur), reo'd, Hecla
Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991); Perkins Hardwood
Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 378 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (no duty to
defend against negligence claim caused by wood fire smoke); International Minerals &
Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988) (waste dumping
which continued for three years excluded); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989), aff'g 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 1988)
(long-term discharge of chemicals into a creek was not "sudden and accidental," even
though it may have been lawful); County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 540
N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 1989) (fourteen years of dumping at a landfill which had repeated
leachate and pollution problems was excluded); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.,
533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1988) (company uncovered hazards buried years ago, but
exclusion applies because former owner polluted knowingly and intentionally); Lower Pax-
ton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(methane escape from a landfill was not an abrupt discharge); Just v. Land Reclamation,
Ltd., 445 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (coverage excluded for continuous debris and
waste pollution from a landfill); State v. Mauthe, 419 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(repeated chromic acid leaks over sixteen years not covered by policy), rev'd, 456 N.W.2d
570 (Wis. 1990).
Many state courts, however, continued to hold the phrase "sudden and accidental"
ambiguous, thus nullifying the effect of the exclusion. See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989) ("sudden" has several reasonable meanings);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989) (ambiguous regarding whether manufacturer expected or intended illegal
dumping); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(toxic waste leaks occurring over three weeks from holes in tanks were unexpected and
unintended, thus "sudden"); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (installation of building materials which leaked toxic chemicals was
negligent but not excluded); Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (continuous contamination at a landfill was an
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while federal courts97 have generally adopted the analysis. Adding fur-
ther to the controversy, however, some courts that hold the pollution
exclusion clause is ambiguous, also hold it is a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the particular pollution falls within the exclusion
clause or its exception.98 Therefore, the issue of coverage under a pol-
lution exclusion clause is an inappropriate subject for summary judg-
ment because a jury should decide material facts.
IV. HECLA MINING Co. . NEw HAMPSHIRE INSuRANCE Co.
A. Facts
Colorado filed a CERCLA complaint alleging strict liability and
common law negligence claims against Asarco, Resurrection Mining Co.
and the Res-Asarco Joint Venture (defendants) for cleanup costs and
other damages resulting from contaminating discharges from the Yak
"accident" and may be covered); Summit Assocs. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d
1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (damages from sludge pit unknown to developer
when property was purchased were covered); Kipin Indus. v. American Universal Ins. Co.,
535 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (release of chemicals was not excluded as it was
unexpected).
97. See, e.g., Alcolac, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Md.
1989) (repeated releases of chemicals was not "sudden and accidental"); C.L. Hauthaway
& Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989) (slow and
gradual discharge from underground pipe excluded); American Universal Ins. Co. v.
Whitewood Custom Treaters, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1140 (D.S.D. 1989) (damages caused by
failure to clean up "sudden and accidental" chemical discharges was not covered); Hayes
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (dry-cleaning sludge was
placed purposely on property for a number of years was not covered); Guilford Indus. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 792 (D. Me. 1988) (damages from ruptured pipes
excluded); State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)
(damages from solvents released over 20 years into drains were excluded); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd,
875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (chemical releases occurring over six years at a landfill ex-
cluded from coverage); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp.
1423 (D. Kan. 1987) (75 years of careless pollution at salt plant was excluded); Borden,
Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th
Cir. 1989) (continuous radioactive waste dumping excluded), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816
(1990); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (continuous toxic waste disposal excluded); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Neville
Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (continued groundwater pollution after
company was put on notice excluded).
Like the state courts, the federal courts were not unified in their rejection of ambigu-
ity. Many federal courts also continued to interpret policies in ways which nullified the
effect of the exclusion clause. See, e.g., City ofJohnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877
F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989) (city was on notice that landfill leaked when it purchased policy,
however, absent evidence of intent or knowledge that damage would flow from its acts,
coverage was not excluded); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp.
1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (insurance company waives "sudden and accidental" defense by
agreeing to provide coverage for damages); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1988) (landfill leakage was expected yet covered
under policy); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (PCBs release into aquifer was not a natural result, however,
damage was covered); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394
(D.N.J. 1987) (seepage from landfill was not excluded, even though state complaint al-
leged the township knew or should have known of pollution).
98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Tunnel into the California Gulch just outside of Leadville.9 9 The min-
ing tunnels were apparently improperly maintained, which caused rock
and timber to collapse, debris barriers to form and impounded water to
seep into the tunnel.10 0 During removal of debris from the polluted
water, a yellow sedimentary sludge surged from the Yak Tunnel and
contaminated the California Gulch drainage basin with limonitic precipi-
tate,, turning a twenty-mile stretch of the Arkansas River orange.
10 '
A third-party complaint by defendants against Hecla alleged the
mining company discharged hazardous substances into the tunnel from
1938 to 1983.102 Since NH and Industrial insured Hecla from 1974
through 1985, Hecla asked both companies to defend the lawsuit.'
0 3
The insurance policies provided defense and liability coverage for dam-
age resulting from unexpected and unintended occurrences. Nonethe-
less, pollution damages were not covered because the policies contained
pollution exclusion clauses. Therefore, the insurance policies covered
only sudden and accidental pollution. 10 4 The insurance companies ar-
gued the California Gulch contamination was reasonably foreseeable
and, thus, not covered under the policies because the pollution was ex-
pected and not an "occurrence."' 1 5 In the alternative, they argued,
even if the pollution was unexpected and unintended, the discharge oc-
curred over a long period of time, so the pollution was not "sudden and
accidental" and thus they did not have a duty to defend Hecla against
the state's CERCLA claims."'
0 6
B. Procedural History
When Hecla was joined as a third-party in the complaint and re-
quested the insurers to defend, Industrial denied coverage and filed for
declaratory judgment 10 7 to determine whether it had a duty to defend
and indemnify10 8 Hecla under the policies. NH subsequently inter-
vened in the declaratory judgment action.' 0 9 Helca refused to proceed
with discovery in the declaratory judgment action and prevailed on both
its Motion for Protective Order and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel. Hecla then moved for summary judgment." 10 Hecla's success
in evading discovery meant the court had only the facts alleged in the
pleadings with which to determine summary judgment. Although Hecla
99. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo. 1991).
100. Id. at 1085 n.3.
101. Id. at 1085.
102. Id. at 1085-86.
103. Id. at 1086.
104. Id. at 1086-87.
105. Id. at 1087.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1086. Declaratory judgment actions to determine preliminary matters, such
as insurance coverage and the duty to defend, are authorized by COLO. R. Cxv. P. 57;
CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-151-101 to 115 (1987).
108. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086. The focus of this Note is on the duty to defend. A de-
tailed discussion of the duty to indemnify is beyond the scope of this Note.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1095.
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admitted regular hazardous discharges occurred in its usual mining op-
erations, it argued this was an "occurrence" because the resulting dam-
age was unintended. 1  The District Court held for Hecla finding both
NH and Industrial had a duty to defend in the CERCLA action, but the
duty to indemnify was not ripe for resolution."
12
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held Hecla knew or
should have known of a substantial probability that its mining activities
would result in environmental damage. 1 3 Therefore, the California
Gulch contamination was not an occurrence because an " 'occurrence' is
an event whose results are both unintended and unexpected."1 4 The
pollution damages can not be unexpected "if they are the ordinary con-
sequences of those acts." 15 The court held the Colorado Mined Land
Reclamation Act (Act) provided constructive notice to Hecla, and other
mining operators, that mining activities "could cause environmental
damage."' 16 This holding precluded the mining companies from as-
serting the defense that they did not intend pollution damages to result
from mining.
The court noted the purpose of the Act was to "aid in the protec-
tion of wildlife and aquatic resources.., and promote the health, safety
and welfare of the people of this state."' 17 The Act, one of two statutes
which regulate mining in Colorado, 1 8 applies to mining and prospect-
ing operations for all minerals and regulates 1 9 land use for mine loca-
tion and related "environmental and socioeconomic impacts"' 20 by
requiring that prospecting notices, 12 1 financial warranties 122 and recla-
mation permits 123 be filed before prospecting. 124 The court of appeals
111. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Heca Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1989), rev'd, 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
112. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086.
113. New Hampshire, 791 P.2d at 1157.
114. Id. at 1156.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1157.
117. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-101 (1984)).
118. See supra note 2. Minerals include oil shale, sand, soil and gravel, but exclude oil
and gas. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-103(7) (1984).
119. With the Department of Natural Resources, the Division of Mined Land Reclama-
tion administers the Act and its regulations. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 407-1 (1990).
120. See C & M Sand & Gravel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 673 P.2d 1013, 1017
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (interpreting the Act as allowing local regulation, by permit, of some
aspects of land use for mining). Certain restrictions apply to mining operations within
national parks, wildlife habitats, trails, scenic rivers or wilderness preservation systems and
recreation areas or facilities. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-110(2); 2 COLO. CODE REGS.
407-1 § 3.2.
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-113(1) (Supp. 1991).
122. Id. § 34-32-113(4).
123. Id. § 34-32-109(1). Mining operations are any "development or extraction of a
mineral from its natural occurrences on affected land." Id. § 34-32-103(8). Mining opera-
tions encompass processing, transporting and disposal of wastes from underground min-
ing. Id.
124. Prospecting is the search for or investigation of a mineral deposit and includes
building access roads, easements or other facilities that may cause a greater disturbance to
land than "ordinary lawful use... by persons not prospecting." Id. § 34-32-103(12). If
the notice and warranty requirements are met, the Board notifies the prospectors of addi-
tional requirements for land reclamation, inspects the land and releases the financial war-
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reasoned the Act's extensive environmental standards and restrictions,
as well as the Act's legislative declaration to protect wildlife and aquatic
resources, gave notice to mining operators that their activities could
cause environmental damage.
C. Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
CGLs with pollution exclusion clauses require insurers to defend CER-
CLA actions for pollution damages resulting from mining activities.
Before construing the "sudden and accidental" language of the pollu-
tion exclusion clause, the court first noted an insurer's broad duty to
defend. CGLs impose two distinct duties on insurance companies-the
duty to defend a lawsuit that falls within the policy language and the
duty to indemnify. 12 5 The duty to defend "is an area of significant dis-
pute"'126 due to the growing potential liability imposed by environmen-
tal statutes and the significant defense costs incurred in defending
claims.
How this defense duty arises is another hotly debated issue. The
duty to defend is usually established in one of two ways-either by look-
ing at the four comers of the complaint or by evaluating extrinsic facts
beyond the allegations of the complaint.' 27 Under the four comers test
adopted by the Hecla court, an insurer has a duty to defend if, on its face,
the underlying complaint states any claim that may potentially be cov-
ered under the policy. 12 8 Therefore, if an insurer can show the com-
plaint unambiguously excludes coverage, then there is no duty to
defend. 129 Insurers also have a duty to investigate facts that might show
probable liability before denying its duty to defend.13 0 Whether these
extrinsic facts, elicited in the investigation, can be used to determine the
duty to defend is questionable.13 1 Some jurisdictions allow use of fac-
tual evidence extrinsic to the complaint's allegations when determining
the duty to defend.13 2 In Colorado, before the Hecla decision, insurers
ranty when there is an acceptable reclamation. Id. § 34-32-113(5). All applications for
reclamation permits must meet stringent standards, such as criteria for minimized distress
to water systems and protection of ditches and gutters from pollution. See 2 COLO. CODE
REGS. 407-1 Rule 6; COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-116. The Board is authorized, along with
the Colorado Bureau of Mines, to inspect reclaimed lands and prospecting activities to
assure compliance with the Act. Id.
125. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1241 n.20.
126. Michael D. Glatt & Lawrence Hobel, Liability Insurance Disputes, in Commercial Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series: Techniques of Self Insurance, 400 PRAcT. L. INsT. 343
(1986).
127. Stewart McNab, The Duty to Defend in Colorado After Hecla Mining, 20 COLO. LAW.
2095 (1991).
128. Glatt & Hobel, supra note 126, at 345 (citing C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1981).
129. Id. (citing Bandy v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 458 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1972).
130. Id. (citing Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App. 1977)).
131. Id. (citing Green Bus Lines v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 981, 987
(App. Div. 1980)).
132. Randy Mott et. al. Hazardous Waste Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability Poli-
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could proceed with discovery of extrinsic facts during a declaratory
judgment action. Whether these facts could be used to establish the
duty to defend was previously within the discretion of the trial court.'
33
The Hecla court's adoption of the four comers test precludes the trial
court from considering extrinsic facts.
The Hecla court held the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify
are separate and distinct.' 34 Avoiding the duty to defend is a heavy bur-
den because the duty arises whenever facts alleged in the underlying
complaint arguably fall within coverage, which if sustained would im-
pose liability. The court introduced a new twist of procedure in Colo-
rado insurance law-insurers seeking to avoid the duty to defend in suits
involving intentional pollution damages, which would be excluded from
coverage under the insurance policies, should not seek a declaratory
judgment decision before the trial of the underlying claim. Insurers risk
losing a summary judgment action if they proceed with a declaratory
judgment claim before facts are discovered extrinsic to the complaint.
Formerly, Colorado insurance law allowed declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings and discovery of extrinsic facts simultaneous with the underly-
ing claim. The Hecla court deviated from this practice and granted
summary judgment to Hecla based on this new procedure.
Finally, the court, while interpreting the contract language, noted
that principles of contract law require ambiguous language to be con-
strued against the party who drafted the agreement, here, NH and In-
dustrial. The court held the pollution exclusion language did not
exclude anything that was "unexpected and unintended." The Califor-
nia Gulch contaminating surge was an "occurrence" covered under the
policies because the CERCLA complaint did not allege either Hecla ex-
pected or intended the environmental damage or that the damage would
flow directly and immediately from its mining operations.13 5 The court's
construction of the contract language provided coverage for pollution
damages that were "unexpected and unintended" occurrences, unless
Hecla knew the pollution damages would result and they were not "sud-
den and accidental." Under the "sudden and accidental exception," the
court held that if the pollution could have occurred suddenly and acci-
dentally, then the insurer must defend. Because the words "sudden and
accidental" in the exception were not defined in Hecla's policies, the
court interpreted them.
The court undertook a complex analysis of the possible meanings of
"sudden and accidental" with relevant case law and concluded "sud-
den" could describe either the unexpectedness of the event or its dura-
des, in Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series: Litigation - Hazardous Waste
Litigation 1986, 301 PRAcT. L. INST. 149 (1986) (citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d
168 (Ca. 1966)).
133. See Troelstrup v. District Ct., 712 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1986); Hartford Ins. Group v.
District Ct., 625 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1981).
134. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086 n.5.
135. In a CERCLA action, a strict liability claim, the plaintiff does not need to allege
the environmental damages are actually intended and expected.
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tion and, therefore, the word was ambiguous. The court held the
sudden and accidental exception allowed coverage unless Hecla knew
the damages would flow directly from its intentional actions. The poli-
cies' pollution exclusion clauses for cleanup and damage caused by pol-
lution were inapplicable to the duty to defend Hecla in the CERCLA
action because the CERCLA strict liability claim purportedly did not al-
lege intentional or expected acts.
The court of appeal's policy interpretation of the Act put mining
companies in the precarious position of having no defense against liabil-
ity for future intentional pollution damages by virtue of constructive no-
tice under the Act. The supreme court's decision was influenced by the
need to reverse this interpretation of the Act. The court held the Act
did not provide notice to mining companies, as a matter of law, that
their activities could cause environmental damage, which would pre-
clude them from recovery under insurance policies. Thus, the court
proclaimed mining a necessary and proper activity and forced insurers
to defend against CERCLA claims. The Hecla court sought to promote
continued development of the mining industry, rather than protect wild-
life and aquatic resources from mining pollution as the court of appeals




The dissent would not have granted summary judgment until more
facts were elicited in discovery. The duty to defend under the pollution
exclusion clause would have been determined either when discovery was
complete or in a subsequent action after the trial of the underlying
claim. Rather than mandate this choice as in the majority opinion, the
dissent would have allowed discretion to look beyond the allegations of
the complaint when defining the duty. The trial judge would then have
discretion to hold the declaratory judgment action in abeyance until res-
olution of the underlying claim. Insurance companies could defend
under a reservation of rights and later seek reimbursement for costs
along with the determination of their duties to defend.
The dissent considered the duty to defend a "fact specific" case-by-
case determination. The dissent detailed several rationales and pro-
vided extensive authority for looking beyond allegations in the underly-
ing complaint in order to determine the, duty to defend. First, the
dissent noted that it is inappropriate to determine an insurer's duty to
defend based solely on allegations in a CERCLA complaint since the
state does not need to allege either a party intended or expected to pol-
lute or that the discharges were sudden and accidental. Second, in
Hecla's case, there was strong reason to believe facts would be elicited
during discovery that would exclude the pollution damages from cover-
age because some allegations inferred intentional behavior on Hecla's
136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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part. Third, any party with ownership interests in the contaminated site
could be held strictly liable, regardless of fault or intent, yet intent was
important to the pollution damage coverage issue. In a CERCLA com-
plaint, whether the pollution damage is "unexpected and unintended"
or "sudden and accidental" is immaterial. Therefore, the complaint al-
legations do not resolve the material issue of fact regarding coverage
under the pollution exclusion clause. The dissent found summary judg-
ment should not have been granted until issues of fact regarding cover-
age were resolved.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Hecla's Procedural Deviation
The primary points of contention in Hecla's motion for summary
judgment were the scope of the policy coverage and the duty to defend
under the policy. The resolution of the issues in Hecla's motion for
summary judgment involved: (1) construing the contract language (the
occurrence limitation, the pollution exclusion clause and its exception);
(2) determining whether events alleged in the complaint, or other facts
discovered, were covered under the policies; and (3) establishing the
duty to defend a CERCLA lawsuit based on undisputed facts. In making
its decision, the Hecla court departed from established Colorado prece-
dent,13 7 which previously allowed insurance companies to seek a deter-
mination of factual issues regarding coverage in a declaratory judgment
action before defending the underlying liability claim. When the court
granted Hecla's motion for summary judgment, it denied the insurers an
opportunity to show coverage did not exist. Further, the court based its
summary judgment decision on the allegations in the complaint, rather
than undisputed facts.
Deciding policy coverage and insurers' duties under policy exclu-
sions may not be an appropriate subject for summary judgment. In
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Colorado National Bank of Denver,
1 3 8
Judge Weinshienk advised there was a genuine issue of fact whether the
events fell under the pollution exclusion clause. Relying on City of North-
glenn v. Chevron U.S.A., the court asked "[d]id the word 'accident' mean
something different than 'occurrence'? Is it an accident whether pollu-
tants in a pond leak out and pollute the ground waters of the state of
Colorado?"1 39 The court concluded that "accident" should not be
given a "very narrow technical definition" as a matter of law. A jury
should construe the words "sudden and accidental" in determining
whether the factual events fell within the exclusion or its exception.
In Hecla, the dissent expressed similiar sentiments regarding the
need to gather facts before deciding the material issues in the summary
137. Troelstrup, 712 P.2d at 1012.
138. No. 86-Z-1033 (D. Colo. filed Nov. 4, 1988) (unreported).
139. Id.; see also City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo.
1986).
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judgment action. 140 Even the court in Waste Management, which decided
the coverage issue as a matter of law, ruled for the insurance company
because facts produced in discovery showed the pollution damages were
intended. This evidence, elicited in deposition testimony of a Waste
Management employee, greatly influenced the court.
Learning the lesson from Waste Management, however, Hecla in-
creased its potential for summary judgment by strategically avoiding dis-
covery, which might have elicited facts showing Hecla's acts fell outside
coverage. Instead, Hecla avoided the coverage issue by seeking a deter-
mination only on the duty to defend, based on allegations and not facts.
Since the mining company prevailed on the defense issue only, the in-
surance company could, presumably, seek a judgment on the coverage
issue later, after a substantial outlay of costs defending Hecla against the
CERCLA claim. Insurers may still litigate coverage issues against in-
sureds, but only in declaratory judgment actions subsequent to resolu-
tion of underlying suits.
NH and Industrial sought a factual determination of both issues-
coverage and duty to defend-because they understood the duty to de-
fend coexisted with the duty to indemnify. The Hecla court held that
only the duty to pay is a question of fact and the duty to defend could be
decided as a matter of law. Thus, insurers with no obligation to pay still
have a duty to defend. However, insurers may do so under a reservation
of rights, and later seek reimbursement for defense costs, if coverage is
ultimately denied.
This procedure forces insurers into an ineffective and unproductive
"wait-and-see" perspective. They cannot file a declaratory judgment ac-
tion unless the facts alleged show that no coverage existed. The in-
sureds will be granted a defense, even though their intentional actions
may be excluded from coverage. Even if facts outside the complaint
show pollution damages were intentional and therefore excluded from
coverage, insurers may still have to defend and later seek reimburse-
ment if those same facts are not alleged in the complaint.
This procedure is inefficient for both insurer and insured. 14 1 In-
sureds still risk being sued by insurers for reimbursement of defense
costs should they ultimately lose the declaratory judgment action after
trial. Rather than proceed with discovery in the earlier declaratory judg-
ment action, the parties expend time, money and resources (both theirs
and the state attorney general's prosecuting the underlying environmen-
tal damage claim) until facts demonstrate how the pollution was caused
and whether it is excluded from coverage. The procedure also discour-
140. See Heda, 811 P.2d at 1092-93 (Mullarkey,J., dissenting). This isa position shared
by many other courts. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946
F.2d 1489, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991) (in deciding whether a duty to defend exists, a court may
look to allegations in the complaint and at any facts that the insurer reasonably could
discover); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 32
(1st Cir. 1984) (court may review independant evidence in a determination of duty to de-
fend "if the complaint ... does not on its face establish lack of coverage.").
141. See McNab, supra note 127, at 2096.
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ages settlements, which might be in an insured's best interest, because
of the insurer's interest in issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel
for its subsequent action against the insured.
14 2
B. Hecla's Contract Construction
The court held the contaminating surge was an occurrence under
the CGL. Moreover, the insurers had a duty to defend because the
CERCLA complaint asserted strict liability and did not assert that the
insured expected or intended the damages to result from its mining ac-
tivities. The occurrence limitation in Hecla's policies, merging with the
"sudden and accidental" language, excluded only damages that the in-
sured knew would flow directly and immediately from its intentional act.
The "sudden and accidental" language could have been a turning
point for the court. A reliable construction goes "beyond semantics"
because: "[O]ccurrence relates to the anticipation of an event-
whether or not it was intentional or expected. The pollution exclusion
... describes the event-not only in terms of its being unexpected, but
in terms of its happening instantaneously or precipitously."' 43 With
this guideline, pollution damage can be correctly categorized. In the
Hecla dispute, the occurrence was the anticipated event, Hecla's continu-
ous and repeated discharges into the tunnel, whether those discharges
were intended or expected. Under the pollution exclusion clause, the
liability for the contaminating pollution caused by the surge is excluded
from coverage. The exception allows for coverage only if the event that
caused the pollution damage is both "sudden and accidental."
For example, an occurrence might be the transportation of hazard-
ous substances across town, the damage might be pollution emissions
from a leak in the truck. Although the transporting of hazardous sub-
stances can be continuous and damages from such may be covered, pol-
lution liability resulting from a leak will be excluded if not sudden and
accidental. Depending on how the leak occurred, the pollution damages
may or may not be covered by the insurance policy. Leaks occurring
from improperly sealed tanks may not be covered, but leaks that eventu-
ally result from weak sealants may be. A factual determination should
be made as to whether the resulting pollution is sudden and accidental
and whether there is coverage for that pollution.
NH and Industrial made a similar argument in Hecla. The insurers
argued the CGLs excluded coverage for pollution damage unless the
release of the pollutants was both sudden and accidental. The insurers
contended a common sense interpretation of the plain language of the
policy mandated that ongoing releases from mining operations for a to-
142. Part of the purpose of CERCLA is to increase settlements: "The fact that the stat-
ute is designed to foster settlements reduces further the chance that a determination of
intent, expectedness, suddeness or accidental nature of alleged damages or discharges
would be determined in the underlying CERCLA case." Heda, 811 P.2d at 1095 n.2 (Mul-
larkey, J. dissenting).
143. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 382
(N.C. 1986).
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tal of ninety years "were emphatically not sudden."1 4 4 Despite this
common sense argument, Hecla contented that the insurers had a duty
to defend because the complaint allegations did not allege that Hecla
intended environmental harm. "Therefore, the District Court was cor-
rect in ruling there is a duty to defend by the insurers here since CER-
CLA is a strict liability statute and mere ownership property which in
some way contributes to environmental damage is sufficient for liability
under the statute."1 4 5 What this argument fails to consider is that
Hecla's liability under the statute is not at issue in the summary judg-
ment motion. What is at issue is the insurer's liability under the pollu-
tion exclusion clause. Hecla's argument-that the CERCLA complaint
did not allege Hecla's specific acts caused various hazardous substances
to be discharged into the Yak Tunnel, which "injured and destroyed nat-
ural resources" 14 6-does not resolve the factual question of whether the
pollution damage was covered in the insurance policies.
While Hecla contended the complaint showed no intentional acts,
the insurers contended the complaint showed that the releases of pollu-
tants were "the antithesis of 'sudden.' 147 Quoting the complaint, the
insureds asserted the pollutants were repeatedly and continuously re-
leased" 'into the environment, including surface waters, ground waters,
air and lands within the State of Colorado, beginning in approximately
1895 and continuing to the present.' "148 When emissions occur on a
regular basis or in the course of business, the sudden and accidental
exception should not apply. Although an occurrence is distinct and sud-
den, such an occurrence may not be accidental. If an accident keeps re-
curring, intent should be inferred.
14 9
Facts alleged in the Hecla complaint showed a contribution of con-
taminating materials into the tunnel over a period of over 15 years,
which eventually released into the California Gulch, making the water
hazardous for any human use. The plain terms of the policy exclusion
compared with the pleadings, which neither expressed or implied the
releases were sudden, showed the alleged occurrences may have re-
mained outside the policy coverage. Yet despite plain language in poli-
cies, courts still hold sudden and accidental exceptions can mean either
sudden or accidental and sudden can mean gradual. 150
"[C]ourts really hate polluters but they hate insurers even
144. Brief of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Association, New
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154 (Colo Ct. App. 1989) (No.CA-87-
0092), rev'd, 811 P.2d at 1083 (Colo. 1991).
145. Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Hecla Mining Co. to Brief of Appellant New
Hampshire Ins. Co. at 8, New Hampshire Ins. Co. (No. CA-87-0092).
146. Reply Brief of Appellant Industrial Indemnity. Co. at 4-5, New Hampshire Ins. Co.
(No. CA-87-0092).
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6.
148. Id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 14).
149. Great Lakes Container v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1984)
(routine discharge that was part of a continuous negligent practice was not "sudden").
150. The court was persuaded by Hecla's "parade of horribles." See Petition for Certi-
orari at 11-12, Hecla (No. 89-SC-646).
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more.'151 Given this attitude towards insurance companies and the new
social policy to find a financially solvent party to fund environmental
cleanups, its hardly surprising courts continue to expand coverage when
interpreting insurance contracts in environmental litigation. However,
traditional insurance law disfavors insuring intentional or reckless be-
havior. In addition, the Hecla court's new procedure will not guarantee
that insurers will fund cleanups.
In Hecla, the court tipped the scales against the public's environ-
mental concerns. Viewed in economic terms the decision is of doubtful
value. It allows mining companies to further externalize pollution
cleanup costs, thereby encouraging the mining industry to pollute at a
greater level. It forces insurers to defend against possible intentional
pollution damages and provides no incentive for the mining companies
to stop polluting. It does not guarantee insurers will pay for cleanup
because the pollution damage may be excluded from coverage in a sub-
sequent declaratory judgment action. The literature on law and eco-
nomics reasons that societal wealth is maximized when financial
responsibility for resulting harm is placed on the party in the best posi-
tion to compare the benefits derived from the activity (mining) with the
costs required to prevent the harm (pollution) resulting from an activ-
ity. This is because the party who knows the risks can best evaluate and,
if efficient, avoid them. 152 Mining companies and other industrial pol-
luters did not win the battle in Hecla, which granted a broad duty to
defend, because the companies remain in the economic labyrinth cre-
ated by decisions that allow industry to avoid internalizing externalities.
Therefore, the Hecla holding does not really promote mining be-
cause the laws of economics dictate the same result-insureds will pay
today for cleanup, or tomorrow for high insurance and litigation costs.
Insurers will inevitably be forced to either abandon coverage for pollu-
tion altogether, increase premiums tremendously or provide coverage
only in states favorable to insurers. 153 The dearth of insurance cover-
age or the alternative exorbitant premiums for pollution damages will in
turn force perpetual industrial polluters to bear their own waste cleanup
costs. The companies may find that their concern for the environment
and incentives for environmental protection may increase as their insur-
ance and litigation costs increase.
In the meantime, courts unwittingly have created a new victim-the
151. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1240 n. 16. In keeping with this "favoritism toward
the insured," courts cite three rules which embody this principle. Id. First, insurers have
the burden to prove noncoverage. Id. (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Albert Pipe &
Supply Co., 484 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Second, ambiguity must be con-
strued in favor of insured, especially when exclusion clauses are involved. Id. (citing 13 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw PRACTICE § 7401 (Berdal ed. 1962)). Third, the insurers must
defend the entire suit if a single allegation in the underlying complaint is covered in the
policy. Id. (citing 7C J. Appelman, supra § 4684).
152. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 150-52 (1970).
153. Insurance companies faced with choice of law decisions in a state with broad con-
struction precedents such as Colorado will insert into policies a clause that all litigation
take place in states without such precedents.
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environment. 154 State and federal government attacks on pollution will
be frustrated by the Hecla decision for two reasons. First, industrial pol-
luters now have a deep-pocket defender, whose interest in the subse-
quent declaratory judgment action may conflict with settlement of a
CERCLA claim. Second, governmental expenditure of state funds to
prosecute with hopes of having insurers pay for the environmental
cleanup does not guarantee insurers will ultimately pay because, under
the Hecla procedure, insurers may still be successful in the subsequent
declaratory action and policy coverage may be excluded.
VI. CONCLUSION: DOES THE BROAD DUTY TO DEFEND PROMOTE
EITHER THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OR THE MINING
INDUSTRY?
Intensified public awareness of hazardous industrial by-products led
Congress to enact strict environmental laws' 55 imposing financial liabil-
ity on polluters for damages. Industrial polluters, such as mining com-
panies, first sought relief from astronomical cleanup costs by claiming
pollution damages were covered under their CGL insurance policies.'
56
Insurers, responding to an onslaught of litigation 15 7 and catastrophic
liability, first denied coverage and argued cleanup costs were not "legal
damages" covered under the policies. 158 Although the issue is far from
resolved, judicial construction of insurance policy language has consist-
ently expanded coverage, compelling insurers to redraft policies or find
themselves liable for pollution they had not intended to insure. When
insurers endeavored to expressly limit liability with pollution exclusion
clauses, courts were flooded with more litigation. Rather than take steps
to prevent future pollution damages, industry tried to escape direct re-
sponsibility for environmental damages by again seeking judicial expan-
154. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1240.
155. Christine F. Ericson, Comment, Excluding the Pollution Exclusion: City of Johnstown,
New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMp. L. 287 n.1
(1990) (citing David Sive, Forward- Roles and Rules in Environmental Decisionmaking, 62 IowA
L. REv. 637 (1977) (describing environmental interests groups established to effect policy
changes)).
156. For a detailed analysis of the litigation in this area, see Hourihan, supra note 64.
For a brief overview see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
157. Today there are literally hundreds of these claims. The following are exam-
ples demonstrating the proportions of the litigation explosion: the Shell Oil
Company is suing 250 of its insurers, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and
one of its subsidiaries is suing more than 140 of its insurers, Allied Signal Incor-
porated is suing 120 of its insurers, the Union Carbide Corporation is suing 115
of its insurers, and the Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corporation is suing 100 of
its insurers.
Pochop, supra note 21, at 300 n.10 (citing Diamond, The $700 Billion Cleaning Bill; Haz-
ardous Waste Sites, 1 INs. REv. 30 (1989)).
158. The drafters of both insurance policies and environmental statutes and regu-
lations believed that their product would best serve the needs of society in deal-
ing with the risks of doing business and protecting the environment. The
resulting collision in assessing liability for environmental damages has proven
bitter and controversial. The determination of liability for environmental dam-
ages to real property is one of the greatest controversies facing industry and the
judiciary in the past decade.
Meridan, supra note 27, at 30A-1 to 30A-2.
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sion of coverage. The resulting collision course has generated pollution
litigation as ubiquitous as the pollution itself. As long as the mining
industry continues to externalize pollution liability costs, it remains both
economically and environmentally inefficient. This is especially true
under the new Hecla procedure because there is no guarantee that the
insurers will fund cleanup. The mining industry may eventually spread
the risk of pollution liability to the public through an increase in insur-
ance premium costs. However, by casting the allocation of environmen-
tal cleanup costs back onto the insurance contract bargaining table, the
Hecla decision forces insurers to further clarify intent when drafting in-
surance policies, rather than leaving courts to interpret contract exclu-
sionary language.
Diana A. Cachey
WARNING: DENIAL OF FETAL PROTECTION UNDER TITLE VII
MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO THE HEALTH OF INDUSTRY
AND SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years, an increasing number of chemicals used in
the workplace have been identified as potential reproductive hazards.'
Many employers have responded to these risks by adopting "fetal pro-
tection policies,", 2 which prohibit fertile women3 from working in toxic
environments. 4 These fetal protection policies have created a conflict
with the prohibition against sex discrimination. Because these policies
affect only women's jobs, the courts consider this conflict exclusively in
the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 UA W v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.6 provided the U.S. Supreme Court with the opportunity to
resolve the conflict between employers protecting women's reproduc-
tive health and violating Tide VII by discriminating on the basis of sex.
Instead, the Court's holding left industry with no means of shielding its
female workers from fetal toxics without violating Title VII, and with no
way of protecting itself against potential future liability.
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Johnson Controls.7  Part I explores the background of Title VII, its
amendment by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act s and the confusion of
the federal circuit courts on the proper application of Title VII for de-
termining the validity of fetal protection policies. Part II addresses the
facts of the case and the reasoning adopted by the Court. Part III fo-
cuses upon a general analysis of the case, discusses how the Court's de-
l. Marcelo L. Riffaud, Comment, Fetal Protection and UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Job
Openings for Barren Women Only, 58 FORDHAm L. REV. 843 (1990).
2. Employers who have adopted fetal protection policies include American Cyana-
mid Co., B. F. Goodrich Co., Dow Chemical Co., Environmental Protection & Aeration
Systems, Inc., Firestone, General Motors Corp., Monsanto, Olin Corp. and St. Joe Miner-
als Corp. See Riffaud, supra note 1, at 843 n.3.
3. Fertile women have been defined as all women who are not certifiably sterile. See
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 1196, 1200 (1991). See also Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982) (all women between ages 5 and 63 are as-
sumed fertile).
4. Several commentators have discussed fetal protection policies. See generally Mary
E. Becker, From Mullerv. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219 (1986);
Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection
with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981); Meredith L. Ja-
son, Note, International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Controlling Women's Equal Employment
Opportunities Through Fetal Protection Policies, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 453 (1990); Pendleton E.
Hamlet, Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal In the Wake of International Union,
UA W v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1110 (1990); Riffaud, supra note 1; Alan
C. Blanco, Comment, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VII - Rebutting the Procreation Pre-
sumption, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 755 (1985).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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cision may affect the future of businesses whose operations expose
workers to fetal-toxic hazards and comments on society's interest in the
problems the decision may create.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race, sex, national ori-
gin or religious beliefs in hiring and employment practices. 9 The provi-
sion was passed to protect racial minorities from historical barriers to
employment. 10 In an unsuccessful attempt to defeat the bill, Congress
added sex to the list of prohibitions against discrimination.1 1 Since the
bill's enactment, courts have vigorously defended women's rights
against job discrimination. 12 Under Title VII, two major claims of dis-
crimination have emerged: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 13
Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment claims arise in two situations. The first is facial
or overt discrimination, which occurs when an employer adopts a prac-
tice or policy of treating women differently from men on the basis of
sex. 14 The only affirmative defense available to an employer for an alle-
gation of facial discrimination is the existence of a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ).15 This statutorily created exception
permits discrimination on the basis of sex only when it is "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."16
The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the BFOQ excep-
tion. 17 The exception has been found to justify discrimination only if
the employer has a reasonable cause to believe "that all or substantially
all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
10. Hamlet, supra note 4, at 1112.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-
36 n. 15 (1977) (distinguishing disparate treatment from disparate impact claims). See also
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1265-68 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985)
(comparing disparate treatment and disparate impact theories).
14. Williams, supra note 4, at 668.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not bean unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business ....
Id.
16. Id.
17. See UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991) (citing Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 122-25 (1985)).
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the job involved."1 8 For example, the courts have allowed the BFOQ
because of safety concerns (the "safety exception"), but stressed that
such exceptions are applied only in narrow circumstances. 19 The safety
exception has been applied to cases in which there is a concern for the
safety of a third party that is indispensable to the business in question.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,20 the Court determined that hiring only male
guards in a maximum security men's prison was a BFOQ because the
ability to keep order and maintain security was essential to the job where
a woman's presence could pose a threat to herself, other security per-
sonnel and the inmates.2 1 Justice Marshall, in his minority opinion in
Dothard, emphasized that although he did not approve of the "sex dis-
crimination condoned by the majority," he felt that it was fortunate the
majority decision was carefully limited to the facts, namely, the "inhu-
man conditions in Alabama prisons."
'2 2
The Court also found a safety exception in Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell,23 a case arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.24 Affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that to estab-
lish a BFOQan employer must show, among other things, that age can
be legitimately used as a safety-related job qualification when it is not
practicable to deal individually with older employees. 25 Such job quali-
fication must be "reasonably necessary to the essence of his business
[as] here ... safe transportation. .".. -26 Accordingly, courts have up-
held facial sex discrimination in very limited situations.
-the second situation in which a disparate treatment claim arises is
pretextual discrimination. This occurs when an employer adopts a prac-
tice or policy that is facially neutral but the employee asserts that the




A disparate impact claim, by contrast, arises when an employer's
facially neutral policy has a disproportionately adverse effect on one
group (such as women) and not on another (such as men) and is not
18. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
20. Id. at 321.
21. Id. at 336-37.
22. Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 62.1-634.
25. Id. at 414.
26. Id. at 413 (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (1976)).
For cases failing to find a BFOQsafety exception, see Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472
U.S. 353 (1985) (mandatory retirement age for firefighters does not automatically consti-
tute a BFOQin an age discrimination case); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (telephone company failed to prove that heavy lifting and
other job requirements constituted a BFOQ).
27. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); Jason, supra note 4, at 460.
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justified by a business necessity. 28 This might occur, for example, when
an employer bases an employee's salary on past salary.2 9 A disparate
impact may thus be created in a world in which women have historically
been paid less than men.30
Unlike disparate treatment claims, the employer's motive is not sig-
nificant in disparate impact claims because the focus is on the conse-
quences of the employer's practices. 3 1 The only defense available to the
employer for a disparate impact claim is the judicially created business
necessity defense.3 2 Under the business necessity test, the employer
must prove that: (1) there is an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
the business; (2) the practice effectively carries out the business purpose
it is alleged to serve; and (3) there are no acceptable alternative policies
or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced, or at least equally accomplish it, with less disparate impact.38
Burdens of Proof
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 4 the Supreme Court set forth a
three step scheme for analyzing a disparate treatment case: (1) the em-
ployee's prima facie showing, (2) the employer's articulated reason and
(3) a pretext.3 5 The three steps address only the element of intent to
discriminate for which the employee bears the ultimate burden of prov-
ing that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.3 6 In es-
tablishing her prima facie case, the employee must show that she was
treated differently than a person from another gender or race, that the
employer intended to discriminate and that the difference in her treat-
ment was caused by the employer's intent to discriminate.3 7
An employer can defend an employee's disparate treatment charge
by arguing that there was a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the [plaintiff's] rejection."' 38 The employer must actually articulate a
reason for the action because a simple denial of the intent to discrimi-
nate will not suffice. 39 The "real" limit on what will be accepted as the
employer's reason is credibility.40 The less the reason is based on "job
28. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
29. Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theoy and Limits, 34
AM. U.L. REV. 799, 801 (1985).
30. Id.
31. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
32. Id. at 431 (establishing business necessity defense).
33. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
34. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
35. Id. at 802-04.
36. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.7, at 277 (2d ed.
1988).
37. Id. § 5.8, at 279-80.
38. Id. § 5.4.4, at 260 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 261.
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performance" or "legitimate needs of the business," the less likely it will
be accepted as the actual reason behind the allegedly discriminatory
treatment.41 To the extent that the employer can introduce rebutal evi-
dence sufficient to overcome the presumption that discrimination was
the reason, a question of fact is created as to whether the employer's
intent was discriminatory or based on a legitimate reason. 42
Once this question of fact is raised, the employee may surrebut the
employer's evidence by focusing on more specific elements of the em-
ployer's behavior than she raised in her prima fade case. She may allege
that the reason asserted by the employer was merely a pretext to hide
the real reason, which was to intentionally discriminate.43 In doing so,
the employee may show that the employer's employment practices and
policies conform to a general pattern of discrimination against a pro-
tected group.
44
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,45 the U.S. Supreme Court held that once
an employee showed a particular employment practice had an adverse
impact upon members of a protected class (thereby establishing a prima
facie case), the employer had the burden of showing that the employ-
ment practice has a "manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion." 46 The Court stated that "[i]f an employment practice that
operates to exclude [members of a protected class] cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. '4
7
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,48 the Supreme Court addressed
the allocation of the burden of proof in a disparate impact case.49 In
that case, a group of plaintiffs claimed that several of the employee se-
lection practices had an adverse impact upon their likelihood of being
hired or promoted.5 0 Although the selection practices used by the em-
ployer were facially fair, they had the practical effect of disqualifying a
disproportionate number of minority group members. The Court held
that an employer carries the burden in a disparate impact case of offer-
ing evidence of business necessity for its employment practice.5 1
Under Wards Cove, once an employee established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the employer merely needed to offer evidence that the
"challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employ-
ment goals of the employer." 52 The employer was not required to-
prove that the challenged practice was "essential" or "indispensable" to
41. Id.
42. Id. at 261-62.
43. Id. § 5.4.5, at 262.
44. Id. at 263.
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id. at 431.
48. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
49. Id. at 656.
50. Id. at 647-48.
51. Id. at 659.
52. Id.
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the employer's business.53 Once such evidence was offered, the em-
ployee carried the ultimate burden of proving that a challenged practice
was either not justified by business necessity or should be considered a
pretext for discrimination for some other reason.5 4 Wards Cove further
held that where plaintiffs sought to prove discrimination based upon a
disparate impact theory, they must identify the specific employment
practice that had the effect of disfavoring them in the selection
process.
55
On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (CRA).56 The Act reverses parts of recent Supreme
Court decisions, including Wards Cove, making it more attractive for em-
ployees to bring discrimination suits by providing increased damages
and jury trials. 57 The CRA addresses Wards Cove in three significant re-
spects. First, the CRA's express purpose is to restore and codify the
concepts of "business necessity" and "job relatedness" as used by the
Supreme Court in Griggs and in other decisions prior to Wards Cove.58
Under the CRA, if the employee is able to establish a prima facie case,
the employer in a disparate impact case can prevail only by demonstrat-
ing either that the challenged practice does not in fact cause the dispa-
rate impact or by proving that the practice is "job related" and justified
by "business necessity."
'5 9
Second, the legislation includes an exception to the Wards Cove re-
quirement that plaintiffs must identify the specific employment practice
that caused the discrimination.6 0 Under the CRA, plaintiffs can treat the
entire decision-making process as one employment practice if they
demonstrate that the elements of the employer's decision-making pro-
cess cannot be separated for purposes of analysis. 6 ' Finally, the CRA
reinforces the principle that claims for disparate treatment and claims
for disparate impact must be treated as distinct by expressly prohibiting
an employer from raising the business necessity defense to a claim for
intentional discrimination. 6 2
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Prior to 1978, there were mixed views concerning how childbearing
or pregnancy discrimination fit into a Title VII analysis. During the
early 1970s, federal courts generally interpreted sex discrimination laws
broadly to include protection of pregnant women and those with
53. Id.
54. Id. at 659, 660.
55. Id. at 657.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071
[hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1991].
57. Id. at 1072-73.
58. Id. at 1071.
59. Id. at 1074.
60. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
61. Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 56, at 1074.
62. Id. at 1075.
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childbearing capacity. 63 In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) adopted guidelines stating that Title VII prohib-
ited policies disadvantaging women because of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions.64 Lower courts interpreted these guidelines
to mean that pregnancy discrimination constituted sex discrimination,
which could only be justified by the BFOQ exception.
65
Despite the view generally held by the EEOC and the courts, the
Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 66 held that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy did not fall within sex discrimination under
Title VII.67 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned that ex-
cluding pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer's disability in-
surance program had not been shown to have a disparate impact on
women.68 The Court characterized the program as covering all risks
shared by men and women and providing an insurance package worth as
much to women as to men.69 The exclusion of pregnancy was merely
the elimination of an extra disability unique to women.7 0 In response to
Gilbert and similar other cases, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act (PDA).7 1 The PDA amended the definition of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII to include discrimination "on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... 72
C. Application of Title VII and the PDA to Fetal Protection Policies
Prior to UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and since the passage of Title
VII, there had been only three reported circuit court cases in which a
plaintiff used Title VII as the basis for attacking fetal protection poli-
cies.73 An amicus brief filed in Johnson noted that these cases "devised
63. See Williams, supra note 4, at 673-74 n. 193 (listing pregnancy discrimination cases
prior to the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1991). The EEOC guidelines state: "A written orunwrit-
ten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employ-
ees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is a prima facie
violation of title VII." Id.
65. See Williams, supra note 4, at 673-74 (identifying decisions during the 1970s as the
first phase of pregnancy-based discrimination jurisprudence under Title VII).
66. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
67. Id. at 136.
68. Id. at 138.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 139.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
72. Id. The PDA provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other per-
sons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
Id.
73. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986
(5th Cir. 1982). A number of early cases were settled, see Williams, supra note 4, at 642
n.l 1. See also Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (early fetal
protection case, it was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds). For a case decided following
the Seventh Circuit decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
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convoluted methodologies" in order to treat fetal protection policies as
"gender neutral" practices with only an incidental disparate impact on
women,74 thus allowing employers to defend their fetal protection poli-
cies by using the business necessity defense.
75
In Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital,76 the plaintiff argued that she
had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that
her employer's facially neutral policy of terminating pregnant x-ray tech-
nicians burdened women's employment opportunities without affecting
those of men. The plaintiff also contended that the hospital had failed
to establish a valid business necessity defense for the policy. 77 Zuniga,
the first female x-ray technician to be hired at the hospital, was informed
that if she became pregnant, she would have to resign or be terminated,
and she would not be entitled to maternity leave. 78 She subsequently
became pregnant and was told to resign or be fired.
7 9
The Fifth Circuit, noting that the PDA did not apply because the
termination occurred prior to its effective date,80 used a benefit/burden
analysis in ruling that Zuniga had established a prima facie case of sex
discrimination.8 1 Next, the court found that the hospital could have uti-
lized an "alternative, less discriminatory means of achieving its business
purpose." 8 2 By examining the hospital's leave of absence policy, the
court found that a leave of absence could be granted for, among other
things, family health,8 3 and to prevent "fetal death, congenital abnor-
malities, small head, mongolian, or missing organs ... ."84 The court
thus held that the same reason cited by the hospital for terminating
Zuniga could have justified giving her a leave of absence.8 5 Because the
hospital failed to use a less discriminatory alternative, its business pur-
pose was determined a pretext and the business necessity defense
failed. 86 The court declined to consider whether avoidance of tort lia-
bility might constitute a business necessity, but acknowledged that
"[a]lthough concern over fetal health alone is arguably not the province
of the employer, but of the mother" a tort suit brought by a deformed
child could be a financial burden, seriously disrupting the safe and effi-
1989), see Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying BFOQ
standard to fetal protection policies).
74. See Brief of the State of California and the California Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1215) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
75. Id.
76. 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 989. The court did not consider the issue of whether the impact of the
hospital's policy was a form of disparate treatment.
78. Id. at 988.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 989 n.6.
81. Id. at 991.
82. Id. at 992.
83. Id. at 992, 993.
84. Id at 993.
85. Id. at 993-94.
86. Id. at 994.
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cient operation of the business.8 7
Two weeks after the decision in Zuniga, the Fourth Circuit decided
Wright v. Olin Corp..88 Wright was the first fetal protection policy case
reviewed after the effective date of the PDA. The plaintiffs alleged that
Olin's fetal protection policy was a pervasive effort to limit womens' ad-
vancement or seniority.8 9 The allegations appeared to resemble a "clas-
sic case" of covert discrimination under disparate treatment as applied
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,90 which Olin disputed by contending
that the plaintiffs failed to prove disparate treatment as they failed to
prove that the business reason-fetal protection-was pretextual.9 1
The plaintiffs went on to argue that McDonnell Douglas did not apply.
They claimed that their undisputed evidence showed an overt intent to
discriminate on the part of Olin because the program had a manifestly
adverse effect upon the employment opportunities of women only.
9 2
The conflict between the parties was whether Olin had the burden of
articulating a nondiscriminatory business reason for the fetal protection
policy or instead had the burden of proving an affirmative defense by
the BFOQ or business necessity.
93
The Fourth Circuit conceded its difficulty in making the facts of this
case fit into a Title VII analysis but concluded that the disparate impact/
business necessity analysis was the most appropriate standard to ap-
ply.94 The court ruled that the disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis was
inappropriate as it would prevent the employer from asserting a busi-
ness justification defense that it would otherwise be entitled to assert
under Title VII.95
There were obvious policy reasons for the court's decision to apply
the disparate impact/business necessity analysis. The court justified its
decision on the conclusion that the distinction between facial discrimi-
nation and disparate impact should not prevent an employer from rais-
ing fetal safety as a justification for discriminating on the basis of
pregnancy.96 The court believed the defenses were distinguishable,
noting that the business necessity defense was "obviously wider" than
the BFOQ defense.97 The court recognized the social implications of
the problem, but noted that any answers are the subject of national pol-
icy, which has not been addressed by Congress.98 This case was the
87. Id. at 992 & n.10.
88. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 1179.
90. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
91. Id. at 1183; Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 5.
92. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1183.
93. Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 6 & n.3 (stating that after Wards Cove, the business
defense is no longer an affirmative defense for disparate impact discrimination).
94. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1184-85 & n.21.
95. Id. at 1185 n.21. The court also rejected the PDA as "conceptually unsound." Id.
at 1184 n.17.
96. Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 7.
97. Idl at 8 (citing Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21).
98. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1188.
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court's attempt to "divine" congressional intent.9 9 Hence, because the
BFOQ is such a narrow defense that could not be established here,
10 0
the court had to look to a broader statutory framework and judicial
interpretation. 101
Two years after Wright, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the fetal pro-
tection issue in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital.10 2 Shelby Memorial
Hospital fired Hayes, an x-ray technician, after she advised her supervi-
sor of her pregnancy.' 0 3 The hospital claimed that Hayes was termi-
nated because exposure to ionizing radiation might harm the fetus and
because the hospital was unable to find alternative employment for
her.10 4 Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Wright, the Eleventh Circuit recog-
nized that under Title VII, as amended by the PDA, a policy based on
pregnancy cannot be deemed neutral. 10 5 The court initially determined
Hayes was a facial discrimination case,10 6 finding that if an employer can-
not overcome the burden of proving that its policy is not facially dis-
criminatory, its only defense is the BFOQ' 0 7 Therefore, the court held
that unless the hospital could show a direct relationship between the
policy and a fertile or pregnant woman's actual ability to perform her
job, the hospital's defense would fail.10 8 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
similar to the Wright court, looked to the business necessity defense to
find a lower standard than that required to prove a BFOQ.1 9 It sought
to find a way to make the employer's pregnancy-based discrimination a
facially neutral policy with an "incidental" disparate impact." 0 The
court allowed the hospital to rebut an employer's prima facie case of
facial discrimination by proving "that a policy applying only to women
or pregnant women employees is justified on a scientific basis and is not
necessary to protect the offspring of male employees .... "" I In so
proving, the court reasoned, the employer has proven that the policy is
neutral in that it protects offspring of all employees.1 2 Nevertheless,
because the policy has a disproportionate impact on women, even if the
employer rebuts the presumption, the employee still has an automatic
prima facie case of disparate impact.' 1 3 However, under the disparate
impact analysis, the employer has the "wider" business necessity
defense.
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that avoidance of
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1186 n.21.
101. Id. at 1188.
102. 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 1546.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1547.
106. Id. at 1547-48.
107. Id. at 1549.
108. Id.
109. See Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 10.
110. Id.




U.A. W, V JOHNSON CONTROLS
potential tort liability is a business necessity defense.' 14 It stated that
potential liability is too contingent and broad to be considered a busi-
ness necessity. 15 Although an employer could be justified in dismissing
an employee for not complying with safety procedures designed to pro-
tect the employee or the employee's offspring, the court noted that the
focus is on health and safety and not possible litigation.
16
The circuit courts had stretched to find that fetal protection policies
should be analyzed under a disparate impact theory affording employers
the "less narrow" business necessity defense. It was at this stage that




Johnson Controls, Inc. (Johnson) is a manufacturer of automotive
and specialty batteries of which lead is a principle component.1 8 Be-
cause of the toxicity of lead, Johnson has a comprehensive hygiene pro-
gram for controlling employees' lead exposure and absorption.
Further, in response to the mounting evidence of the significant health
risks of exposure to lead, and at the specific urging of its plant physi-
cians and outside medical consultants, Johnson, in 1982, adopted a fetal
protection policy designed to protect unborn children and their mothers
from the harmful effects of lead exposure. 19 The policy excluded wo-
men of childbearing capacity from working in environments in which
their blood-lead level could rise above thirty micrograms.' 2 0 It pro-
vided that fertile or pregnant women would not be hired for, or be al-
lowed to transfer into, jobs in which the lead exposure was excessive,
nor would they be hired for, or be allowed to transfer into, any position
from which they could be promoted to a position with excessive expo-
sure to lead.' 2 ' Female employees were required to medically docu-
ment their inability to have children before they would be considered
for these positions.' 2 2 The women removed from their jobs as a result
of the policy were transferred to other positions at Johnson without loss
of pay or benefits.' 2 3 International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, United Auto
Workers and a group of individual employees (UAW), brought a class
114. Id. at 1552-53 n.15.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
118. Id. at 1199.
119. Johnson adopted the policy after research showed that a woman's exposure to
lead can harm a fetus at a lower blood-lead level than that which causes harm in an adult
and could injure the fetus even before a woman knows she is pregnant. Id. at 1199-1200.
120. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871,876 (7th Cir. 1989), revud, 111 S. Ct.
1196 (1991).
121. Id. at 877.
122. Id. at 876 n.8.
123. Id. at 876.
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action suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, alleging that Johnson's fetal protection policy violated Title
VII by discriminating on the basis of sex.
124
B. Lower Court Rulings
The district court granted summary judgment for Johnson, apply-
ing the business necessity test.125 The Seventh Circuit affirmed en banc
the district court's summary judgment in favor ofJohnson. 126 The ma-
jority directly acknowledged the decisions in Wright and Hayes holding
that the business necessity defense can be appropriately applied to fetal
protection policy cases under Title VII. 1 27 The circuit court concluded
that Johnson Controls had shown that a fetal protection policy was a
reasonable necessity for industrial safety.
128
The Seventh Circuit also analyzed the fetal protection policy under
the BFOQ defense. Citing Dothard v. Rawlinson,129 the court recognized
that in resolving whether a BFOQ was valid depended on the employer
reasonably believing that all or substantially all fertile women would be
unable to perform the job safely and efficiently. 130 The court concluded
that Johnson's policy was supported by a BFOQ defense.' 3 ' With this
decision, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit court to hold that a
fetal protection policy could be upheld as a BFOQ.
3 2
C. The Majority
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in
UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 13 3 which reversed the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision. The Court concluded that Johnson could not establish that its
policy met the BFOQexception to Title VII. 13 4 The opinion was based
on the plain language of the PDA, which prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against female employees because of their ability to become
pregnant.13 5 The Court interpreted the PDA as providing that a policy
based on pregnancy is facially discriminatory and the employer's only
defense is a BFOQ.
3 6
The Court began with a departure from the views of Wright and
Hayes. Those courts had reasoned that the challenged fetal protection
124. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988), af'd, 886
F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
125. Id. at 316-17.
126. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 887.
128. Id. at 897-98.
129. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
130. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 897.
131. Id. at 898.
132. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991).
133. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
134. Id. at 1198, 1207.
135. Id. at 1198, 1203.
136. Id. at 1203-04 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 684 (1983)).
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policies were facially neutral.1 3 7 Employers were therefore allowed to
justify their policies under the business necessity defense. 13 8 The Court
established that Johnson's policy was not neutral because it did not ap-
ply equally to men and women. 13 9 Men were allowed to choose whether
they wanted to work in ajob that was a risk to their reproductive health.
The Court also noted that, even though Johnson's policy may not have
had a discriminatory intent, that was not sufficient to convert the overtly
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory
effect. 140
The Court supported its finding that Johnson's policy was facially
discriminatory by using the language of the PDA to show that, for all
Title VII purposes, discrimination because of pregnancy is facial dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. 14 1 Because Johnson chose to treat all
female employees as if they could become pregnant, the Court con-
cluded the policy demonstrated such discrimination.
Next, the Court turned to the issue of whether Johnson should be
allowed to discriminate on the basis of sex by proving that its fetal pro-
tection policy was a BFOQ. For this purpose, the Court reiterated the
restrictive scope of the BFOQas applied in its prior decisions in Dothard
v. Rawlinson142 and Western Air Linesj, Inc. v. Criswell.143 Johnson argued
that its fetal protection policy fit into the safety exception, a judicially
recognized BFOQ.14 4 Refusing to expand the safety exception to fetal
protection policies, the Court reasoned that neither conceived nor un-
conceived fetuses can be considered third parties indispensable to the
battery manufacturing business. 145 The Court cited Judge Easter-
brook's dissenting opinion in the Seventh Circuit's decision in which he
observed that it was a play on words to say that "the job" atJohnson to
manufacture batteries without risk to the fetus was the same as "the job"
at Western Airlines to fly-planes without crashing. 14 6 The Court limited
the safety exception to those situations where sex or pregnancy affected
the employees' ability to perform their jobs. 14 7 The Court disposed of
the concern for employers' tort liability raised by Justice White in his
concurring opinion by stating that, if an employer fully informs the wo-
man of the risks involved in the job, and has not acted negligently, there
is but a remote chance that the employer will be held liable. 14 8 Based
on these findings, the Court ruled that Johnson failed to establish a
137. Id. at 1203.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1203-04.
141. Id. at 1203.
142. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
143. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
144. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 1205.
145. Id. at 1206.
146. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1207 (citing UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 913 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting)).
147. Id. at 1206.
148. Id. at 1208.
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BFOQ and therefore its policy violated Title VII as amended by the
PDA.
D. The Concurring Opinions
There were two concurring opinions in the Johnson case. First, in a
brief opinion, Justice Scalia elaborated on Judge Easterbrook's view by
saying that not only was Johnson prohibited from excluding fertile wo-
men from jobs, but that Title VII also gives employees the power to
make employment decisions that affect their families. 149 He also ad-
dressed the question of whether an employer's compliance under Title
VII is required even if it violates state tort law by stating that it is reason-
able to believe that Title VII has "accommodated" state tort law
through the BFOQ exception.'
50
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ken-
nedy, wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the majority
that Johnson's fetal protection policy was facially discriminating and
constituted a violation of Title VII unless a BFOQ exception could be
proven.1 51 Justice White's opinion, however, criticized the majority for
reading the BFOQ defense so narrowly that it could never be used to
warrant a sex-specific fetal protection policy. 15 2 According to Justice
White, the majority's interpretation of the BFOQ defense meant that
even pregnant women could not be prevented from working in areas of
high exposure to chemicals toxic to their fetuses.'
5 3
Justice White argued that avoiding substantial tort liability is ajusti-
fication for preventing women from working in certain jobs. 15 4 He also
voiced his displeasure with the majority's view that employers have little
to fear from liability suits if they inform women of the risk, and if the
employer has not acted negligently. He found this to be of little comfort
to employers, since: (1) it is not clear whether Title VII preempts state
tort liability; and (2) even though employers may avoid claims brought
by employees, they cannot escape the claims brought by injured chil-
dren. 155 Justice White considered the general rule that parents cannot
waive their children's rights to sue because of the parents' own negli-
gence. 156 Every state currently allows children born alive to sue in tort
for prenatal injuries caused by the negligence of third parties.' 57 Fur-
thermore, an increasing number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery
for torts causing prenatal injuries prior to conception.
158
In his opinion, Justice White argued that the majority's limiting of
149. Id. at 1216 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1210 (White, J, concurring).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1214.
154. Id. at 1210.
155. Id. at 1211.
156. Id. at 1211.
157. Id. at 1210-11.
158. Id.
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the safety exception to those situations where sex or pregnancy affected
the employees' ability to perform their jobs did not support. its conclu-
sion that a fetal protection policy could not be justified as a BFOQ.159
Justice White asserted that Dothard and Criswell made it clear that avoid-
ing substantial safety risks to third parties was not only an inherent part
of an employee's ability to perform a job, but also an inherent part of
the usual operations of an employer's business. 160 He pointed out that
protecting fetuses while performing the duties of battery manufacturing
was as legitimate a concern as was the safety of prison inmates or airline
passengers.' 6 1 Furthermore, Justice White noted that the legislative
history of Title VII gives examples of permissible sex discrimination,
and in none of those situations did sex interfere with the employee's
ability to perform the job.' 6 2 Disagreeing with the majority's claim that
the PDA restricted the use of the BFOQ defense, Justice White con-
tended that Congress did not intend for the PDA to alter an employer's
defenses under Title VII. Congress intended to redefine sex discrimina-
tion to include pregnancy and childbirth but not to change, in any other
way, how Title VII is applied to sex discrimination. 163
Although he disagreed with the majority's narrow application of the
BFOQdefense, Justice White concluded thatJohnson's fetal protection
policy reached too far in excluding all fertile women, regardless of age,
and in excluding women from jobs that might advance into positions in
which the duties require high quantities of lead exposure.164 He also
agreed thatJohnson had not shown that its policy was reasonably neces-
sary to its usual business operations, as Johnson had incurred no in-
crease in fetal risk or associated costs since the implementation of its
fetal protection policy in 1982.165
III. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in Johnson concluded that sex-specific fetal
protection policies are not legal under Title VII unless the safety of third
parties is related to job performance and is relevant to an employee's
ability to perform the assigned tasks. This decision has the effect of say-
ing that under Title VII, employers are allowed to consider only produc-
tion-related concerns and are prohibited from recognizing external
societal/moral judgments in determining how businesses should oper-
ate. The opinion is inconsistent with relevant precedents, statutory lan-
guage and the legislative history. It also exhibits a total disregard for
the employer's legal duty and society's interest in the health of its mem-
bers. Protecting third parties, including fetuses, from serious health and
159. Id. at 1213.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1214 n.8. The examples were a female nurse hired to care for an elderly
woman, an all-male baseball team, a masseur and a washroom attendant. Id.
163. Id. at 1214.
164. Id. at 1215.
165. Id.
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safety risks arising directly out of the manufacturing process is reason-
ably necessary to a responsible employer's normal operation and thus
can constitute a BFOQin narrow circumstances.
A. Relevant Precedents, Statutory Language and Legislative History
Each circuit court considering the issue prior to Johnson has strug-
gled with the limits on the BFOQas a defense to facially discriminatory
fetal protection policies. In Wright, the court was admittedly attempting
to find the "probable" congressional intent in the absence of specific
congressional expression regarding fetal protection policies.' 66 In or-
der to find those answers, the court had to devise a way to instead apply
a business necessity defense, providing more latitude to explore the
conflict between fetal safety and sex discrimination. In Hayes, although
the court acknowledged the presumption that the fetal protection policy
was facially discriminatory and ruled that the district court's findings of
fact were sufficient to support a holding of facial discrimination, it al-
lowed the employer to rebut the presumption of a disparate impact in
order to be "completely fair" to the employer.' 6 7 Thus, it was clear
from these cases that the courts were reaching for a reasonable solution
to fetal protection policies.
The Supreme Court in Johnson rejected the precedent set by the cir-
cuit courts and essentially disposed of the disparate impact analysis and
business necessity defense for fetal protection policies, leaving only a
BFOQ defense, which the court applies only under the most extreme
circumstances. The majority in Johnson also pointed to its decisions in
Dothard and Criswell to support its restrictive interpretation of the safety
exception as a BFOQ. As Justice White indicated in his concurring
opinion, protecting fetal safety while performing the duties of battery
manufacturing is as legitimate a concern as is the safety of prison in-
mates and airline passengers. 168 In the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Johnson, the court acknowledged that the safety exception in Dothard was
extremely limited because more was at stake than a woman's decision to
accept the risks of employment in a maximum security male prison.
169
However, the court felt that there was similarly more at stake than a
woman's decision to work in a high lead exposure such as the "intellec-
tual and physical development" of her unborn child.1 7 0 The Seventh
Circuit feared that a female employee could somehow "rationally dis-
count" the ultimate risk, believing that her baby would not be harmed
from lead exposure.' 7 1 Therefore, the court held that since "more is at
stake" than the woman's right to make an employment decision, Dothard
served as support for the conclusion that a fetal protection policy consti-
166. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189 (4th Cir. 1982).
167. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1984).
168. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1213 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring).




U.A. W. V. JOHNSON CONTROLS
tuted a BFO. 1 72
The Supreme Court's majority decision also found that the PDA
established a BFOQ standard that all pregnant employees must be
treated the same as other employees unless they differ in their ability or
inability to perform the required work. 173 As Justice White argued, the
PDA simply amended the definition of sex under Title VII without elimi-
nating or altering the BFOQdefense. 174 The PDA merely clarified Title
VII to make it clear that pregnancy was included in the protection pro-
vided under Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions. 175 The legislative
history of the PDA described pregnancy and related conditions as part
of the definition of sex under Title VII, but "it does not change the
application of Title VII to sex discrimination in any other way."' 176 The
House report also stated that the "pregnancy-based" distinctions would
be applied the same way as other proscribed acts of sex discrimina-
tion. 177 Furthermore, the majority failed to offer any explanation of
why Congress might have intended a measure, designed in part to pro-
tect fetal health, to be construed as requiring an employer to expose the
unborn child to toxic hazards known to cause irreparable brain dam-
age.178 As the Supreme Court counseled in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
"[w]e need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we inter-
pret a statute."
179
B. Employer's Legal Duty
Johnson has a legal duty to avoid injuries to the unborn child that
result directly from the toxic hazards of Johnson's own manufacturing
operations. The majority acknowledged that over forty states now rec-
ognize a right to recover for prenatal injuries based either on negligence
or wrongful death.' 80 What the majority failed to acknowledge is that
the child itself, if born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to
bring an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries.'18 There are
also a small number of courts that have allowed a cause of action for
recovery by children who have not yet even been conceived when the
harmful contact with the mother occurs. 182 Contrary to the majority's
suggestion that an employer might discharge this duty simply by cau-
172. Id. at 898.
173. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.
174. Id. at 1213 (White, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1214 (quoting S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1977))(empha-
sis omitted).
177. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4752).
178. Brief for Respondent at 34, UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989) (No. 89-1215).
179. Id.
180. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
181. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 at 368
(5th ed. 1984).
182. Id. at 369 & nn.24-26.
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tioning its employees about the risks and leaving the choice to the em-
ployee, the employer's duty runs directly to the fetus or potential fetus.
It is difficult to estimate Johnson's exposure to tort liability. How-
ever, given today's litigious society, it is an important consideration. 183
As an example, it was mass tort suits that drove the asbestos industry
into bankruptcy.18 4 For Johnson and other similarly situated compa-
nies, compensatory and punitive damages awarded in tort suits brought
by lead-poisoned children could easily put them out of business. This
decision makes that possibility more of a reality.
C. Society's Interest in the Health of its Members
Whether society's interest is characterized as fulfilling reasonably
perceived legal duties or simply as promoting the overriding interest in
the health and safety of children, properly implemented fetal protection
policies serve a greater public good than merely protecting employers
from lawsuits.18 5 Society has an unquestionable interest in the health of
its members, including children.18 6 An employer's adoption of policies
protective of the health of its employees and their families, consumers
or persons living near its facility is a social good that should be en-
couraged. As the country becomes increasingly burdened by industry's
hazardous products, by-products and wastes, the government has in-
creased its requirement, at a substantial expense to industry, that
health-fetal health included-become a corporate concern.
18 7
It seems easy to understand how Johnson's policy could be con-
strued as the offensive intrusion of "reproductive police" into the work-
place.18 8 The majority's holding in Johnson may be read to support that
view by finding that fetal protection policies violate Title VII by not al-
lowing women to freely choose whether or not to work around fetal tox-
ics. 18 9 The wrong choice, however, may create cause for public
concern. For example, at least one out of eight women who. had chil-
dren while working in high-lead environments gave birth to a child suf-
fering from lead poisoning. 190 Families with lead-poisoned children
may be required to turn to a "deep pocket" such as government or in-
dustry for help. 191 Just as babies of cocaine addicts require hundreds of
thousands of dollars to survive, lead-poisoned children with irreversible
mental retardation require expensive care and frequently institutional-
ization at taxpayer or corporate expense.
192
183. Id. at 905.
184. Id.
185. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984).
186. See Williams, supra note 4, at 645.
187. Id.
188. Arlynn L. Presser, Should "Fetal Protection" Policies Be Upheld? Yes: For Risky Busi-
nesses, A.B.A. J., June 1990 at 38.
189. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991).
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CONCLUSION
InJohnson, the United States Supreme Court missed an opportunity
to modernize Title VII by broadening the BFOQdefense into a tool for
balancing rights and, in the instant case, by balancing sexual equality in
the workplace against threats to the health and safety of unborn or un-
conceived children from toxic manufacturing operations. If fetal protec-
tion policies are strictly prohibited, as analyzed under this Court's
version of a BFOQ standard, many companies will have to abandon
these policies or go out of business as a result of substantial tort liability.
Clearly, companies will have no defense for Title VII allegations under
this restrictive interpretation of the BFOQbecause they will not be able
to prove that the women excluded cannot perform the physical tasks of
their jobs.
Further, this decision equates an employer's efforts to honor its per-
ceived legal obligation with a concern merely for the balance sheet. The
fairness of forcing an employer knowingly to expose a fetus to its haz-
ardous substances and processes and then be required to compensate
for the consequences should be examined. The consequences of a tort
suit could be financially devastating, seriously disrupting the safe and
efficient operations of the business.
1 93
Finally, this decision, if carried out, will create a risk to society. If
and when a business discontinues operations, for whatever reason, the
burden will be shifted to society to establish programs to train and main-
tain handicapped children or to teach children to cope with the mental
and physical injuries which could result from lead exposure or other fe-
tal-toxic hazards in the workplace.
Shirley A. Levy
193. See Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982).
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